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Afghanistan
The Surge And After
2010-06-27
The recent discovery
In 2007, wasn't it? It's just the the Newspaper of Record, the venerable New York Times herself, only just got around to noticing.
by the US of untapped mineral deposits in Afghanistan valued at around $1 trillion has led many to conclude that Afghanistan could emerge as one of the world's most important mining centres. It is equally likely Afghanistan might fall prey to the 'resource curse' the idea that natural riches often create more problems than they solve. In any case, this is the only bit of good news to have come out of Afghanistan in the last few months.

There are growing signs that Barack Obama's surge strategy, announced with great fanfare in March 2009, is in real trouble. The US Congress is seeking explanations as to why the Afghan government is not assuming greater share of the burden and trying to assess if the president's July 2011 deadline to commence troop withdrawal is feasible. And the disdainful comments of General Stanley McChrystal who has been dismissed since about Obama and his civilian policy team have exposed enduring fault-lines in Obama's strategy and underlined the sense of peril pervading the corridors of powers in Washington.

Senior US military leaders openly talk about the Taliban regaining momentum. The US-led offensive in Marjah, the showcase of the new counter-insurgency strategy, has achieved only limited gains. Absence of governing institutions in Marjah has brought the offensive on the verge of failure. Because of difficulty in winning local support, the much-anticipated campaign to secure Kandahar, Afghanistan's second largest city, will begin after several months and proceed more slowly than planned. Much-needed training of the Afghan army is not going anywhere with NATO short of trainers on the ground and the difficulty in figuring out how to replace Canadian and Dutch troops that will withdraw this summer.

Relations between Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the White House are at an all time low. Karzai lost no time in dismissing two high-profile ministers interior minister and intelligence chief from his cabinet who were most closely allied with the US. These were men Washington had insisted Karzai include in his cabinet after his re-election last year and they were resisting Karzai's attempts to negotiate with the Taliban.

Obama lost credibility with Karzai when he started publicly rebuking him for various governance failures.
It can't be so, when all the world hailed Barack Obama as so much more subtle and charming than his presidential predecessor. He must have a secret plan to suddenly bring everyone round to the right way of thinking.
True, Karzai has spectacularly failed in constructing modern governmental machinery and seems to have little interest in building provincial and local governance institutions. But for better or worse, that's the hand Washington has been dealt in Afghanistan. Obama has tried to belatedly handle Karzai with greater sensitivity but his problem was compounded by the fact the US ambassador in Kabul, Karl Eikenberry, didn't see eye to eye on strategy with the now-replaced top military commander, General McChrystal.

The perception that the US will withdraw from Afghanistan come what may
Thank you, President Obama.
has created a situation where the Taliban has every incentive to hunker down and wait out US assaults, Karzai has every incentive to keep dragging his feet and US military commanders have every incentive to keep producing easier solutions as opposed to achieving harder and longer-term results. Karzai has lost confidence in America's commitment to win the war and is seeking to strike deals with the Taliban and their Pakistani patrons.
Needs must, and all that, poor man.
The biggest strategic mistake the Obama administration made was announcing a pullout date starting next summer. While pouring in more troops is politically no longer feasible, pulling out altogether will be a shot in the arm for the Islamist extremists.

There is complacency in certain quarters in India that America cannot afford to fail in Afghanistan. While this may indeed be the case, America's Afghanistan strategy is facing a crisis. India will have to preserve its own vital regional interests. The Indian foreign secretary has recently articulated a set of principles underlining India's Af-Pak policy. They include accepting reintegration of the Taliban rank and file if they give up violence, a regional framework to complement an internal peace process, adherence to the principle of non-interference in Afghanistan's affairs, and ensuring that Afghanistan emerges as a regional trade and transit hub.

This is a laudable set of principles but can India translate it into reality? It reads more like a wish list than actionable policy, especially in the regional context where Pakistan's security establishment relishes the double game it is playing in Afghanistan. Pakistan's support for the Taliban in Afghanistan continues to be sanctioned at the highest levels of government with the ISI even represented on the Quetta shura, the Taliban's war council to retain influence over the Taliban's leadership. Taliban fighters continue to be trained in Pakistani camps. The ISI does not merely provide financial, military and logistical support to the insurgency. It retains strong strategic and operational control over the Taliban campaign in Afghanistan.

Despite launching offensives against militants in North and South Waziristan, Pakistan's military continues to look upon the Taliban as a strategic asset. Asif Ali Zardari has visited captured Taliban leaders, assuring them support. Pakistan's security establishment is manipulating the Taliban's political hierarchy so as to have greater leverage over future peace talks.

India's urgent task is to move beyond mere articulation of wishful principles and carve a policy response that can reduce the damage to Indian national interests from the Afghan war's mismanagement by the Americans.
Posted by:tipper

#2  India needs to liberate a 100K corridor through Pakistan occupied Kashmir, which would give a direct route to the Northern Alliance's territory. Afghanistan problem solved.
Posted by: phil_b   2010-06-27 19:10  

#1  Add to this lovely picture the efforts of our friends in Iran, who continue to actively support unrest in the region in a successful effort to drain US military resources away from the Iranian border areas.
Posted by: Besoeker   2010-06-27 14:28  

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