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| General Diaz Perez and the Chiapas Conflict |
| 2011-08-21 |
| Sorry it's so late edition. For a map, click here. Much of the information for this article comes from from the National Security Archvies, Wikipedia, and other online published Mexican news sources. By Chris Covert Blame for the Acteal, Chiapas Massacre of December 22nd, 1997 is still very much in the air and depends on which side of the Mexican political spectrum you read. There's the official government version which states that ongoing conflict between Ejercito Zapatista de Revolucion Nacional (EZLN) supporters and government supporters eventually led to the slaughter. Ultimately, blame for the slaughter rests in the existence of EZLN guerillas in the area. This even though southern Mexican politicians had been literally begging the government to do something about Guatemalan communist guerrillas taking sanctuary in southern Mexico beginning in 1992. It is not like the EZLN sprung out of nowhere. The less than official version, supported by leftists and human rights groups supporters states it was a direct attack by individuals armed by the government. The Mexican government disclaims any responsibility for the attack or for arming the individuals who committed the murder even though the Mexican government had been at least two years into arming its supporters against EZLN supporters when the killings took place. If the Mexican government's opus magnus on the matter, Libro Blanca Sobre Acteal, or White Paper About Acteal is to be believed, both sides pressed against each other with increasingly hostile acts. Leftists ridicule the government's claim even though the White paper does recount several instances of armed attacks in the area the year prior to the Acteal massacre against both sides. But the left should talk. One of the reasons the white paper said the shootings at Acteal took place was a "surprising absence" of human rights groups in the area just prior to the massacre. In the white paper, it is well known that human rights and international NGOs were supporters of the EZLN, the implication being they were all too willing to look the other way when EZLN supporters armed and otherwise took matters into their own hands. Whomever gets the ultimate blame, it seems clear that local government supporters armed by the Mexican Army starting in 1995 went out of government control very quickly. And standing atop the organizational structure with his hallmark of excellence of command, but less than stellar control is then Colonel Leopoldo Diaz Perez. General Diaz Perez is not mentioned in any of the documents released so far into the National Security Archives. One of the reason why is that the Mexican Army refuses to allow release of that information for national security purposes. And much of the information publicly available on the internet speaks of events starting in 1994, when the Chiapas Conflict went hot to 1995, at about the time Mexican General Mario Renan Castillo Fernandez began implement Mexico's counterinsurgency strategy in Chiapas. In a May, 1999 memorandum to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), a US defense attache in Mexico City stated that the actual arming of groups in Chiapas friendly to the government and to the army were in fact Mexican Army officers and NCOs with experience in the local Indian dialects. The purpose of the teams were primarily to gather intelligence on EZLN activities and to provide protection of friendly elements in the respective areas of the teams. The teams were initially deployed in areas around Los Altos, which is ten kilometers southwest of San Cristobal de Casas, and near Los Canadas. The teams were frequently rotated to different areas for their own protection. The memorandum's reference to sympathetic groups also indicate those groups were armed. In Mexico it is illegal to posses a weapon larger than .22 caliber outside your abode, so it seems clear that not only were the teams meeting on a regular basis with sympathetic groups, they may well have been arming them. The DIA report doesn't say so in so many words, but the attache admits in the wake of the Acteal massacre, direct support of the groups may have been reduced, implying the groups were in fact supported by SEDENA's counterinsurgency strategy with firearms. It has already been shown that the EZLN groups were already armed, a fact that is often lost in describing the events that led up to the massacre. If General Castillo Fernandez's plan was to provide local independent levies to monitor and if necessary engage EZLN guerrillas and supporters, then his strategy paid off. In that context, the massacre at Acteal makes some sense in that it was a means of deliberately destroying peaceful supporters of the EZLN, serving as a warning to remaining communities that did support the EZLN. It was an easy and high profile target The church that was attacked at Acteal was occupied by a group of passive Catholics who called themselves Los Abesas or the Bees. The group comprised pacifist Christians who supported the goals of the EZLN and who rejected violence as a means of achieving goals. They were leftist oriented in their politics and likely supported the EZLN materially, which is a serious crime in Mexico. The indiscriminate killing of individuals at Acteal ageing from a few months to 67 years old is what made the attack so heinous, other than the fact the people were unarmed. In many other contexts, such an attack would prove disastrous for the attacking group, but not so in Mexico, and not so for many of the actors in the Chiapas conflict. Group Chiapas General Diaz Perez's role in the Acteal massacre was probably a direct result of his command methods. According to Vangardia.mx article he became known as a commander who allowed his staff and subordinates considerable leeway to execute their orders. In this context Diaz Perez took the meaning of Procedimiento Sistematico de Operar (PSO) or Standard Operating Procedure, and subverted it to apply to his commands. Another glaring criticism of Diaz Perez in the article was his "remarkable inability to understand origin of social problems that prompted the emergence of EZLN guerrillas". One of General Diaz Perez's tasks as head of Group Chiapas was establshing and operating Bases de Operaciones Mixtas (BOM) or mixed operating bases which was interspersed throughout the area as a means of control of his teams. These BOMs served as military police outposts for the region as well. His methods were heavily influenced by General Hector Sanchez Gutierrez, who had counterinsurgency training in the US and has boss General Castillo Fernandez, who also received training in the US in counterinsurgency doctrine. Diaz Perez's subordinate as commander of the Mexican 24th Military Zone, Colonel Jos� Guadalupe Arias Agredano, also received counterinsurgency training in the US. According to a 2007 report in Group Chiapas was disbanded on January 15, 2001. Following his posting in Chiapas he served as chief of staff of various Military Zones until he ascended to command of the 24th Military Zone in 2009. |
| Posted by:badanov |
