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| Iraq |
| FRAGO in Abu Ajil |
| 2006-11-02 |
| ABU AJIL, Iraq, Nov. 1, 2006 — The Iraqi soldiers and U.S. Paratroopers passed the afternoon hours before their mission double-checking radios and performing last-minute inspections of their vehicles and weapons. Despite the language barrier and cultural differences, they shared conversations accentuated with cigarette smoke and laughter. Soon, the cheerful mood would shift to serious and mission-focused. The sun would set, and the illumination of the quarter-moon would be all that was left of light in the town of Abu Ajil. The rural farming area is about 2.5 miles, or 4 kilometers, east of Tikrit, and was the setting for Operation Portland, a joint-cordon and search mission with Iraqi soldiers from Company C, 1st Battalion, 1st Brigade, 4th Iraqi Army Division, and Paratroopers from Battery A, 1st Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, Oct. 28, 2006. The target was an insurgent cell responsible for numerous indirect fire and roadside bomb attacks against U.S. and Iraqi forces throughout Tikrit and its surrounding villages and towns. At least six houses were suspected of harboring the insurgents. Several times during the pressing hours until the mission, voices called out, “FRAGO!,” which is a military acronym short for fragmentary order, basically meaning there is a change to the mission. This could happen for many reasons. There could be a change in the location of the target, how many or which homes are going to be searched, the route that will be driven, or the time the mission will begin, said 1st Lt. Brett Popp, 3rd Platoon leader, Battery A. The troops had to re-group and make sure everyone in every platoon and squad – including the Iraqi soldiers – knew what adjustments to make because additional houses were added to the search list. “Things are never going to go as planned,” Popp said. “Sometimes we receive new intelligence on a mission up until the moment we roll out the gate, but we’ve done a great job making last-minute adjustments and not letting those changes get in the way of accomplishing our mission.” Just after 9 p.m., the more than 20-vehicle convoy, staggered with Iraqi army pickup trucks and U.S. humvees, left the gate of Saddam Hussein’s “Birthday Palace” – now an Iraqi army base – en route for their targets. The convoy began splitting up once it reached the village. Each Iraqi platoon and its U.S. counterpart were responsible for cordon and searches of their own objectives. The troops dismounted their vehicles in a frenzy as they rushed the gates and doors of each home. The women and children were quickly asked to separate from the men, and all were questioned. Some troops searched rooms and property while others pulled security. Iraqi soldiers explained to the women why their men were being questioned. Some of the women wept with fear of their husband or son being taken away to a coalition detainment facility. Only two men were detained, but both were positively identified as individuals the troops were searching for, Popp said. “Any insurgent we can get off the streets makes a difference,” said Staff Sgt. Jason W. Walker, 3rd Squad Leader, Battery A. The mission was a success in all aspects, not only because of the captured insurgents, but because of the level of competence the Iraqi soldiers are showing, Walker said. When the Paratroopers of Battery A arrived to Tikrit in August, the Iraqi soldiers didn’t grasp the complexity of conducting military operations. “They didn’t understand pulling security or segregating the men and women,” Walker continued, “but now they’re even starting to use hand-and-arm signals they developed on their own.” “They’ve come a long way since we first started working with them,” Walker said. |
| Posted by:Bobby |
| #2 Gee, Glenmore, ya mean it's not because the military is too uneducated, un-nuanced, and just plain dumb to get it right the first time? Thanks for the insight; sounds quite logical. |
| Posted by: Bobby 2006-11-02 08:26 |
| #1 For joint US-IF missions I would think mission change orders upon leaving the gate would be 'standard' - too many leaks in the IF hierarchy who would signal warnings to the real targets, so revise targets from place-holders to actual only after underway. |
| Posted by: Glenmore 2006-11-02 07:36 |