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Syria-Lebanon-Iran
How Israeli negotiator played Nasrallah By Emmanuel Sivan
2008-07-20
Virtually no heroes can be found in the affair of the abducted soldiers, except for the noble Regev and Goldwasser families. Surely a cack-handed cabinet that hastened to wage war without pausing to reflect, and a vociferous media with a penchant for exaggerations and sentimental melodrama, are not among these heroes.

But maybe, in addition to the Regevs and the Goldwassers, we can add Ofer Dekel to the list, for his performance as the government's representative in the negotiations to return the two soldiers' bodies. He helped make the best out of a difficult situation, and at minimal cost.

Dekel operated within a rigid framework, made up of a government that needed an achievement, and to put an end to this affair; a reckless and impatient media; and the genuine human drama of the missing soldiers' families'.

Through it, he managed to keep a clear head. He correctly assessed that the leader of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, is not the all-powerful sorcerer he's made out to be, and that Hezbollah - yes, even the mighty and dreaded Hezbollah - had some constraints that could be exploited.

One constraint stems from the organization's primary source of power - its status as the only armed militia inside Lebanon.

Its raison d'etre, in all the agreements within Lebanon and in other Arab countries, was resisting Israel's presence in Lebanon. The Israeli withdrawal in May 2000 stripped it of its legitimacy. How can Hezbollah justify its existence as a militia now?

The pressures to disarm Hezbollah increased with Syria's pullout from Lebanon in March 2005.

Furthermore, its need to take action against Israel, to justify its military component, produced the July 2006 kidnapping. In staging this attack, as Nasrallah himself admitted in retrospect, Hezbollah did not take into account a massive Israeli reaction.

This means that even the great Nasrallah makes mistakes, despite our commentators' insistence that he reads us like a book.

The other constraint is that Iran was upset over Hezbollah's reckless move, as the abduction was construed in Tehran. Furthermore, Iran was displeased with Hezbollah's use of long-range missiles, which were meant exclusively for a large-scale showdown with Israel.

This is why Iran has forbidden the organization to use the missiles until further notice.

Obviously, the Iranians are not eager to see a second round of hostilities with Israel - certainly not while they are attempting to dampen the international and diplomatic pressure over their uranium enrichment program.

Iran has an interest in presenting itself as a reasonable and responsible regional power.

This all means that despite Hezbollah's rearmament drive, it does not possess a military option right now. The balance of terror in the north is tipping in the favor of the Israel Defense Forces, as Hezbollah has reason to fear a ferocious Israeli retaliation for its military activities, in the name of a rematch or revenge.

Hezbollah's need to legitimize itself as an armed militia is becoming more pressing in light of how the March 14 Alliance, a coalition of anti-Syrian political parties and independents in Lebanon, is gaining support.

Hezbollah, which the Christian-Sunni-Druze alliance considers an enemy of Lebanese sovereignty, can justify its existence with nothing more than the pitiful pretext of liberating the Shaba Farms, which Hezbollah's detractors have ridiculed and belittled.

Another grave error by Nasrallah - May's forceful takeover of the Sunni quarter in Beirut - increased the need for legitimacy.

The takeover clearly showed that the militia is battling not just the Zionists, but also coreligionists: Lebanese Sunnis. Following the murder of its leader Rafik Hariri, the Lebanese Sunni establishment has become a strong believer in a strong and independent Lebanon.

The newly founded alliance between Christians and Druze has consolidated itself even further, while Sunni Muslim movements outside Lebanon, headed by Egypt's Muslim brotherhood, strongly rebuked Hezbollah for perpetrating this act - which Sunnis call an act of civil war.

If Hezbollah is sensitive to any sort of media coverage, it is not the coverage by Al Jazeera, with its amorphous and sentimental viewership.

Hezbollah cares about winning supporters from fanatical sister sects and Muslim organizations. This is especially true now that the Sunni-Shi'ite gulf is widening from its rupture point in Iraq.

The conclusion is that Hezbollah is in grave need of an achievement that would help it legitimize its existence as a militia.

Dekel apparently comprehended this, as well as Hezbollah's poor bargaining chips.

After all, the Israeli team negotiated under the near-certain assumption that the two MIAs were dead. Dekel understood the weaknesses of an organization that many perceive to be omnipotent, and this is why he was able to run a truly praiseworthy negotiation process.
Posted by:Fred

#5  I dunno, Perfesser, the exchange makes Nasty look like a man who can get stuff done. That makes him look good to the rubes.

The Israelis are in a bad situation up north. Their army was allowed to deteriorate, the Hezbies have protection, and the world doesn't mind at all that the Hezbies are killing Jooos. Next time they have to go up there they might as well toss the Hezbies and re-occupy southern Lebanon -- the condemnation won't be any worse.
Posted by: Steve White   2008-07-20 10:02  

#4  I disagree with almost everyone here. Not that Olmert's not a crook, which he certainly seems to be, but that his decision not to send in massive ground forces into Lebanon was precisely correct. Put simply, it would not have been enough to damage Hezbollah, it would have to be and stay defeated. The only way to do that would have been to reoccupy the country, and there is simply no way that the U.S. could have supported such an occupation. The prisoner exchange makes Hezbollah look weak, not strong.
Posted by: Perfesser   2008-07-20 08:21  

#3  How to snatch a defeat from the jaws of victory. Well, not really jaws of victory were in play in the matter, but ya get my drift.
Posted by: Spike Uniter   2008-07-20 03:21  

#2  Outstanding stupidity or spin. Israelis gave Nasrralah the victory and legitimacy he needed.
Posted by: Slaviger the Grim7444   2008-07-20 02:28  

#1  This guy just doesn't get it -

Hezbollah has guns and money and is happy to kill its opponents, thats the only legitimacy it needs. And any other status it has it gets from winning propaganda victories, which this was.

What a dingbat.
Posted by: buwaya   2008-07-20 02:12  

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