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| Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia |
| Al-Qaeda priorities in the North Caucasus |
| 2006-05-05 |
| An analysis by Agentura.Ru Studies and Research Centre (ASRC) how the role played by Al Qaeda an global jihad movement in the North Caucasus has changed over the last years. Compiled by experts from the Institute of Defense and Security Studies (Singapore) and Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (Israel). First published in Novaya Gazeta. All experts agree that Al-Qaeda's presence in any given region is signified by public beheading of hostages, terrorist attacks on Western targets, and the use of suicide bombers (shakhids). All this evident is in Iraq. Experts at the IDSS (Institute of Defense and Security Studies in Singapore) say it will all be evident in Afghanistan as well in 2006. They point out that the Taliban wasn't exactly skillful from the military standpoint in the past, but interaction with foreigners enabled them too hone their skills. Some sources imply that Taliban activists are split into of groups 10 to 25 men each, and each group includes an Al-Qaeda member or a mercenary from the Persian Gulf countries who teaches the rest the tactics deployed in Iraq. Coordination of terrorist attacks has improved greatly as a result. The Taliban started using suicide bombers in late 2005. These tactics were largely unknown in Afghanistan before September 11, because "istishhad" (the eagerness to become a martyr) was alien to the Afghan culture. Not any more. Beheading hostages is becoming a widespread tactic in Afghanistan. The Taliban is using these executions to emphasize its contacts with the global jihad movement. All this is essentially absent in Chechnya. Chechen terrorists don't use suicide bombers nowadays (the most recent terrorist attacks of that kind took place in 2004), and don't attack American or British targets. Al-Qaeda leaders don't call Chechnya the third battlefield of the global jihad (after Iraq and Afghanistan). Moreover, Russian secret services have never uncovered any evidence that any act of terror in Russia was organized under Al-Qaeda's direct command. And yet, the conflict in Chechnya retains its considerable role in propaganda for the global jihad. The Al-Qaeda suicide terrorists who hijacked passenger jets on September 11 had once intended to fight in Chechnya. These days, video recordings of battles in Chechnya are being viewed in Iraq. In fact, experience in Chechnya is being widely used in other countries. Iraq's first suicide bomber blew herself up on September 28, 2005. Although some extremists had used women in this capacity in the past, it was in Chechnya that women first began blowing themselves up for religious rather than political motives. The first female suicide bomber drove a KamAZ truck loaded with high explosives into the building of a federal forces commandant's office in Alkhan-Yurt in Chechnya in June 2000 - and that incident sparked a series of similar explosions worldwide. Israel's first female suicide bomber blew herself up in January 2002, and two women followed suit in Uzbekistan in March 2004. However, it is highly unlikely that Al-Qaeda abandoned the actual Chechen front (not the propaganda front) only because of the absence of American military contingent there. IDSS experts John Harrison and Rohan Gunaratna believe that Al-Qaeda is in decline nowadays. Yoram Schweitzer agrees. He maintains that Osama bin Laden's organization never succeeded in transformation from a group into a movement. Moreover, the second generation of fighters appeared in the global jihad now - from Iraq, Europe, and South Africa - and they pushed bin Laden's Afghani and Bosnian followers into the background. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the head of the Iraqi Al-Qaeda network, makes an emphasis on this new generation and is practically out of bin Laden's control now. Bin Laden built his global terrorist network using Afghanistan, and al-Zarqawi is now using Iraq in the same manner. Aware of the fact that a great many Al-Qaeda ringleaders and senior officers are arrested, al-Zarqawi would not mind taking over its cells on the territory from North America to Asia. Al-Zarqawi has enormously boosted his influence in Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Persian Gulf states. Terrorist web-sites usually post information on al-Zarqawi's operations nowadays, leaving Al-Qaeda as such and bin Laden in the periphery of attention. Using his considerable skills in dealing with media outlets, al-Zarqawi is becoming the symbol of global jihad. What information is available at this point indicates that emissaries of both structures (Al-Qaeda and al-Zarqawi's network) operated in the Caucasus until recently. Bin Laden was represented in Chechnya by Abu Omar al-Saif between 1995 and November 2005 when he was killed. Al-Zarqawi has been represented since 2002 by Abu Hafs al-Urdani. Al-Saif of Saudi Arabia was an ideologue rather than field commander. He bears a lot of titles, all of them with religious undertones: legal advisor to Chechen mujahedin, member of the Shar'ah court, head of the Court of Appeals in Chechnya, etc. Al-Saif's opinion was not valued in the Caucasus alone. Calling the war in Iraq "the third wave of Crusades against Muslims," al-Saif actually viewed peace as a never-ending battle for the triumph of Islam. He did not really care about regional and cultural differences between Muslims from different countries. Abu Hafs Al-Urdani is a Jordanian. He represents al-Zarqawi and Chechen diaspora in Jordan. It is common knowledge that "Arab" Chechens have played a major role in the conflict in the Caucasus ever since 1995. The first Foreign Minister of Ichkeria Shamil Beno was a Jordanian Chechen. Zijad Sabsabi, representative of Chechnya in Moscow, was born in Syria. |
| Posted by:Dan Darling |