| Submit your comments on this article |
| Iraq |
| U.S. officer describes disarray in Iraqi army |
| 2006-11-03 |
| In an assessment for a military journal, a U.S. Army officer who advised Iraqi troops concludes the goal of having Iraq control its security "will exceed" the new army's capability "for some time to come." In an article for Military Review, Lt. Col. Carl D. Grunow wrote that "without steadfast American support, these officers and soldiers will likely give up and consider the entire effort a lost cause." Grunow recounted his experience of 12 months as the senior adviser to an Iraqi army armored brigade in Taji, north of Baghdad. His stint ended in June. The article in the July-August issue of Military Review is titled "Advising Iraqis: Building the Iraqi Army." Grunow found and grappled with several problems during his experience. One was what he called the Iraqi "death blossom," in which any enemy attack on the soldiers "provokes the average Iraqi soldier to empty his 30-round magazine and fire whatever belt of ammunition happens to be in his machine gun. Ninety percent of the time, there is no target, and the soldiers always agree that this is extremely dangerous, in addition to being a grievous waste of ammunition. But they continue to do it." Grunow also found that Iraqi soldiers were using techniques and tactics from the Iran-Iraq war, when there were "clear battle lines fought with mass military formations, and one in which civilians on the battlefield were a nuisance, not the center of gravity." He contrasted the new Iraqi army with the one under ousted ruler Saddam Hussein. "Iron discipline was the norm under Saddam. The lowliest lieutenant could expect instant obedience and extreme deference from his soldiers," Grunow wrote. "Today's army is very different. Unlike Saddam's, the new army serves the cause of freedom, and officers and soldiers alike are a bit confused about what this means." Iraqis, he said, are "horrendous at keeping track of their soldiers. There are no routine accountability formations, and units typically have to wait until payday to get a semi-accurate picture of who is assigned to the unit. Because Iraqi status reports are almost always wrong, American advisers have taken to counting soldiers at checkpoints to get a sense of where combat power is distributed." Key paragraph coming up: Grunow praised the Iraqi skill in dealing with a tough environment. He said that "economic sanctions and austerity have made the Iraqis outstanding improvisers" and they "display great ingenuity with maintenance operations." ...and manufacturing IEDs. One trait of Iraqis is that they are "fatalistic, surrendering their future to the will of Allah. This explains how they can continue to function despite daily car bombings, atrocities and murders that have touched nearly every family." ...and why some of them are extremely hard to pacify. He wrote the "most frustrating aspect" of this viewpoint is that "it translates into a lack of diligence and detailed planning. To their credit, the Iraqis almost always made mission, but it was typically not to the standard that Americans expect." Cultural differences and friction are "inevitable," Grunow wrote, and command relationships involving U.S. and Iraqi forces presented some misunderstandings. "Another problem plaguing the strategy is that it's unnatural for U.S. soldiers to step back and allow their Iraqi partners to take the lead when the soldiers think they can do it more efficiently and quickly." Despite deep disparities, the 2nd Armored Brigade, the unit he assisted, now takes the lead on operations "within its AO [area of operations], suffering casualties and fighting the enemy alongside its American partners." |
| Posted by:Jotle Omavitch4006 |
| #7 The Iraqi Army has a strong incentive to be creative about maintenance of armoured vehicles : IEDs. Most of the Iraqi Army only has access to the leftovers of Saddam's Soviet equipment, which has been rusting away in depots since the end of the war, or unarmoured pickup trucks. When they get a good mechanic crew together, they cannibalize several of the downed vehicles to get a few runners, and then equip a unit. The Allies like Poland have been shipping spare parts to the Iraqis since most Polish equipment is still ex-Soviet, as well as full vehicles. Naked self-interest fuels changes in approaches, also, several Iraqi Army units are filled with Kurdish Peshmerga which are noted for their ability to adapt and overcome. |
| Posted by: Shieldwolf 2006-11-03 14:31 |
| #6 Steve, no, I've heard that term repeatedly. It seems to be in common usage over there. As for this business of the Iraqis "display[ing] great ingenuity with maintenance operations", if that's truly the case, then they're something new in the history of modern Arab militaries, since according to Ken Pollack, one of the most consistent characteristics of Arab militaries is their universal incompetence in maintenance and related technical fields, to the extent of most Arab militaries employing large cadres of foreign technical and maintenance support personnel to keep things operational. This explicitly included the Iraqi army up to the time Pollack was writing. |
| Posted by: Mitch H. 2006-11-03 10:38 |
| #5 what he called the Iraqi "death blossom," Carl seems to be a fan of "The Last Starfighter" |
| Posted by: Steve 2006-11-03 09:14 |
| #4 Any different than rebuilding the South Korean army after its near annihilation in the summer of 1950? I do detect that unlike then, we've actually spent the time to do some real training before throwing them into a grinder. The present method seems a lot less Darwinist and less costly in lives. |
| Posted by: Procopius2K 2006-11-03 09:11 |
| #3 ..I'm curious - has anyone tried doing an "I'm an Iraqi" ad campaign for the Iraqi army the way they do ad campaigns here for the US Army? It seems we are pretty good at that sort of thing and if we can create and reinforce an image of a tough, professional, NON-SCETARIAN Iraqi military, we might get some real benefits out of it. Mike |
| Posted by: Mike Kozlowski 2006-11-03 09:00 |
| #2 He gave a good assessment. By far, everyone is in agreement that the Iraqi military is too informal, seen as "just a job", where you can take leave anytime you like. This is a problem that can only be solved by gradualism, call it a "professionalism upgrade." This will be done once the army is up to full strength and in complete control of the country. It will involve the creation of a major "elite" unit, held to much higher standards as an "honor" unit. It will be held up as an example to other units to emulate, whose new commanders will slowly integrate the elite units' policies until they are the norm, attriting out soldiers who don't adapt. The changeover will also include the "up or out" policy that the US uses in its military, to continually hone its military professionalism, and, importantly, to create a very large inactive reserve. |
| Posted by: Anonymoose 2006-11-03 08:48 |
| #1 There are negotiations going on in Amman, Jordan between the Iraq government and the opposition (terrorists and non-beligerents), which could end the conflict. Engagements suggest that US troops are attacked, not to end the occupation, but to get them out of the way so that sectarians can have a go at each other. Apparently, the Sunnis are going to the wall against Shiite control while the Shiites want a free hand against their Islamic enemy. And Sunnis have Saudi funding (not necessarily from government sources) Unfortunately, the Iranian government is smuggling sufficient cash to keep both anti-Sunnite and Occupation campaigns going. If they cannot bribe Iraq troops, they threaten their families. So what can the US do? Play the Sunni Card, and attack Iran. Sometimes your only choice is between bad and worse. And that is tough luck for the Ayatollahs. |
| Posted by: Snease Shaiting3550 2006-11-03 08:24 |