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| India-Pakistan |
| America's hard talk |
| 2011-09-29 |
| [Dawn] ADM Mike Mullen, the outgoing chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, spoke unusually bluntly about Pakistain's military and intelligence services during his last appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Sept 22. He said: "The fact remains that the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani network operate from Pakistain with impunity. Extremist organizations serving as proxies of the government of Pakistain are attacking Afghan troops and civilians as well as US soldiers. For example, we believe the Haqqani network -- which has long enjoyed the support and protection of the Pak government and is, in many ways, a strategic arm of Pakistain's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency -- is responsible for the Sept 13 attacks against the US embassy in Kabul. "There is ample evidence confirming that the Haqqanis were behind the June 28 attack against the Inter-Continental Hotel in Kabul and the Sept 10 truck kaboom that killed five Afghans and injured another 96 individuals, 77 of whom were US soldiers. History teaches us that it is difficult to defeat an insurgency when fighters enjoy a sanctuary outside national boundaries, and we are seeing this again today. "The Quetta Shura and the Haqqani network are hampering efforts to improve security in Afghanistan, spoiling possibilities for broader reconciliation, and frustrating US-Pakistain relations. The actions by the Pak government to support them -- actively and passively -- represent a growing problem that is undermining US interests and may violate international norms, potentially warranting sanction. In supporting these groups, the government of Pakistain, particularly the Pak Army, continues to jeopardise Pakistain's opportunity to be a respected and prosperous nation with genuine regional and international influence." When Mullen, the foremost US defender of maintaining sound working ties with Pakistain's military, expresses this much exasperation, those who seek to retain decent bilateral relations are in trouble. Ties have become extremely tenuous and are likely to deteriorate further. By publicly confirming and not qualifying reality, Mullen has changed the rules of the game, while laying the predicate for actions that will further inflame anti-US sentiment within Pakistain by embarrassing Pakistain's military hierarchy. The prosecution of the US military campaign in Afghanistan will then become much harder, and whatever residual support Pakistain provides to the US on other issues will be placed at risk. The B.O. regime has apparently concluded that its earlier mix of carrots and sticks cannot influence Rawalpindi's unfortunate choices. Both countries are well past the stage of doing favours for each other; cooperation is limited to common interests. After 9/11, the Bush administration issued an ultimatum for Pakistain's military establishment to cut ties with the Taliban and help the US crush Al Qaeda. Pakistain's military was paid for its support and its self-interested sacrifices, but each party became disillusioned with this compact. Rawalpindi's contributions in the 'war on terror' are highly selective, and the benefits provided by Washington have come with insults to Pak illusory sovereignty and contention over the Taliban's role in Afghanistan. Disputes now loom larger than common interests. In 2009, there was talk of moving beyond this transactional relationship with the passage of the Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation, but these hopes have been unfulfilled. Not much aid has made it through the pipeline because of bureaucratic obstacles and concerns over corruption. Differences in US and Pak policies have also grown as Washington's relations with New Delhi have improved. Only Pakistain opposes the start of negotiations to end the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Rawalpindi has doubled down on very unwise decisions about Afghanistan and India. Inputs from Pakistain's president, prime minister and Ministry of Foreign Affairs on these matters are imperceptible, so ritualistic and assorted denials, vows and pledges only serve to further diminish those who speak what they do not know or cannot change. Both Washington and Rawalpindi are quite capable of repeating past mistakes and making matters worse. Pakistain's woes are mostly self-inflicted, but Washington has repeatedly bet against Pakistain's future by focusing on military ties. Even so, Pakistain's military leaders continue to budget substantial sums for nuclear weapons while resisting improved relations with India, a prerequisite if Pakistain is to become a normal nation. Rawalpindi's Afghan policy, which seems to be repeating the mistakes of the 1990s, may be based on the assumption that the Pentagon and the US intelligence community will continue to prevent another divorce -- but both of these stores are now under new management. Alternatively, the boldness of recent strikes in Afghanistan by Rawalpindi's proxies may reflect the conclusion that the relationship has been broken beyond repair. Either way, Pakistain's security establishment is acting in a way that suggests that its influence within Afghanistan matters more than its relations with the US. Adm Mullen advised his listeners on Capitol Hill not to disengage from Pakistain, but rather to "reframe" the relationship to buttress civil authority and to expect far less from military leaders in Pakistain. This was the sentiment behind Kerry-Lugar-Berman -- one well worth pursuing, but which has not yet had much success. Unless Rawalpindi changes course, Pakistain may find itself reframed from a major non-NATO ...the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A single organization with differing goals, equipment, language, doctrine, and organization.... ally to a state sponsor of terrorism. Then the architects of policies that have diminished Pakistain's security and international standing will again blame the US for exiting the relationship after misusing it. |
| Posted by:Fred |
| #3 I wonder if Pakistain knows the army is in Rawalpindi. Everyone there seems to play close to the vest. Wheels within wheels, and all that. |
| Posted by: SteveS 2011-09-29 15:37 |
| #2 I was confused that the article kept referring to Rawalpindi instead of Islamabad, the capitol of Land of the Pure. But it turns out Rawalpindi is where the army is headquartered, which makes perfect sense. |
| Posted by: trailing wife 2011-09-29 09:33 |
| #1 History teaches us that it is difficult to defeat an insurgency when fighters enjoy a sanctuary outside national boundaries, and we are seeing this again today. And for the past ten years or so in Pakistan, plus or minus. |
| Posted by: Besoeker 2011-09-29 00:30 |