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| India-Pakistan |
| MusharrafÂ’s Last Jam |
| 2008-02-07 |
| By John McCreary The tragic assassination of Benazir Bhutto was merely the coup de grâce for a U.S. strategy that was already doomed to failure. When Pervez Musharraf falls, too, will American leaders finally wake up and see Pakistan for what it is, not for what they wish it to be? American officials always seem to hit it off with their Pakistani counterparts. Typically well-educated, articulate, affable, apparently liberal, and averse to confrontation, they appear to share U.S. goals and values. But the personal bonhomie can lead to dangerous illusions. It tends to obscure key facts of Pakistani political history, half of which has been dominated by military governments who usurped the constitution. And it blinds U.S. leaders to the reality that Pakistani leaders pursue strategic national interests that are inimical to American goals—be it containing nuclear proliferation, promoting peace on the subcontinent, fighting terrorism and extremism, or spreading democracy in the Muslim world. Take Benazir Bhutto, a U.S. favorite before her Dec. 27 assassination. As prime minister, she spurred Pakistan’s aggressive nuclear weapons program, acquired missile and aircraft delivery systems from China and North Korea, and supported the Taliban to provide strategic depth against India. Pervez Musharraf, another U.S. favorite, executed those programs first as chief of the Army staff and later as president. In the October 2002 general elections, Musharraf’s chief political ally was the pro-Taliban MMA, the Islamist political coalition that won control of two of Pakistan’s four provincial governments. It would be a mistake to view this military-mosque alliance as one of mere convenience. Far from simply being “infiltrated” by Islamist sympathizers, the Army rank and file is largely composed of them. In other words, Pakistan’s military is an agent of extremist views, not a bulwark against terrorism. Nor do U.S. policymakers fathom the depths of Pakistan’s ethnic fissures. Successful countries usually have a common national narrative or sense of self. Pakistan’s national identity, in contrast, is based on not being Hindu—a thin reed on which to hang a unified state. We all know about the restiveness of the Baluchis and Pashtuns who populate Pakistan’s tribal areas. But the country’s tribalism extends east of the Indus River, which Americans tend to see as the dividing line between civilization and the wild. Bhutto, for instance, was a secular Sindhi politician in a country where Punjabis dominate the armed forces and the government. Mobs have rioted in Sindh province over Bhutto’s murder, chanting anti-Punjabi slogans. In fact, Pakistan is one huge “tribal area”—a fundamentally unstable country that is not committed to the rule of law or elected government. So, before desperate U.S. policymakers tried to arrange a shotgun wedding between Musharraf and Bhutto, they might have examined the interest groups the two leaders represent, the distance and issues that separate them, and the nature of the interaction between Pakistan’s military, Islamist, and secular political players. Instead, U.S. officials liked them both, so they promoted cooperation between two viscerally hostile interest groups. As a result, Pakistan is much more unstable than it was before Bhutto returned on October 18 and was subsequently killed. She will not be the last to die in this bout of political instability. If anything, the situation will probably get worse. Government leaders are always under some degree of stress. But stress becomes a threat to national stability when governments are unwilling or unable to satisfy the needs and wants of their people, or when they anger specific, powerful groups. That’s when governments usually blunder in judgment, timing, and crisis management—and Musharraf has proven himself to be quite the blunderer indeed. Until recently, the effects of his chronic bad judgment have been mitigated by good advisors, lavish U.S. aid, and a buoyant economy. But in 2007, Musharraf’s luck began to run out. His first big mistake was attacking the Pakistan judiciary in March, when he suspended the chief justice for trivial reasons, mostly personal pique. (We know this was a blunder because he was forced to retract it. One of the key signs of a stable government is that it can enforce its orders.) In June and July, Musharraf mishandled the Red Mosque insurrection in Islamabad. The storming of the mosque led Baitullah Mehsud, the Pashtun tribal leader allegedly behind the Bhutto assassination, to declare war against the government. Al Qaeda followed suit in September. (A stable government does not expand the ranks of its enemies.) Then in November, Musharraf imposed a state of emergency to perpetuate his political power, showing how out of touch he is with the political scene. (Pakistani polls rate him the least-popular politician in Pakistan.) His latest blunder, failing to protect Bhutto, may be the one that ultimately threatens his regime. There are only two possible outcomes for Pakistan now, both of which involve Musharraf taking action that brings about his own death or overthrow. One is a praetorian coup from within the military; the other is a popular uprising. Either can result from his mishandling of an important national issue, such as secession by a district or province. You can bet the corps commanders of the Pakistani Army are already calculating the costs and benefits of five more years of Musharraf. Despite the riots in Sindh, there are no signs of a widespread uprising. The most likely scenario is for popular unrest to prompt the Army to oust Musharraf to stabilize the country. (This is how Suharto was overthrown in Indonesia in 1998.) Musharraf has poor judgment and is prone to be more dictatorial and capricious than Pakistanis accept. He will blunder again and thus become the agent of his own political or physical demise. The only question is, will the United States see it coming? John McCreary was a senior intelligence expert at the Defense Intelligence Agency for 38 years. Currently vice president for intelligence applications of dNovus RDI, a San Antonio-based defense contractor, he writes the nightly executive commentary NightWatch. |
| Posted by:john frum |