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| Iraq |
| Why it is time to start a new chapter in the U.S. advisory mission in Iraq |
| 2009-12-23 |
| Through its partnership with the Iraqi military, coalition forces have made progress in marginalizing many of the most egregious practices of the old regime. Brutal interrogation methods are no longer the norm, and blatant bribery has at least been stigmatized to the point where it takes place behind closed doors. But despite the best efforts of advisor teams and training initiatives, many of the same problems continue to plague the Iraqi Army (IA) senior leadership: a lack of detailed planning, an inability to trust and encourage initiative in subordinates, and a high level of corruption at the expense of the enlisted soldiers. Despite being in the "new army," Iraqi generals and field grade officers have still spent a majority of their careers in the "old army." Not surprisingly then, the Saddam-era tendencies manifest themselves most prominently amongst these officers, who view themselves as benevolent Bedouin sheiks, graciously bestowing patronage on their tribesmen (their troops) and competing for prestige amongst the other prominent tribal leaders (other officers). While they pay lip service to the idea of serving their country and their fellow Iraqis, their actions reveal that they have very little genuine concern for anyone other than themselves. In short, it seems that their reasons for being in the IA are simply the paycheck and the social prestige accompanying their rank and position. We therefore need to shift our advisory efforts away from these incorrigible senior officers and focus instead on the still malleable company grade officers. Otherwise, the poisonous, old-order mentality will inevitably seep into the minds of these young officers still learning what it means to be leaders and soldiers. As an advisor to an IA colonel over the past 10 months, my experiences have strongly spoken to these points. My counterpart constantly insists on offering me tea, food, and gifts as a way of demonstrating his great generosity. I find that I am always the one initiating any kind of work-related conversation, and whenever I do, he seems forlorn that I have ruined our social time together by injecting such a depressing subject. Despite my title of advisor, my counterpart has curiously never once asked for my advice. When he fails to produce a convenient excuse to avoid acting on one of my recommendations, he simply ignores it. Although his performance has been tolerable, or "Iraqi good enough," he is far from what I would objectively describe as professionally competent, hard working, or even honest. He sleeps for the better part of each afternoon, so I have made it a habit to not bother visiting him then. Whenever I do visit, I rarely find him engaged in anything work related but rather socializing with other officers or watching television. To be sure, my counterpart maintains his appearance as a staff officer by attending required meetings and doing what few tasks the division commanding general assigns him. As long as he fulfills these minimal requirements, he will continue to enjoy the benefits of his position, to include a well-furnished, air-conditioned office; his own air-conditioned living quarters with satellite television; his own shower and toilet; three soldiers who act as his personal servants by attending to his every need; and 7 days of paid vacation per month. With so few real responsibilities and so many benefits, what incentive does he have to heed my recommendations? Despite the fact that I enjoy a very amiable relationship with my counterpart, he and I both know that he does not have to listen to my suggestions, so he ignores them. The difference in rank between my counterpart and me can only minimally account for this problem. I have watched officers of similar rank to their counterparts encounter the same obstacles. Some advisors may disagree with this analysis based on their successes with their Iraqi counterparts. I will concede that, as mentioned above, advisors have successfully reduced or marginalized the most blatant fraud, waste, and abuse of the IA senior leadership. But regardless of rank, no advisor will be able to alter the fundamental mindset of an Iraqi senior officer: what's in it for me? Conversely, consider the IA's company grade officers, who have spent most of their careers in the new army. Unlike the Iraqi senior officers, whose attitudes toward the advice of their advisors ranges between indifference and annoyance, the Iraqi junior officers are still openminded and eager for instruction. Outside influences have acted upon these officers early enough in their lives to broaden their perspectives. They do not necessarily accept the defeatist worldview of the older generation--life is not necessarily a zero-sum game, individuals can effect change in their lives, there is reward in sacrificing for a larger purpose. While still proud of their Arab heritage, they are nonetheless more willing to shun the aspects of their culture that prove to impede progress of their nation. In general, they are more punctual. They are more willing to admit when they are wrong or when they do not know how to do something. Like their senior officers, they are very hospitable. I am always offered tea and food when I am the guest of a junior officer. But when the time comes to discuss business, I have found that they devote their attention entirely to the matter at hand. My experience with one Iraqi first lieutenant exemplifies the remarkably more receptive and openminded attitude of Iraqi junior officers. When I approached this lieutenant about conducting intelligence training with some of his soldiers, he was more than interested; he was enthusiastic. On the first day of training, he had his soldiers seated in the classroom 15 minutes early, note-taking materials out and ready to receive instruction. The 13 soldiers he brought with him were attentive throughout the class, asked questions, and were actively engaged in the training. Toward the end of the training, I conducted a practical application exercise with the class on questioning techniques in which I acted as a "source" and the Iraqi soldiers asked questions. When a soldier would ask poor questions, I would stop the exercise, providing constructive criticism so that the rest of the class could learn from his mistakes. Unlike what would happen if an advisor ever constructively criticized a field grade officer in front of others, these soldiers did not get their feelings hurt or feel like I was making a personal attack on them. The class' professional atmosphere--as set by the Iraqis themselves--prevented such pettiness and was a direct reflection of the lieutenant's composed demeanor. At the end of the day, the lieutenant's reward for his efforts was his fly-infested living quarters, shared with another lieutenant. The stench that surrounded his crowded living area from the combination of rotting food, standing water, and burning trash was nauseating. And yet, despite having no running water, intermittent electricity, and only a small fan for relief from the stifling heat, the lieutenant was as gracious a host as any Iraqi colonel or general. With these factors in mind, why then is the brigade level and above the focus of our advisory effort in Iraq? What motivation to change are we giving the senior officers of today's IA, comfortable in their ornate offices and entrenched in the top-down, centralized system of the old regime? Life is good for the average senior Iraqi officer, and he has no intention of risking all that he has attained for the sake of such lofty ideals as service to country. Unfortunately, I fear that no amount of advising will ever change this mindset. Thus, instead of doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different result, our partnership with the IA should move forward with a new direction and purpose. The future of the IA and, consequentially, the future of American strategic interests in Iraq, lie in the next generation of senior officers, or those currently serving as company grade officers. Unlike their alleged "leaders," Iraqi junior officers are willing to receive criticism constructively, allowing advisors to offer honest recommendations without the fear of transgressing upon the Arab cultural norms designed to protect egos. Unfortunately, they receive hardly any attention from our advisor teams. Thus the primary influences on Iraqi company grade officers are the corrupt and incompetent field grade and general officers above them. As long as this continues to be the case, these junior officers will learn from the example of their predecessors and adapt their practices. In 20 years the result will be an IA with the same type of leaders and the same problems of today. To a degree, the old army mentality has already begun to permeate the junior officer ranks as an inevitable result of the example set by their leaders. Influencing Iraqi junior officers today so they are better senior officers tomorrow will be a critical step toward preventing this outcome. |
| Posted by:GolfBravoUSMC |