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| Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
| Iran's Arab unrest |
| 2007-09-06 |
| By Amir Taheri Is the Islamic Republic facing a growing revolt by Iran's Arab minority? Until a couple of years ago, the question would have sounded naive. In the '80s, Arab-Iranians fought bravely against Saddam Hussein's forces, even though they were linked to the invading Iraqis by ethnic, tribal, linguistic and religious ties going back 1,300 years. Data from the Foundation for the Martyrs (which is supposed to look after war veterans and families of the war dead) show that the number of Arab-Iranians who died for the fatherland was proportionally four times higher than Iranians from other ethnic backgrounds. In the last two years, however, evidence has mounted that Arab-Iranians - disenchanted by the Islamic Republic and angry at Tehran's increasingly repressive policies under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad - are being drawn toward dissidence and revolt: * Last year, rising tension in a number of towns and villages forced Ahmadinejad to cancel a much-publicized visit to the southwestern province of Khuzestan. (He later managed a shortened version of the trip, amid tight security.) * In the last few weeks, the authorities have executed 11 men in connection with the nascent Arab revolt. Hundreds more have been arrested and shipped to jails in unknown destinations. * Last month, bands of Arab youths ran riot in the streets of Ahvaz (Khuzestan's capital), attacking government offices and banks and setting official cars on fire. Eyewitnesses say the authorities had to bring in special Baseej (Mobilization) militia units to regain control. The pro-government militia later raided several neighborhoods where ethnic Arabs form a majority, arresting dozens. Among them was Thamer Ahvazi, a top pop star. His crime? Singing "defiant" rap-style songs in Arabic. The best estimates put the number of ethnic Arabs in Iran at about 2.2 million, or more than 3 percent of the population. More than half live in Khuzestan, a province that produces almost 70 percent of the oil that Iran exports each day. But in recent decades, the province's mainly Arab feature has changed for several reasons. First, the discovery of oil in 1908 led to a boom that created job opportunities that the locals couldn't fulfill. Hundreds of thousands from the Iranian heartland poured into Khuzestan, first as temporary laborers and then as permanent residents. Second, a government policy, formulated in 1928, seeks to "Persianize" majority-Arab areas by bringing farmers from distant provinces. The newcomers revived the province's moribund agriculture, introduced new crops and, as they prospered, multiplied faster than native Arabs who remained largely excluded from the new economy. The introduction of the military draft also brought change. Many ethnic Arabs smuggled their male children to the Arab coast of the Gulf to avoid obligatory military service. Most never returned. Sometimes whole families and clans emigrated to avoid the draft and taxation by an increasingly assertive Tehran government. At the same time, better-educated ethnic Arabs moved north to settle in Tehran and other cities in the Iranian heartland, where they gradually lost their Arab identity. It's hard to identify the exact causes of the tension in Khuzestan. One source is the emergence in next-door Iraq of a new government dominated by Arab Shiites. (Not a single ethnic Arab holds a key government position in Iran.) Many Arab Shiite tribes on both sides of the Iran-Iraq border retain their ancient bonds of blood and tradition. The Bani Kaab, the Bani Amer, the Bani Tamim and other tribes have always moved and intermarried regardless of the border. The dream of a unified Arab Shiite state (encompassing central and southern Iraq as well as Iran's Khuzestan province), which Arab nationalists call "Arabistan," appeals to activists on both sides of the border. Not surprisingly, some local tribal chiefs and even Shiite mullahs are trying to use that dream to build a constituency for themselves. Adding to the tension are a number of armed groups, some set up by Saddam Hussein in the 1970s as a means of exerting pressure on Tehran. Often linked to smuggling networks operating in both Iran and Iraq, these groups have been mainly responsible for attacks on border posts and police stations in towns near the border. The main source of the tension, however, is the central government's policy of implicit discrimination against the Arab minority. This is especially manifest in state-owned corporations, where non-Arabs have advantages in job opportunities, grades and pay. Arabs are also at a disadvantage in higher education. Entry into Iranian universities is through a tough set of exams known as konkour. Ethnic Arabs usually come from worst-rated secondary schools, don't quite master Persian (the language of the tests), and are unfamiliar with questions dealing with Persian culture and literature. As a result, an ethnic Arab's chance of getting into university is 12 times lower than his compatriots from Tehran, Shiraz or Isfahan. Demands that at least 10 percent of places at local universities be reserved for ethic Arabs have been turned down by successive Iranian administrations. Ahmadinejad regards such policies as "un-Islamic." One outlet for Arab-Iranian grievances is the so-called Khuzestan Welfare Party, which calls for greater autonomy for the province within the Iranian state. Created in 1946, the party disappeared in the 1950s, to reappear in 2005. No one can gauge its strength. But it provides a moderate alternative to the radical Ahvaz Liberation Front (ALF), which has preached armed struggle since the 1970s. The revolt of Arab-Iranians is in its early stages. There is, as yet, no evidence that it might degenerate into secessionism. But Ahmadinejad's repressive policies could help those who claim that ethnic Arabs would be better off in a secular democratic state with their Iraqi Shiite Arab brethren, rather than remaining in an Iran dominated by chauvinistic mullahs. |
| Posted by:ryuge |
| #4 Far too little, far too late. The Persian people allowed their Shiite mullahs to entrench themselves so thoroughly that only large scale violent force will uproot them. I do not see how anything but external military action will do the job. It seems highly unlikely that Iran's military can adequately oppose the IRG and Qods Force. That leaves little hope. |
| Posted by: Zenster 2007-09-06 16:54 |
| #3 It's still a good idea to partition Iran and cut off Persian access to the oil and gulf. |
| Posted by: ed 2007-09-06 10:34 |
| #2 Wishful thinking. Nothing to see here. agree G*rom, writer in search of a pathetic reality. |
| Posted by: Red Dawg 2007-09-06 10:31 |
| #1 Wishful thinking. Nothing to see here. |
| Posted by: gromky 2007-09-06 10:19 |