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| India-Pakistan |
| Time to get real on Jammu and Kashmir |
| 2008-02-09 |
| By Arvin Bahl Former US President Bill Clinton referred to Jammu & Kashmir as the most dangerous place on Earth: It is the only place where two nuclear powers are involved in violent conflict. Jammu & Kashmir represents one of the world's longest standing disputes as it has been in existence since the Partition of the Indian Sub-continent in 1947. Numerous frameworks have been utilised to explain the Jammu & Kashmir conflict. Some have attempted to analyse it in the context of great power politics, arguing that the dynamics of the Cold War drove India and Pakistan into initial conflict despite the fact that the US and the Soviet Union did a great deal to bring about a compromise over Jammu & Kashmir. Others view it as a clash between Hindu and Muslim civilisations despite the fact that India has a larger Muslim population than Pakistan. The question of why the Jammu & Kashmir conflict continues is the question of why Pakistan is so pre-occupied with wresting control over the Kashmir Valley from India. Some may object to this view, arguing that it is "politicians on both sides" who are most responsible for perpetuating the conflict. Though India views all of Jammu & Kashmir as an integral part of it, New Delhi is willing to settle the conflict by formalising the status quo and converting the Line of Control into an international border, a very rational policy that is realist in nature. Pakistan's quest for Jammu & Kashmir has little to do with strategic, territorial or geopolitical aims and cannot by explained by realist or rationalist theories of international relations. The Kashmir Valley is a small landlocked region that only represents roughly 15 per cent of the total area of Jammu & Kashmir held by India. The chances of Pakistan wresting control of the Kashmir Valley from a larger and much more powerful India are next to nothing. Pakistan's economy cannot bear the strain of its large defence budget, and Pakistan puts itself at risk of military confrontation with a stronger power in its quest for the Kashmir Valley. Pakistan's quest stems from its founding ideology, the two-nation theory, and its domestic politics. According to the two-nation theory, Muslims of the sub-continent were a nation distinct from the Hindus, with whom they could not live in peace and by whom they would be permanently oppressed in Hindu-majority India. Thus they needed to have their own homeland. Pakistan's conceding that a Muslim majority region that is contiguous with it can be a part of India would undermine the basis of its creation. Jammu & Kashmir also has ideological significance for India, being the foremost symbol of Indian secularism. The two-nation theory, which was dubious to begin with, considering that Hindus and Muslims of the sub-continent shared the same languages, customs and culture, has faced challenges from a variety of ethnic groups in Pakistan. The Bengalis, who were the majority of the country's population, seceded in 1971, disproving the notion that Muslims of the sub-continent were a nation. Virtually every ethnic group, except the dominant Punjabis, has tried to secede at some point. Pursuing conflict with India over Jammu & Kashmir has been used as a way to overcome challenges that threaten the basis of Pakistan's national ideology and strengthen national cohesion. The Pakistani military, the country's most powerful institution since its formation, has used the conflict with India to bring about and legitimise its dominance. The military views conflict with India as a way to justify its continuing prominence in Pakistani politics and its massive budget. It has been much more confrontational towards India than civilian Governments and has thwarted attempts by civilian leaders to improve relations with India. For example, when Benazir Bhutto first came to power in 1988, she sought to improve relations with India. She took steps to stop Pakistan's support for insurgencies in Jammu & Kashmir and Punjab. Soon, however, she was forced to revert to the policies of Gen Zia-ul Haq. When Mr Nawaz Sharif came to power, he initiated a dialogue with Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who took a historic bus trip to Lahore in February of 1999. However, in the summer of 1999, the Pakistan Army launched the Kargil operation. According to Pakistan's former Foreign Secretary Niaz Naik, this was done to undermine Mr Sharif's peace initiative. Every few years Indians and Pakistanis become puzzlingly optimistic about the prospects for a solution to the Jammu & Kashmir conflict, and the media in both countries creates the impression that a solution is around the corner. Given India's desire to maintain its territorial integrity and Pakistan's to change the status quo, the mutual exclusivity of Indian secularism and the two-nation theory, and the interests of the Pakistani military, solving the conflict is a near impossibility. There is simply no middle ground. This is what makes Jammu & Kashmir a much harder dispute to solve than the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Despite the animosity both sides recognise that a change to the current status quo needs to occur: Israelis must feel secure and not have to face terrorism, and there must be a two-state solution. While it may be difficult to find a solution that satisfies Israel's desire for security and the Palestinians' for a viable state, the two are not completely mutually exclusive. In Jammu & Kashmir, however, India is perfectly fine with the status quo, while Pakistan has opposed it for 60 years. There is perhaps a road that could lead to a potential solution. India's succeeding in reducing alienation in Jammu & Kashmir, ties between the two countries improving, and Pakistan becoming more democratic and liberal, could lay the groundwork for an agreement. Pakistan's national identity, albeit reformulated, could even be compatible with some kind of a settlement. One of the integral components of Pakistan's identity as a haven for South Asia's Muslims has been a concern about the rights and struggles of Muslims worldwide. If India succeeds in reconciliation with the Kashmiris, Pakistan, instead of focussing narrowly on the ideas of the two-nation theory that Hindus and Muslims cannot co-exist, could argue that its quest for Jammu & Kashmir was not in vain and that support for the insurgency and keeping the issue highlighted internationally caused India to "take the aspirations of the Kashmiris seriously". But Pakistan has not become more democratic and the Islamist forces are becoming stronger, not weaker. Most important, it is simply difficult to fathom that Pakistan will ever be willing to countenance officially rejecting the basis for its creation. Thus, one should not be optimistic at all about the prospects of a final solution to the Jammu & Kashmir conflict anytime in the near future. — The writer, a US-based scholar, is the author of From Jinnah to Jihad: Pakistan's Kashmir Quest and the Limits of Realism |
| Posted by:john frum |
| #1 The more I look at Pakistan, the less difference---except for the scale effects---I see between it and Paleostan. |
| Posted by: g(r)omgoru 2008-02-09 17:23 |