In my opinion, if we want to understand the root cause of IranÂ’s current problems, we have to glance back at the events following the 1979 Revolution, which, in my analysis, had two contradictory trends. Mr. Rafsanjani in 1989 took over the executive branch with a mandate to reconstruct the country after a devastating eight-year war. He also promised to reform the economy with the World BankÂ’s guidance, open up the countryÂ’s cultural atmosphere, normalize IranÂ’s foreign relations, and institute principles of scientific management in place of religious management. These goals were interconnected and formed a so-called "package." In reality, this package was none other than following the Western model of development. As such, it alienated the leftist camp and marked a departure from some of the 1979 RevolutionÂ’s ideals. The alienation of the leftist camp, to which I myself belonged, did not matter much, as leftists did not hold much power anyway.
Mr. Rafsanjani’s main problem was with the Hezbollahis, or the “pious,” committed forces who quickly realized that Mr. Rafsanjani’s “scientific” management does not leave a place for them or their ideology.
I think Mr. Rafsanjani did not intend to alienate the Hezbollah. In fact, he preferred that the Hezbollah stayed in power, after a little moderation of a radical ideology. Mr. RafsanjaniÂ’s program, however, was to institute scientific management, and that did not leave any place for the Hezbollahi forces. The Hezbollah, however, regarded itself as the bastion of the revolution and pursued its own interests, so it was natural that it would not tolerate Mr. RafsanjaniÂ’s package and direction of change.
In fact, if we want to be impartial, the Islamic Republic had been able to withstand all kinds of foreign and domestic challenges precisely by relying on HezbollahÂ’s determination and ideological ferocity. Therefore, it was not easy for the regime to push Hezbollah aside. In fact such a move may have even brought about a tactical suicide, depriving the regime of its main bastion of support.
Losing HezbollahÂ’s support meant that Mr. Rafsanjani needed to rely on the support of an alternative social base, which was emerging in the form of a new and progressive middle class, something that Mr. Rafsanjani did not have a good grasp of and did not try to bring about. At least, his efforts to do so were too little and too late.
On the one hand, Mr. Rafsanjani did not want to lose Hezbollah, while on the other, he was not able to create a stable social class to replace it. For this reason, despite his accomplishments in his first term in office, Mr. Rafsanjani retreated during his second term and essentially abandoned his development program in a bid not to alienate the Hezbollah any further. Meanwhile, in order to stand up to Rafsanjani and discredit his programs, Hezbollah began propagating its own ideology more vehemently and strengthened its organizational capacities.
Mr. Rafsanjani finished his second term in office while a disorganized new middle class was dispersed across the country, whereas an organized and institutionalized Hezbollah had emerged more powerful than ever before.
RafsanjaniÂ’s disorganized supporters went head to head with HezbollahÂ’s organized forces during the 1997 presidential election, in which the former camp won the battle, owing to its sheer numbers. But this was only the beginning of a much larger and more dangerous game that followed, which I will get to in my next article.
Ahmad Zeidabadi is an Iranian journalist and political analyst. His articles appeared in many newspapers and other media such as Rooz and BBC Persian.