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| Afghanistan |
| The way out of the Afghan quagmire |
| 2009-03-26 |
| By Chinmaya R. Gharekhan Ahmed Rashid, whose book Descent into Chaos has deservedly been widely acclaimed, reveals that in 1988 Pakistan could have extracted a recognition of the Durand Line as part of the agreement that ended the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, but that it never raised the issue, despite considerable prodding by the United Nations. After 9/11, says Mr. Rashid, many Pakistanis maintained that if only Afghan President Hamid Karzai had recognised the Durand Line, he would have appeased Islamabad sufficiently to halt its military support to the Taliban. Yet the military refrained from insisting on Afghanistan recognising the Durand Line — despite several opportunities to do so. Neither the Afghan mujahideen government in 1992 nor the subsequent Taliban regime — which depended on Islamabad’s support — was asked to recognise the Line. Mr. Rashid cites Sahebzada Yaqub Khan, who was Pakistan’s Foreign Minister during a period of the 1980s, as admitting that the military deliberately never asked for an Afghan recognition of the Line. At that time, President Zia-ul-Haq passionately worked toward creating a pro-Pakistan Islamic government in Kabul, to be followed by the Islamisation of Central Asia. This was, according to Mr. Rashid, part of Pakistan’s strategy to secure ‘strategic depth’ in relation to India. General Zia’s vision depended on an undefined border with Afghanistan, so that the army could justify any future interference in that country and beyond. The logic, according to Mr. Rashid, was that as long as there was no recognised border there could be no international law to break if Pakistan forces were to support surrogate Afghan regimes such as the one led by the Taliban. Mr. Rashid’s observations are relevant in today’s context when we bear in mind that he is reported to be a close adviser to General David Petraeus and is even said to have directly briefed President Barack Obama. The fact that he is from Pakistan should not detract from his insights; he impresses one as being a reasonably objective analyst. Mr. Rashid confirms what India has experienced over the past decades, namely, the Pakistan establishment’s obsession with India, and its tendency to evaluate every situation through the prism of its impact on India. If something will help India in any way, Pakistan will oppose it. And if something will hurt India Pakistan will support it, even if, in the process, Pakistan itself might get hurt. As of today, the establishment means the Pakistan Army, of which Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is an integral part. If, at some time in the future, democracy gets genuine acceptance in Pakistan, when the civilian government would not have to look over its shoulders to worry about the Army’s reaction, this India-centric obsession might get diluted and, eventually, hopefully, disappear. Until then, however, the international community will be making a serious mistake if it does not take into consideration this basic fact of life in the subcontinent. Bruce Reidel, who has been tasked by Mr. Obama to oversee the final version of the review of the “Af-Pak” region undertaken by Richard Holbrooke, will surely recognise the significance of this reality. Several responsible leaders, including the Prime Minister of Canada and a former British Ambassador to Kabul, have said candidly that the war in Afghanistan is not winnable. The principal preoccupation of the United States currently is to formulate an exit strategy, which would enable it to leave behind an Afghanistan which can more or less maintain its own internal security and one where, the U.S. will persuade itself to believe, Al-Qaeda will not find a safe heaven from where it can plan and carry out anti-West attacks. Influential voices in Washington are already calling for a lowering of the goals by excluding the establishment of a functioning democracy in Afghanistan. Dialogue with the so-called moderate elements of the Taliban is an important, perhaps the most important, element of this strategy in the making. In theory it makes sense to try to divide the opposition and win over a section of it to one’s side, but this seldom works out in practice. It is early days to pass a definitive judgment on whether General Petraeus’ tactics of co-opting, by whatever means, a number of Sunni tribal chiefs to work alongside the Americans will ensure stability in Iraq in the long term. But it certainly seems to have provided enough of a cover for the administration to announce a kind of pull-out from Iraq. There are many examples where such methods have not worked, including of Vietnam. Even in Somalia this experiment has failed to restore stability. The “traitors” expose themselves and their families to targeted assassinations and hostage situations. The horrible record of the Taliban does not seem to worry those who advocate an accommodation with the ‘good’ Taliban. Experts such as Mr. Rashid, who encourage the administration in this direction, are perhaps motivated by the desire to help the U.S. to extricate itself from the Afghan quagmire. It will not be fair, or helpful, to impute other motives to them, even though the end result of this approach could be the establishment of precisely the kind of regime in Kabul as is desired, short-sightedly, by Pakistan. For India as well as other neighbours, not excluding Pakistan, such an outcome will have extremely negative consequences, which need not be spelt out here. Is it possible to think of some other direction in which to try to solve the intractable situation that Afghanistan is in at present? Henry Kissinger, in an article in the International Herald Tribune (February 28, 2009) argued: “Afghanistan is almost the archetypal international problem requiring a multilateral solution for the emergence of a political framework.” Such an outcome would be possible, he suggests, only if Afghanistan’s neighbours, principally Pakistan, agree on a policy of restraint and opposition to terrorism. Mr. Kissinger did not propose any details of a possible framework. In an article published in The Hindu some six years ago on December 24, 2003, which this writer had the privilege to co-author with Hamid Ansari, now the Vice President of India, we suggested the possible provisions of a political framework for Afghanistan. We proposed to combine Afghanistan’s traditional preference for neutrality with external guarantees of respect for such neutrality as well as of non-interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. We argued that only a combination of the two would negate the desire to interfere from without and the impulse to seek it from within. We felt that the Agreement on the Neutrality of Laos of 1962 offered a possible model for Afghanistan. That agreement spelt out the reciprocal commitments of the Laotian government on the one side and of the 14 co-signatories on the other. In Afghanistan’s case, the package would include the settlement of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. The Obama Administration has taken a positive initiative by convening the ‘umbrella’ meeting in The Hague on March 31, inviting all the regional players, including Iran, to participate in it. India will be represented by an able and experienced hand. Hopefully, the ideas expressed here could be of some help. The writer is a former Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations. |
| Posted by:john frum |
| #1 We felt that the Agreement on the Neutrality of Laos of 1962 offered a possible model for Afghanistan. The North Vietnamese were signatories, they just forgot to leave Laos. This twit seems to have amnesia and can't remember the Pathet Lao and the Ho Chi Minh Trail and all the rest of the successful aspects of the 62 Agreement. And don't forget the neutrality of Cambodia. The similarities to Vietnam are already great, why not make it complete. At least it's a way out, never mind all the brave GIs that will give up their lives for nothing while we preform the Afghanization of the war. Spruce up the Helo Pad on the roof of the US Embassy in Kabul. |
| Posted by: GolfBravoUSMC 2009-03-26 15:24 |