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| Iraq |
| Promoting Failure |
| 2007-02-22 |
| The Army gets the lead out. By Mackubin Thomas Owens Earlier this month, the Senate voted 83–14 to confirm Gen. George Casey as Army chief of staff. Ten of those “no” votes came from Republicans, four of whom — John McCain, John Ensign, Saxby Chambliss and Lindsey Graham — serve on the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC). The four grilled General Casey during his confirmation hearing, forcefully taking him to task for lack of progress in Iraq during his tenure as the commander of US ground troops there. Democratic senator Carl Levin, chairman of the committee, disagreed: “It is not fair that General Casey be tagged with failures, massive failures which were caused by the false policies, the wrong policies, the deceptions, the ignorance, the arrogance, the cockiness of civilian leaders in this administration.” But Republican senator John E. Sununu, who is not a member of the SASC, had an answer for Levin. “There are many factors that contributed to the failure to improve the situation [in Iraq], but ultimately our military leadership has to bear some responsibility for its choices. Simply put, we shouldn’t reward a lack of success on the field of command with such an important promotion.” This is the central issue of civil-military relations during wartime. How much responsibility for victory or defeat does a military commander bear? |
| Posted by:ryuge |
| #4 He clearly didn't read McMasters' book, and he didn't prosecute the war agressively. He failed. Just like the commander of the San Francisco, he is responsible for what happened under his command and he should not be promoted for failure. There needs to be some personal responsibility in the Army above the level of Sgt, Grainer. If you could poll the flag officers in the Army, I wonder how many think the cancellation of the Crusader was a mistake. If it's above 5% then I say the Army is in dire need of a culture change. And I'm not sure the Clinton Generals are all gone. |
| Posted by: Nimble Spemble 2007-02-22 21:16 |
| #3 Not so sure, guys. (OK, I stipulate the incompetent host govt. and sometimes bizarre intel agencies) First, Owens talks of an Anbar offensive that never was. Sure, there were fitful mini-campaigns in the western Euphrates valley, and some other stuff - but all were linked very specifically to securing the environment for elections. Never anything resembling a serious undertaking that would use scale and serious measures and deception to kill lots and lots of bad guys. Uh - if you actually secure a lousy small town with a serious perimeter, and don't telegraph every move (or better yet, falsely telegraph some moves), you can just about eliminate the "whack-a-mole" thinggy cuz the moles don't get out. But that's between me and Owens, I guess. Perhaps my memory fails me, but I clearly recall how every little eeny teeny offensive op that was described in the morning briefings would cause some of us to perk up and say "finally!" - of course they never lasted and were never all that serious. I have limited, but non-zero, info and perspective on MNF-I plans and mindset. I am not aware of a single bit of evidence that Casey or MNC-I senior brass ever felt constrained by State, per se. It always looked like the embassy's flawed (though not entirely incorrect) Sunni-engagement and politics-centric strategy dovetailed perfectly with a military command that showed not the slightest interest in closing with the enemy. I don't know how much embassy input there was in the campaign plan I saw early in '06, but I was crushed when I read it. All Iraqis-in-the-lead (when they weren't capable in many cases and when, in fact, the locals would have been far more favorably impressed by occupiers-in-the-lead, so long as they took DECISIVE action). Lots of stuff about building on the success of the elections and referendum, Sunni participation in the first sovereign parliament, etc. I would agree that Owens is WRONG! about "The Army is in dire need of a cultural change, of a shift from thinking primarily in terms of conventional war". With some caveats, the problem looked to me like exactly the OPPOSITE: the Army needs to drop nearly all of its fanciful concepts about UNCONVENTIONAL war. Last year there was actually a great story about US vs. Iraqi approaches to a classic Iraqi situation. I think it was in the WaPo. A US colonel, advisor to an Iraqi army unit, was the focus of the story - along with his conflict with his counterpart in the US Army unit, based across the road. A local town suffered some insurgentitis, the Iraqis wanted to cordon, detain military-aged males, round up and sit on key sheikhs, etc. US side was horrified, said "oh no, we can't do that, somebody will be upset!", etc., and the Iraqis watched with dismay as the US approach was tried and failed. I could be wrong, but my sense is not that any of these bad instincts come from State or Washington, in the concrete sense. Feels and looks like there are some serious misconceptions among Army personnel about how to fight a war. An acquaintance used to say "too many graduate degrees" when shaking his head and lamenting the latest instance in which the US refused to use force or risk even the tiniest bit of hurt feelings in responding to utterly vicious terrorists operating within a populace that has a purely hobbesian understanding of power and domination. I take a much darker view than you guys - and have for over a year. I think Casey, Chiarelli, and many others actually believe in the obviously inappropriate, ineffective strategies that have contributed to the failure to make more headway in Iraq to date. I've seen mid-level staff officers shake there heads at the same things, I've seen civilians making common-sense challenges to the brass and receiving pitiful responses (in one case a very senior officer just stopped coming to meetings where he simply couldn't offer persuasive replies to challenges from civilians). The four SASC members may have "grilled" Casey to some extent, but my impression is that they still didn't go anywhere near the real problem. War is a test of wills - war in Iraq is as pure a test of wills as one will encounter on Earth Obsession with short-term political comfort and tidiness and telescoping years of political and economic reconstruction into a short period prior to establishment of security, all the while constantly telegraphing our desire to leave ASAP - these were key elements of the inappropriate strategy, and I'm not aware Casey objected to a bit of it. |
| Posted by: Verlaine 2007-02-22 20:10 |
| #2 Seconded. |
| Posted by: Excalibur 2007-02-22 09:51 |
| #1 The Army is in dire need of a cultural change, of a shift from thinking primarily in terms of conventional war WRONG! WRONG! WRONG! The Army is in no need of change. What the Army is in NEED of is the ability to execute a classic foreign internal defense (FID) mission without being hog tied and hamstrung by a US Embassy & State Dept, medling politicians, bureaucratic intelligence agencies, and a totally incompentent host nation government. Ask yourself why General Tommy Franks didn't stay on... and why he and several other very successful general officers have not commented publically on this situation. |
| Posted by: Besoeker 2007-02-22 08:39 |