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| Africa North |
| The Libyan Islamic Fighting Groups revisions: one year later |
| 2010-07-24 |
| [Maghrebia] The experiment of Libya's dialogue with the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) did not gather as much media attention as some participants probably hoped it would. However, this does not diminish the importance of the outcome. The Libyan state opened the door to absorbing jihadists who renounce the use of violence as a means for change and to reintegrating them into society. Despite the many shortcomings of this experiment, it undoubtedly remains one of the pioneering approaches that deserve examination, in order to measure the extent of its success in turning the page of struggles between Arab governments and armed Islamist groups. The dialogue between the Libyan government and the LIFG began in 2006 and reached its peak in the month of Ramadan in 2009 when the leadership of the group published major revisions under the title "Corrective Studies in Understanding Jihad, Accountability and the Judgment of the People". The revisions resorted to Islamic legal arguments to conclude that it is not permissible to take up arms in order to overthrow Arab and Islamic governments. The authors of the revisions were six of the leading figures of the LIFG: the emir, Abdul Hakim al-Khuwailidi Balhaj (Abu Abdullah al-Sadiq); his deputy, Khalid Muhammad Al-Sharif; the spiritual leader, Sami Mustafa Al-Saaidi (Abu al-Munzir al-Saaidi; the group's first emir, Miftah al-Mabruk al-Thawadi (Abdul Ghaffar); the military commander, Mustafa Al-Said Qunayfid (Abu al-Zubair); and Abdul Wahhab Muhammad Qayid, the elder brother of Abu Yahya al-Libi. The authors acknowledged they were wrong for taking up arms against the regime of Colonel Muammar Kadhafi, which they unsuccessfully attempted to overthrow in the mid-1990s. They also criticised at length interpretations they deemed contradictory to the teachings of the Islamic religion, such as indiscriminate violence that some armed groups commit in the name of jihad, an indirect reference to some operations carried out by al-Qaeda or other organisations which espouse the same ideology. The LIFG leaders added to their revisions a letter of apology to Kadhafi for attempting to overthrow his regime and assassinate him. In the letter, they stated that they were wrong in even forming an armed group, which was understood to be their agreement to dissolve it. The LIFG stances shocked some of the Islamists aligned with jihadist movements aligned with al-Qaeda. Some al-Qaeda supporters posting on internet forums were not pleased with the initiative and called for the continuation of fighting against individuals they described as apostates in the Arab world (the governing regimes) and against the West, which they claim supports these regimes and keeps them in power. However, it is noteworthy that after the publication of the revisions in its complete version, there has been no Islamic legal reasoning from al-Qaeda or its supporters rejecting what the LIFG presented. This clearly indicates that critics have not found any Islamic jurisprudential deficiencies in the principles on which the LIFG leaders based their conclusions. The Libyan authorities rewarded the LIFG in March by releasing three of its six leaders who co-authored the revisions, in addition to 200 Islamist jihadists who were either affiliated with the LIFG or with the "Iraq networks", which included youths arrested under suspicion that they were preparing to leave for Iraq and engage in fighting there, or even to prepare for operations inside Libya itself or in neighbouring countries. The release of these prisoners was not the only step taken regarding these individuals. Dr. Saif al-Islam al-Kadhafi, the son of the Libyan leader, who has been a pivotal figure in all the dialogues that occurred between the imprisoned LIFG leaders and the chiefs of the security agencies since 2006, promised that the government would take care of those released from jail and help them reintegrate into society and rebuild their future. So far, it has not been clear as to how this help is being provided -- or if it is being provided at all -- and whether the government has provided them with homes or job opportunities, or even loans so that they can start their own business projects to earn a living. Honouring these promises will be of utmost importance. It could remove any excuses some could use to encourage the released prisoners to return to violence, based on the pretext that the government did not honour its promises. However, this is not the only hurdle preventing a complete reconciliation between the government and the freed jihadists. One hurdle is the extremism displayed by some of the youths eager to take part in what they consider as jihad, whether it be in Iraq, Afghanistan or Somalia. Indications of this extremism emerged during the dialogue that took place among the Islamists themselves inside the Libyan prisons before the release of the LIFG leaders earlier this year. In the prisons, it became apparent that the LIFG leaders belonged to a different generation from the "neo-jihadists", who were openly supportive of al-Qaeda and its leader Osama bin Laden. This new generation, according to a recent London seminar evaluating the LIFG revisions, refused to engage in any type of dialogue with regimes they deemed as "apostate". Despite the wide Islamic knowledge that LIFG leaders possess, some of the imprisoned youths were solely focused on waging jihad, even though they lacked the knowledge about many of its conditions, which the LIFG leaders tried to explain to them, but to no avail. The reconciliation between the Libyan state and the Islamists could be at danger if an al-Qaeda affiliated cell engaged in violent acts and bombings. This could prompting a reaction by the government against all the Islamists that have been released, regardless of whether or not they support al-Qaeda. Another hurdle is the ambiguity surrounding the stance of some in the Libyan state towards reconciliation with the jihadists. This could possibly be due to the nature of the jamahiriya system of government. Even though Saif al-Islam al-Kadhafi was successful in securing consent of the authorities to release the LIFG prisoners, other parties within the Libyan regime do not trust the Islamists. Some high ranking officials in the Libyan government believe that the LIFG leaders changed their stances only after they were defeated militarily, and after the group was wiped out, initially inside Libya in the mid-1990s, and subsequently when the LIFG leaders were handed over to Libya after their arrests abroad in the context of the "war on terror". Some Libyan security officials openly stated they still viewed the Islamists as security threats. But perhaps the most significant hurdles, and to which none of the two parties addressed, have to do with the political future of those jihadists who agreed to renounce violence and who now reject the actions of al-Qaeda and groups with similar ideologies. |
| Posted by:Fred |
| #1 IIRC TOPIX > THE US deems AL QAEDA IN MAGHREB a de facto THREAT. |
| Posted by: JosephMendiola 2010-07-24 01:36 |