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| The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy |
| 2006-03-29 |
| Severe EFL from Froeign Policy Today, for the first time in almost 50 years, the United States stands on the verge of attaining nuclear primacy. It will probably soon be possible for the United States to destroy the long-range nuclear arsenals of Russia or China with a first strike. This dramatic shift in the nuclear balance of power stems from a series of improvements in the United States' nuclear systems, the precipitous decline of Russia's arsenal, and the glacial pace of modernization of China's nuclear forces. Unless Washington's policies change or Moscow and Beijing take steps to increase the size and readiness of their forces, Russia and China -- and the rest of the world -- will live in the shadow of U.S. nuclear primacy for many years to come. Is the United States intentionally pursuing nuclear primacy? Or is primacy an unintended byproduct of intra-Pentagon competition for budget share or of programs designed to counter new threats from terrorists and so-called rogue states? Motivations are always hard to pin down, but the weight of the evidence suggests that Washington is, in fact, deliberately seeking nuclear primacy. For one thing, U.S. leaders have always aspired to this goal. And the nature of the changes to the current arsenal and official rhetoric and policies support this conclusion. Washington's pursuit of nuclear primacy helps explain its missile-defense strategy, for example. Critics of missile defense argue that a national missile shield, such as the prototype the United States has deployed in Alaska and California, would be easily overwhelmed by a cloud of warheads and decoys launched by Russia or China. They are right: even a multilayered system with land-, air-, sea-, and space-based elements, is highly unlikely to protect the United States from a major nuclear attack. But they are wrong to conclude that such a missile-defense system is therefore worthless -- as are the supporters of missile defense who argue that, for similar reasons, such a system could be of concern only to rogue states and terrorists and not to other major nuclear powers. What both of these camps overlook is that the sort of missile defenses that the United States might plausibly deploy would be valuable primarily in an offensive context, not a defensive one -- as an adjunct to a U.S. first-strike capability, not as a standalone shield. If the United States launched a nuclear attack against Russia (or China), the targeted country would be left with a tiny surviving arsenal -- if any at all. At that point, even a relatively modest or inefficient missile-defense system might well be enough to protect against any retaliatory strikes, because the devastated enemy would have so few warheads and decoys left. During the Cold War, Washington relied on its nuclear arsenal not only to deter nuclear strikes by its enemies but also to deter the Warsaw Pact from exploiting its conventional military superiority to attack Western Europe. It was primarily this latter mission that made Washington rule out promises of "no first use" of nuclear weapons. Now that such a mission is obsolete and the United States is beginning to regain nuclear primacy, however, Washington's continued refusal to eschew a first strike and the country's development of a limited missile-defense capability take on a new, and possibly more menacing, look. The most logical conclusions to make are that a nuclear-war-fighting capability remains a key component of the United States' military doctrine and that nuclear primacy remains a goal of the United States. Ultimately, the wisdom of pursuing nuclear primacy must be evaluated in the context of the United States' foreign policy goals. The United States is now seeking to maintain its global preeminence, which the Bush administration defines as the ability to stave off the emergence of a peer competitor and prevent weaker countries from being able to challenge the United States in critical regions such as the Persian Gulf. If Washington continues to believe such preeminence is necessary for its security, then the benefits of nuclear primacy might exceed the risks. But if the United States adopts a more restrained foreign policy -- for example, one premised on greater skepticism of the wisdom of forcibly exporting democracy, launching military strikes to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and aggressively checking rising challengers -- then the benefits of nuclear primacy will be trumped by the dangers. |
| Posted by:Nimble Spemble |
| #5 I agree with the liberals, lets reduce the size of our nuke arsenal. Send a few to NKOR, Iran, Syria,Sudan,Somalia,maybe even a couple to pakiland, just to let them know they arent towing the line. By the time we're done, whammo! hardly any nuclear arsenal left at all. |
| Posted by: bigjim-ky 2006-03-29 23:39 |
| #4 Unless Washington's policies change or Moscow and Beijing take steps to increase the size and readiness of their forces, Russia and China -- and the rest of the world -- will live in the shadow of U.S. nuclear primacy for many years to come. They say this like it's a bad thing. |
| Posted by: xbalanke 2006-03-29 21:54 |
| #3 Article: But if the United States adopts a more restrained foreign policy -- for example, one premised on greater skepticism of the wisdom of forcibly exporting democracy, launching military strikes to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and aggressively checking rising challengers -- then the benefits of nuclear primacy will be trumped by the dangers. Let me get this straight - a policy of forcibly exporting democracy, launching military strikes to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and aggressively checking rising challengers is made safer if we have a weaker nuclear force and/or missile defense? But that same nuclear force and missile defense is what we use to deter enemy nuclear attacks - if they hit us with nukes, we will obliterate them. And the thought of nuclear alliances is a little naive - does anyone seriously think China will trade Beijing for DC in Russia's behalf? Heck, China won't even trade Beijing for DC to get Taiwan back. In fact, the disintegration of Russia due to nuclear attack would be an excuse for China get back all the territory it lost to Russia during the 18th and 19th centuries. Radiation eventually goes away - just look at Hiroshima and Nagasaki just a few years after the atomic bombings. |
| Posted by: Zhang Fei 2006-03-29 19:10 |
| #2 Amazing isn't it? But at least it's got the Ruskies and ChiComs talking to eachother about coordinating strategic programs again. |
| Posted by: Nimble Spemble 2006-03-29 18:49 |
| #1 More mush from the liberals at Foreign Policy. What is it with their obsession with unilateral American nuclear disarmament? |
| Posted by: Zhang Fei 2006-03-29 18:47 |