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| Emboldenment Effect in Iraq - How the MSM helps al-Q |
| 2008-06-24 |
| .pdf at link. And yes, this is from Harvard. There is an explicit and quantifiable cost to public debate during wartime in the form of increased attacks. Based on these results, it appears that Iraqi insurgent groups believe that when the U.S. political landscape is more uncertain, initiating a higher level of attacks increases the likelihood that the U.S. will reduce the scope of its engagement in the conflict. However, the magnitude of the response by Iraqi insurgent groups is relatively small. To the extent that U.S. political speech does affect insurgent incentives, it changes things only by about 7-10 percent. And if total deaths have been 4,000 that's 280-400 Americans. Relatively small. Unless you or your brother are one of them. But still, a small price to pay for Nan and Harry to mug for the evening news. Second, the insurgent response to low resolve periods may not represent an overall increase in the total number of attacks, but rather a change in the timing of attacks. New information about U.S. cost-sensitivity increases the perceived return to violence and thus insurgent groups condense the violence they would have committed over several weeks into a shorter time horizon. Third, regardless of whether the observed effect represents an overall increase or inter-temporal substitution, the evidence in this study indicates that insurgent groups are strategic actors that respond to the incentives created by the policies and actions of the counterinsurgent force, rather than groups driven by purely ideological concerns with little sensitivity to costs. There appears to be a systematic response of Iraqi insurgent groups to information about the U.S. willingness to remain in Iraq and/or public support for the war. Finally, it is not possible to determine from these results the overall benefits or costs of public debate, or its net effect on counterinsurgency effectiveness. One issue is how to weigh the difficult tradeoff between U.S. and Iraqi casualties. If the goal of U.S. policy is to minimize harm to Iraqi civilians and to shift the costs and risks of the conflict from non-combatants to U.S. forces, more public debate may be better. I have to admit that this is how economists look at the world. In addition to the potential social preference for protecting civilians, there are pragmatic reasons why such a shift may be desirable. Because military targets tend to be more difficult to successfully attack, the total number of fatalities (civilian plus military) tends to decline as targeting increases. The targeting also forces insurgents to reveal themselves to the military (more so in certain types of attacks), making detection easier. Maybe Nan and Harry can coordinate their outbursts with Centcom operations planners. Third, protecting and reducing civilian fatalities may increase support for the counterinsurgent among the general populace—consistent with the “hearts and minds” approach to counterinsurgency. As mentioned above, there may be additional benefits to a vigorous public debate, from improving the quality of political and military policy choices to reducing the moral hazard effect of unconditional support for the incumbent government. Without analyzing and measuring the additional consequences, it is not possible to determine if antiwar criticism of U.S. policy is on balance bad. |
| Posted by:Nimble Spemble |
| #1 I do love real research results! Thank you for posting this, Nimble Spemble. The author did make a good point about motivating the terrorists to concentrate on hardened military targets rather than civilians, but it would be better were such things deliberate rather than the result of political malice aforethought. |
| Posted by: trailing wife 2008-06-24 21:32 |