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| A Gateway for Hackers |
| 2007-08-14 |
| Current administration policy is replete with examples of quickly enacted efforts whose consequences led to the opposite effect. (Beware of what you wish for . . . .) With Congress caving last week, the National Security Agency no longer needs a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrant to wiretap if one party is believed to be outside the United States. This change looks reasonable at first, but it could create huge long-term security risks for the United States. The immediate problem is fiber optics. Until recently, telecommunication signals came through the air. The NSA used satellites and antennas to pick up conversations of foreigners talking to other foreigners. Modern communications, however, use fiber; since conversations don't go through the air, the NSA wants to access communications at land-based switches. Because communications from around the world often go through the United States, the government can still get access to much of the information it seeks. But wiretapping within the United States has required a FISA search warrant, and the NSA apparently found using FISA too time-consuming, even though emergency access was permitted as long as a warrant was applied for and granted within 72 hours of surveillance. Avoiding warrants for these cases sounds simple, though potentially invasive of Americans' civil liberties. Most calls outside the country involve foreigners talking to foreigners. Most communications within the country are constitutionally protected -- U.S. "persons" talking to U.S. "persons." To avoid wiretapping every communication, NSA will need to build massive automatic surveillance capabilities into telephone switches. Here things get tricky: Once such infrastructure is in place, others could use it to intercept communications. Grant the NSA what it wants, and within 10 years the United States will be vulnerable to attacks from hackers across the globe, as well as the militaries of China, Russia and other nations. Such threats are not theoretical. For almost a year beginning in April 2004, more than 100 phones belonging to members of the Greek government, including the prime minister and ministers of defense, foreign affairs, justice and public order, were spied on with wiretapping software that was misused. Exactly who placed the software and who did the listening remain unknown. But they were able to use software that was supposed to be used only with legal permission. The United States itself has been attacked. In six hours in August 2006, remote attackers entered computers at the Army Information Systems Engineering Command at Fort Huachuca, Ariz.; the Defense Information Systems Agency in Arlington; the Naval Ocean Systems Center in San Diego; and the Army Space and Strategic Defense Command in Huntsville, Ala. The hackers transported more than 10 terabytes of data to South Korea, Hong Kong or Taiwan, and from there to the People's Republic of China. Each intrusion was only 10 to 30 minutes. The downloaded information included Army helicopter mission-planning-systems specifications and flight-planning software used by the Army and Air Force. U.S. communications technology is fragile and easily penetrated. While advanced, it is not decades ahead of that of our friends or our rivals. Compounding the issue is a key facet of modern systems design: Intercept capabilities are likely to be managed remotely, and vulnerabilities are as likely to be global as local. In simplifying wiretapping for U.S. intelligence, we provide a target for foreign intelligence agencies and possibly rogue hackers. Break into one service, and you get broad access to U.S. communications. The Greek wiretapping and Chinese thefts from U.S. military sites are warnings that entities other than the NSA could exploit the vulnerabilities of U.S. communications networks. Were the proposed wiretapping technology penetrated by foreign intelligence services, U.S. security and privacy could be quickly and severely compromised. In its effort to provide policymakers with immediate intelligence, the NSA forgot the critical information security aspect of its mission: protecting U.S. communications against foreign interception. So did Congress. Lawmakers granted the warrantless wiretapping only for six months -- and they need to look carefully before it endangers U.S. national security for the long term. |
| Posted by:Delphi |
| #5 *happy sigh* I do so love Rantburg! Thank you, Professor 3dc!! I became suspicious as soon as I saw the title links to the Washington Post... and the writer's argument that fiber optics vs. airborne telecommunications -- I thought that most of us get our email through phone wires or cable. But I'm not really up on such things, so I could be wrong. |
| Posted by: trailing wife 2007-08-14 22:23 |
| #4 3dc, neat summary. When reading the article, the bogusity meter pegged past the scale. Grant the NSA what it wants, and within 10 years the United States will be vulnerable to attacks from hackers across the globe, as well as the militaries of China, Russia and other nations. FUD. Plain and simple. Whether NSA monitors or not has no bearing on vulnerability of military or gummint networks. It is an entirely different issue. In fact, it is NSA that makes a substantial effort to develop a secure environment. Point in case is their Secure Linux Layer contribution. |
| Posted by: twobyfour 2007-08-14 22:01 |
| #3 3dc - thanks. As I read this article, I became suspicious that this was just an end-run attack on the wiretaps. It was just a vague suspicion based on the way the article was written. They never really told us HOW they could use the switches to increase their ability to wire tap - just that it was "tricky" and that communication technology is "is fragile and easily penetrated". Then they gave examples that may or may not have been related to these land-based switches. It was all very vague. After reading your post - it just makes me think that Congress didn't have the support it needed to shut down the FISA warrents so now it is trying to create a straw-boogy man that we need to be protected against so that they can try again from this angle. |
| Posted by: AT 2007-08-14 21:39 |
| #2 Thanks for the Rantburg U. lecture, 3dc. As someone once said to me long ago: remember the last time you saw or read a news article on a topic you're an expert in, and think about how many things were wrong. Why assume they're any better on topics you're not an expert in? |
| Posted by: xbalanke 2007-08-14 21:06 |
| #1 I am a communications expert (R&D) and the logic in the article blows right past me. 1) Yes fiber tends to run through the US. 2) Internet wise that is why the DoD created an internet designed on hierarchy instead of a mesh or other equally valid but more robust structures.... If the root nodes are in the US we can tap. It is an advantage. With other structures you might have root spheres or torus or something a bit more tricky to tap. So we are blessed that the fiber comes to us due to the net structure. 3) How the hell does this tie into hacker attacks on the US and Greece and China and Russia That's a big jump with no logic explaining it or making the case. 4) from what field did this claim come from: ntercept capabilities are likely to be managed remotely, and vulnerabilities are as likely to be global as local. In simplifying wiretapping for U.S. intelligence, we provide a target for foreign intelligence agencies and possibly rogue hackers. Break into one service, and you get broad access to U.S. communications. If you want to understand the net I can provide some sites that give clues but this is bogus... If anything this makes a good argument for implementing other topologies within the DoD and later the US and leaving the rest of the world with a flat hierarchical net. Consider what I said with these analogies. Consider the current net somewhat like a binary tree. If you don't know what that is then think "Org Chart" Now consider other topologies. The most common one is water supply in a city. Water has a mesh of connections in a subdivision. Leading in to the subdivision are one or more water supplies with pressure reduction valves. If there is more than one leading into the subdivision they are usually in opposite ends. If one fails the other still supplies water and pressure. Now if you were to imagine sailing little itti-bitty boats (packets) in a subdivisions water pipes from a to b there are multiple paths you could take. (direct lines, squared arcs, great ciricles....) You can't do that with the internet and its trees. The only way from a to b is along the tree branches. One way and that's it. So you can be sure to tap any message on the internet along the path from a to b. Not so for trapping the sub in the water system. It has multiple paths. There is no single choke point or valley to watch. So. The net is designed the way it is to make life easy for SAM and the NSA. |
| Posted by: 3dc 2007-08-14 20:03 |