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| Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
| Stratfor sez : The ground war has begun. |
| 2006-07-21 |
| Email freebie, no link. The ground war has begun. Several Israeli brigades now appear to be operating between the Lebanese border and the Litani River. According to reports, Hezbollah forces are dispersed in multiple bunker complexes and are launching rockets from these and other locations. Hezbollah's strategy appears to be threefold. First, force Israel into costly attacks against prepared fortifications. Second, draw Israeli troops as deeply into Lebanon as possible, forcing them to fight on extended supply lines. Third, move into an Iraqi-style insurgency from which Israel -- out of fear of a resumption of rocket attacks -- cannot withdraw, but which the Israelis also cannot endure because of extended long-term casualties. This appears to have been a carefully planned strategy, built around a threat to Israeli cities that Israel can't afford. The war has begun at Hezbollah's time and choosing. Israel is caught between three strategic imperatives. First, it must end the threat to Israeli cities, which must involve the destruction of Hezbollah's launch capabilities south of the Litani River. Second, it must try to destroy Hezbollah's infrastructure, which means it must move into the Bekaa Valley and as far as the southern suburbs of Beirut. Third, it must do so in such a way that it is not dragged into a long-term, unsustainable occupation against a capable insurgency. Hezbollah has implemented its strategy by turning southern Lebanon into a military stronghold, consisting of well-designed bunkers that serve both as fire bases and launch facilities for rockets. The militants appear to be armed with anti-tank weapons and probably anti-aircraft weapons, some of which appear to be of American origin, raising the question of how they were acquired. Hezbollah wants to draw Israel into protracted fighting in this area in order to inflict maximum casualties and to change the psychological equation for both military and political reasons. Israelis historically do not like to fight positional warfare. Their tendency has been to bypass fortified areas, pushing the fight to the rear in order to disrupt logistics, isolate fortifications and wait for capitulation. This has worked in the past. It is not clear that it will work here. The great unknown is the resilience of Hezbollah's fighters. To this point, there is no reason to doubt it. Israel could be fighting the most resilient and well-motivated opposition force in its history. But the truth is that neither Israel nor Hezbollah really knows what performance will be like under pressure. Simply occupying the border-Litani area will not achieve any of Israel's strategic goals. Hezbollah still would be able to use rockets against Israel. And even if, for Hezbollah, this area is lost, its capabilities in the Bekaa Valley and southern Beirut will remain intact. Therefore, a battle that focuses solely on the south is not an option for Israel, unless the Israelis feel a defeat here will sap Hezbollah's will to resist. We doubt this to be the case. The key to the campaign is to understand that Hezbollah has made its strategic decisions. It will not be fighting a mobile war. Israel has lost the strategic initiative: It must fight when Hezbollah has chosen and deal with Hezbollah's challenge. However, given this, Israel does have an operational choice. It can move in a sequential fashion, dealing first with southern Lebanon and then with other issues. It can bypass southern Lebanon and move into the rear areas, returning to southern Lebanon when it is ready. It can attempt to deal with southern Lebanon in detail, while mounting mobile operations in the Bekaa Valley, in the coastal regions and toward south Beirut, or both at the same time. There are resource and logistical issues involved. Moving simultaneously on all three fronts will put substantial strains on Israel's logistical capability. An encirclement westward on the north side of the Litani, followed by a move toward Beirut while the southern side of the Litani is not secured, poses a serious challenge in re-supply. Moving into the Bekaa means leaving a flank open to the Syrians. We doubt Syria will hit that flank, but then, we don't have to live with the consequences of an intelligence failure. Israel will be sending a lot of force on that line if it chooses that method. Again, since many roads in south Lebanon will not be secure, that limits logistics. Israel is caught on the horns of a dilemma. Hezbollah has created a situation in which Israel must fight the kind of war it likes the least -- attritional, tactical operations against prepared forces -- or go to the war it prefers, mobile operations, with logistical constraints that make these operations more difficult and dangerous. Moreover, if it does this, it increases the time during which Israeli cities remain under threat. Given clear failures in appreciating Hezbollah's capabilities, Israel must take seriously the possibility that Hezbollah has longer-ranged, anti-personnel rockets that it will use while under attack. Israel has been trying to break the back of Hezbollah resistance in the south through air attack, special operations and probing attacks. This clearly hasn't worked thus far. That does not mean it won't work, as Israel applies more force to the problem and starts to master the architecture of Hezbollah's tactical and operational structure; however, Israel can't count on a rapid resolution of that problem. The Israelis have by now thought the problem through. They don't like operational compromises -- preferring highly focused solutions at the center of gravity of an enemy. Hezbollah has tried to deny Israel a center of gravity and may have succeeded, forcing Israel into a compromise position. Repeated assaults against prepared positions are simply not something the Israelis can do, because they cannot afford casualties. They always have preferred mobile encirclement or attacks at the center of gravity of a defensive position. But at this moment, viewed from the outside, this is not an option. An extended engagement in southern Lebanon is the least likely path, in our opinion. More likely -- and this is a guess -- is a five-part strategy: 1. Insert airmobile and airborne forces north of the Litani to seal the rear of Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon. Apply air power and engineering forces to reduce the fortifications, and infantry to attack forces not in fortified positions. Bottle them up, and systematically reduce the force with limited exposure to the attackers. 2. Secure roads along the eastern flank for an armored thrust deep into the Bekaa Valley to engage the main Hezbollah force and infrastructure there. This would involve a move from Qiryat Shimona north into the Bekaa, bypassing the Litani to the west, and would probably require sending airmobile and special forces to secure the high ground. It also would leave the right flank exposed to Syria. 3. Use air power and special forces to undermine Hezbollah capabilities in the southern Beirut area. The Israelis would consider a move into this area after roads through southern Lebanon are cleared and Bekaa relatively secured, moving into the area, only if absolutely necessary, on two axes of attack. 4. Having defeated Hezbollah in detail, withdraw under a political settlement shifting defense responsibility to the Lebanese government. 5. Do all of this while the United States is still able to provide top cover against diplomatic initiatives that will create an increasingly difficult international environment. There can be many variations on this theme, but these elements are inevitable: 1. Hezbollah cannot be defeated without entering the Bekaa Valley, at the very least. 2. At some point, resistance in southern Lebanon must be dealt with, regardless of the cost. 3. Rocket attacks against northern Israel and even Tel Aviv must be accepted while the campaign unfolds. 4. The real challenge will come when Israel tries to withdraw. No. 4 is the real challenge. Destruction of Hezbollah's infrastructure does not mean annihilation of the force. If Israel withdraws, Hezbollah or a successor organization will regroup. If Israel remains, it can wind up in the position the United States is in Iraq. This is exactly what Hezbollah wants. So, Israel can buy time, or Israel can occupy and pay the cost. One or the other. The other solution is to shift the occupational burden to another power that is motivated to prevent the re-emergence of an anti-Israeli military force -- as that is what Hezbollah has become. The Lebanese government is the only possible alternative, but not a particularly capable one, reflecting the deep rifts in Lebanon. Israel has one other choice, which is to extend the campaign to defeat Syria as well. Israel can do this, but the successor regime to Syrian President Bashar al Assad likely would be much worse for Israel than al Assad has been. Israel can imagine occupying Syria; it can't do it. Syria is too big and the Arabs have learned from the Iraqis how to deal with an occupation. Israel cannot live with a successor to al Assad and it cannot take control of Syria. It will have to live with al Assad. And that means an occupation of Lebanon would always be hostage to Syrian support for insurgents. Hezbollah has dealt Israel a difficult hand. It has thought through the battle problem as well as the political dimension carefully. Somewhere in this, there has been either an Israeli intelligence failure or a political failure to listen to intelligence. Hezbollah's capabilities have posed a problem for Israel that allowed Hezbollah to start a war at a time and in a way of its choosing. The inquest will come later in Israel. And Hezbollah will likely be shattered regardless of its planning. The correlation of forces does not favor it. But if it forces Israel not only to defeat its main force but also to occupy, Hezbollah will have achieved its goals. Send questions or comments on this article to analysis@stratfor.com. |
| Posted by:anonymous5089 |
| #10 Iff my instincts on Israel's alleged "buffer zone" strategy is correct, Israel will also control the most + best of Lebanon's natural water systems, which in turn will eventually force the terror groups to seek formal supplies from Syria-Iran, which Israel + USA + NATO/Allies will be able to detect vv SATWAR. |
| Posted by: JosephMendiola 2006-07-21 22:36 |
| #9 Bit tactical problem for Hezbollah not mentioned in the above article: water. August. Utilities shut off. No electricity for water pumps or treatment plants. Israelis can supply thier own water. Thats the problem with living in a hole: you're in a hole. If thye run generators, the IR gives it away, boom go the gennies from a bomb. Hezbollah is going to get VERY thirsty in a coupel weeks if they get bypassed, cut off and cordonded. The only hard part is that Israel will have to take missle fire for longer. |
| Posted by: Oldspook 2006-07-21 21:50 |
| #8 If Hezbollah is motivated enough they can do something similar in southern Lebanon. Will the Israelis pay sufficient blood? Don't know, but I know they don't particulary want to. And that's the problem. It was one of your generals who said that the purpose of a soldier is not to die but to help the fellow on the other side die. Just wait a week, or so. |
| Posted by: gromgoru 2006-07-21 21:20 |
| #7 It's very difficult to hide, w/o plugging them up, tunnel entrances from infrared optics like those on tanks. The same tanks can then take out the tunnels. If the tunnels are plugged up, a thorough search by airborne ground penetrating radar and infantry will find them. |
| Posted by: ed 2006-07-21 17:39 |
| #6 Thank you Oldspook for speaking from your depth of experience and facts. Too many people are still fighting WW2, Korea and Viet Nam. We do way more with way less now it.still paid for in blood however. Israel isn't going to get into a Iran vs Iraq situation with Hizbu'allah. |
| Posted by: Sock Puppet of Doom 2006-07-21 17:19 |
| #5 (quick words home for a bite then back to work) Stratfor misses one thing: in terms of reducing fortifications and fixed positons, Israel has some new tricks they have learned from the US actions in Iraq. Startfor is assuming a MOUT model from the 90's, not a modern one. And from there come sthe operational surprise that will coutner Hezbollah's stratigic surprises and attempts to shape the battlefield. One thing they are right on about is the Bekka. Israel MUST clean it out. And that includes interdiction within about a foot of the Syrian border (i.e over at times). Operationally speaking if Israel needed to, they could hit the logistics points for Hezbollha in Syria and smash up some Syrian military while thy are at it. Not enough to force an occupation, but enough to smash the C3I apparatus of the Assad regime - and let them know the cost for playing proxy with Hezbollah. The latter will become neccesary once Israel has gathered enough actionable and exposable intelligence to show Syrian direct complicity with the attacks on Israel. I believe such evidence can be gathered, and will ultimately be the capstone for strikes on Syria's air defense, airforce and army logistics points, as well as Hama's ammo dumps, headquarters and training areas in Syria. This will happen once they secure the flank of their thrust into the Bekka and seal the area south of the Litani river., cordoning off the fortified zones that Hamas has seled themselves into. Hezbullah has had 5 years of Iranian and Syrian support and money, and complete negligence by the Lebanses government in which to prepare this war they have initiated. They must be destroyed, Nasrallah and all his corhorts must be killed, or if captured, summarily executed as war criminals. And their supporters in Syria and fiscal suppoerters elswhere must be made to pay the ultimate price via assasinations by the Mossad. Those rich guys want martyes, Israel will give them martyrs. But not the poor deluded fools they fund and brianwash with hatred - this time, make the money men get their skin in the game whether they like it or not. Bullets, bombs and bankruptcy shoudl be their fate - and the fate of thier families as well (because that s how Arab society works) |
| Posted by: Oldspook 2006-07-21 17:06 |
| #4 SPoD, the Japanese dug into bunkers in Iwo Jima were static and quickly became surrounded. They knew they were going to die, and their job was to make the Marines pay. We took the island but we paid in blood. If Hezbollah is motivated enough they can do something similar in southern Lebanon. Will the Israelis pay sufficient blood? Don't know, but I know they don't particulary want to. And that's the problem. |
| Posted by: Steve White 2006-07-21 16:45 |
| #3 All that seems to be missing the 'Heroic Fighters of' and 'undefeatable' in front of the 'Hezbollah'. Being dug in puts them in static concentration. In warfare this is not always an advantage. It means you can be surrounded, cut off, starved out and destroyed. The Hizbu'allah or "party of god" name is all one needs to know about the orgaization. Dissassembling it is what needs to be done. Israel is the one doing it. While "experts" carp from the sidelines. Warfare is not fun and it's not easy. It entails risks. Would these asshats prefer Israel did nothing? I am beging to thinks so. |
| Posted by: Sock Puppet of Doom 2006-07-21 16:26 |
| #2 Wow. Stratfor you guys rock! This came out only a day after Haaretz said the same thing! Very impressive. Let me get out my credit card... |
| Posted by: Iblis 2006-07-21 14:50 |
| #1 Sounds like Hezbollah is setting up much like the nutters did in Fallujah. Anyone at Rantburg remember how that one turned out? If they hope to set up an insurgency they are batty. Israel only needs to destroy the rockets and humiliate Hezbollah in order to be able to maintain face when they withdraw leaving Hezbollah as the weak horse. Baaka valley can be dealt with using airpower. IF they get rockets with that kind of range that'll be phase two but my guess is the loss of face Hezbollah is facing will cause them to regroup in Syria where they don't have to worry about Lebanese vengence. |
| Posted by: rjschwarz 2006-07-21 14:14 |