| Submit your comments on this article |
| Afghanistan |
| The Afghanistan paradox |
| 2008-10-08 |
| By Michael Yon Can the war in Afghanistan be won? It depends on whom you ask. The senior British commander in Afghanistan recently was quoted in The Times of London, "This war cannot be won." A French diplomatic dispatch reports that the British ambassador said the best solution would be to find an "acceptable dictator" to take over the troubled country. But the British soldiers with whom I was recently embedded in Helmand Province had very high morale and felt optimistic about Afghanistan. And British and American officers whose judgment and honesty I trust share that optimism, even acknowledging the difficult challenges they face, and that this will take a decade (according to Brits) or decades (according to Americans). Do these soldiers know something their leaders don't? Or is it just another Afghan paradox? This is a land of paradox. The people here are friendly and hospitable, violent and suspicious. The war effort enjoys broad support, yet our alliance is unraveling. The Taliban are widely despised, and yet certain elements of it are integral parts of Afghan society. People want the national government to succeed, yet they have little or no faith in it. In many respects, while the country takes center stage in today's geopolitics, it is stuck in the Middle Ages. I've driven over a thousand miles up and down Afghan roads during the past few weeks to find that many locals are thankful to the coalition of American, British and other NATO forces that are trying to bring peace and stability to the country. Others say they hate us. It has become clear to me that we're losing this war. But losing doesn't mean lost. When someone says they know what to do in Afghanistan, it's best to remain skeptical. Some folks are flat-out lying, like recent attempts to deny the existence of a secret report documenting how 10 French soldiers who were killed didn't have enough ammo or working radios. Others are telling us what we want to hear, like it will just take a few more troops and some border incursions into Pakistan to straighten out this mess. There are a few honest players in Afghanistan, and I'm listening carefully to them. But please understand this much: In a land whose paradoxes can confuse and even crush powerful empires, any solutions - if they even exist - will not be simple or painless. When I traveled extensively in Iraq, I spent a lot of time with combat units that were consistently winning against the enemy, both in kinetic operations and gaining the support of the people. All the while, we were losing certain aspects of that war, both in Iraq and back on the home front. It wasn't until our tactical superiority was supported by an effective strategy that we started turning things around. Iraq now has the chance to become a peaceful andprosperous country, and a good ally. I sense that the day will come when I will request a visa togo on vacation in Iraq. Can the same thing happen in Afghanistan? I am less confident - for today, anyway. Gen. David Petraeus, who recently assumed command of Centcom, responsible for U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq (and many other countries), knows that these two countries present different challenges. The counterinsurgency manual he revised, and his own doctoral dissertation on the effects of Vietnam on the American military and foreign policy, show an intellect that is subtle enough to recognize a paradox and honest enough not to try and hide behind it. One of the paradoxes described in the counterinsurgency manual is: "Tactical success guarantees nothing." If anyone can unravel Afghanistan, it's Petraeus. But that might be beyond even his talents. Describing his successful partnership with the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, Petraeus recently said: "There has to be absolute unity of purpose, unity of effort, even if there cannot be and will not be unity of command." Right now, our enemies have unity of purpose: They want to kick us out of here. Meanwhile, we can't even agree about whether or not this war can be won. |
| Posted by:tu3031 |
| #6 We tried that in South and Central America and most became Democracies after the Cold War. Only a couple have reverted to questionable governments. We tried that in South Korea and Taiwan and both became raging successes and transitioned over to Democratic governments once they were wealthy enough. We tried that in Greece in the 70s and they also became a Democracy in time. A few still hate us today but nobody considers them an enemy of the USA. We never tried that in Afghanistan, we walked away after the Soviets were defeated and we've been trying to help a fledgling Democracy run by Karzai. |
| Posted by: rjschwarz 2008-10-08 15:36 |
| #5 Actually, rjs, that's exactly what just fell apart. |
| Posted by: Darrell 2008-10-08 15:09 |
| #4 I think the solution for Pakistan is not to insist on Democracy but to allow "our Bastards" to run the place and keep a lid on the nonsense. Posted by: rjschwarz Didn't we try that is S. and Central America in the 60s and 70s? And exactly how far did it get us? |
| Posted by: DLR 2008-10-08 14:28 |
| #3 I think the solution for Pakistan is not to insist on Democracy but to allow "our Bastards" to run the place and keep a lid on the nonsense. |
| Posted by: rjschwarz 2008-10-08 14:18 |
| #2 You want to win in Afghanistan? Then you have to get very serious about Pakistan, Russia and Iran. |
| Posted by: Jack is Back! 2008-10-08 12:47 |
| #1 i don't think the US government thinks of this as a winnable situation like a normal one would. This has too do with keeping the radicals of the muslims in kind of a cetral place too fight instead of spread out all over the place. Also looks like another good place for pour jets too land just in case it ever does break loose with Iran |
| Posted by: sinse 2008-10-08 11:50 |