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| Iraq |
| Today's Yon: In Iraq, a storm before the calm |
| 2008-05-05 |
| Monday, May 5th 2008, 4:00 AM April saw 49 U.S. casualties in Iraq, the highest total in seven months. Does this mean, as some insist, that the enormous progress we have made since the start of the military surge is being lost? As one who has spent nearly two years with American soldiers and Marines and British Army troops in Iraq - having returned from my last trip a month ago - here's my short answer: no. We are taking more casualties now, just as we did in the first part of 2007, because we have taken up the next crucial challenge of this war: confronting the Shia militias. In early 2007, under the leadership of Gen. David Petraeus, we began to wage an effective counterinsurgency campaign against the reign of terror Al Qaeda in Iraq had established over much of the midsection of the country. That campaign, which moved many of our troops off of big centralized bases and out into small neighborhood outposts, carried real risks. In every one of the first eight months of 2007, we lost more soldiers than we had the previous year. Only as the campaign bore fruit - in the form of Iraqi citizens working with American soldiers on a daily basis, helping uncover terrorist hideouts together - did the casualty numbers begin to improve. Now we are helping the Iraqis deal with a much different problem: the Shia militias, the most well-known of which is "Jaysh al-Mahdi," known as JAM, largely controlled by Moqtada al-Sadr. To comprehend our strategy here, we need to understand the goals of these militias, which pundits, politicians and the press all too often gloss over. Al Qaeda's aim was to destroy Iraq in civil war. Allegedly devout Muslims, the terrorist savages were willing to rape, murder and pillage their own people just as long as they could catch America in the middle. One reason Al Qaeda in Iraq can regenerate so quickly, despite being hated by most Iraqis, is that, armed with generous funding from outside Iraq, they mostly recruit young men and boys from Iraqi street gangs, giving them money, guns and drugs. In contrast, JAM and the other Shia militias do not want to destroy Iraq; they want power in the new Iraq. They did not, for the most part, start out as criminal gangs, but as self-defense organizations protecting Shia neighborhoods from the chaos of post-invasion Iraq, including Al Qaeda. Because the militias are strong, well-organized and long had deep support among the population, and because their goal is political power, not random destruction, some have argued that we should have nothing to do with taking them on. They predict a bloody and futile campaign that would make us once again enemies of the Iraqi people rather than their defenders. These critics miss a crucial on-the-ground reality: Virtually all insurgencies, however noble their original purpose, eventually degenerate into criminal organizations, classic Mafia-like protection rackets, especially as they achieve their original goals. With Al Qaeda mostly wiped out of Baghdad, the militias that once defended Shia neighborhoods now prey on them. In Basra to the south, where al Qaeda always feared to tread, the situation is even worse. Practically speaking, that city has been ruled by an uneasy coalition of rival Shia gangs for years. The great victory of the past year and a half has been the decision of Sunni citizens to turn against Sunni outlaws. Now, neither we nor the Iraqi government can maintain our credibility with the Sunni if the Shia militias are allowed to remain outside the law. The militias, unlike Al Qaeda, are not insane; we can negotiate with them. But we and the Iraqi government can only capitalize on the shifting sentiments of the Shia neighborhoods if we first demonstrate that we and the government - not the gangs - control the streets. That means, for the next few months, expect more blood, casualties and grim images of war. This may lead to a shift in the political debate inside the United States and more calls for rapid withdrawal. But on the ground in Iraq, it's a sign of progress. Yon is an independent reporter and blogger (michaelyon-online.com). His new book is "Moment of Truth in Iraq."By Michael Yon |
| Posted by:Sherry |
| #10 Yon was writing at an op-ed level of generalization, but he's wrong (in an irrelevant way) about "all" insurgencies, and in a slightly less irrelevant way about the JAM. Many of its components started, and remained, little more than predatory gangs. There was no sustained Sunni terror war in most of the south, or the east. But JAM affiliates there were sometimes so awful that the locals themselves took up arms agin 'em. The militias are best "negotiated" with not just from a position of strength, but after their leading members have been killed, or imprisoned, or humiliated (in the case of the many that are little more than criminal enterprises, and especially in the case of those that are very Iran-aligned). That is, if you want your "progress" to last more than a month or two. But if not, I suggest you consult current CoS Casey about his wildly successful strategy of treading lightly and carrying a small stick. |
| Posted by: Verlaine 2008-05-05 22:51 |
| #9 A head on a Pike at the gate reduces the martyr syndrome |
| Posted by: Dorf 2008-05-05 21:14 |
| #8 A head on a Pike at the gate reduces the martyr syndrome |
| Posted by: Dorf 2008-05-05 21:12 |
| #7 But not Tater. He has got to go No argument there. The trick is ensuring he isn't accorded martyr status when he's taken down. |
| Posted by: Pappy 2008-05-05 18:43 |
| #6 Tater Tot is not 100% synonymous with the Shia militias. Probably there are militias we should be speaking to. But not Tater. He has got to go. Recall that even some of the "insane" AQI affiliates wound up switching sides and fighting with us. No doubt similar techniques will work with the Shia gangs. Neutralize those you can and obliterate the rest. |
| Posted by: Iblis 2008-05-05 16:07 |
| #5 #3 - I tend to agree, I even think we can negotiate with Muqty, as long as from a position of strength (which is what Yon calls for) and realizing what he is, and not trusting farther than we can shake a stick at him. OTOH, even if we CANT negotiate with Muqty, doesnt mean we cant negotiate with local leaders who may have been aligned with him in the past. |
| Posted by: liberalhawk 2008-05-05 13:35 |
| #4 "The great victory of the past year and a half has been the decision of Sunni citizens to turn against Sunni outlaws. Now, neither we nor the Iraqi government can maintain our credibility with the Sunni if the Shia militias are allowed to remain outside the law." I agree, this is a key factor. |
| Posted by: liberalhawk 2008-05-05 13:33 |
| #3 The militias, unlike Al Qaeda, are not insane; we can negotiate with them. Comment to a particular anonymous poster last week, whose Arab-vocabulary seemed limited to 'hudna' and 'taqqiya': since Yon appears to be truth-incarnate here at Rantburg, is the idea acceptable now? |
| Posted by: Pappy 2008-05-05 13:30 |
| #2 Most of those "critics" are dhimocrats and part of the surrender and retreat movement. |
| Posted by: DarthVader 2008-05-05 11:10 |
| #1 Many of those "critics" have the same attitude (don't disturb the criminal & he will stay away from ME) w/r to Iraq and here in the US. |
| Posted by: tipover 2008-05-05 10:51 |