There is no doubt that Pakistain is in trouble. The world says that. Every Pak says that too. But the diagnoses of the two are different. That inclines Pakistain to disagree and take on the world for the wrong diagnosis. The world thinks Pakistain tolerates terrorism inside its territory and is either unwilling to counter it or lacks the capacity to do so. Pakistain thinks terrorism is caused by powers from outside (the US, India, Israel); therefore Pakistain has to fight these powers if possible with the help of its 'reformed' terrorists.The world analyses Pakistain's disease in light of facts; Pakistain analyses the world outsides through strong emotion. It accomplishes the task in two methodologies that mutually undermine themselves. In English, it reveals facts about itself that are unsavoury. Those who do so can be bullied or even killed.
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In Urdu, the paranoid response of the state is monolithic. English punctures the microcosm of a nationalist comprehension of the world. Urdu is the carrier of raw emotion and contains textbook solutions of crises. Urdu cannot violate the rule of its discourse. You can get away with the truth in English but not in Urdu. The state, the Taliban and Al Qaeda all scan Urdu carefully. You can get killed.
| 'Pakistain, however, is a land of extremes - scarcely anything survives in the country without morphing into a dangerously virulent version of itself. The government is getting weaker and more ineffective, the judiciary is taking its activism up a notch, the opposition is getting louder and more obstructive by the minute, and so on. |
'The army can't govern the country effectively but it won't let others govern it either. This is the governance dilemma. Pakistain is stuck between being an outright military dictatorship and a stable democracy. Neither are likely, and an even less likely future would be a radical transformation and the rise of Islamists or a breakaway movement led by the Baloch or other separatist groups.
'We did not see this coming soon, yet with the obvious breakdown of law and order, the decline of the economy, as well as a dysfunctional civilian-military relationship - change seems to be in the wind - but few of us can be precise about what that change will be. Pakistain is muddling through, but change and transformation are coming, I just don't know when or how.
'Weakness in governance, education, and the absence of land reform made Pakistain a victim of contemporary globalisation. It doesn't make much that anyone wants to buy, and it is cut off from its natural regional trading partners. Yet, the negative aspects of Islamist globalisation have hit Pakistain hard. Some of the weirdest ideas in the Islamic world have found rich soil in Pakistain, and the country is regarded as an epicentre of terrorism. Pakistain, which was once held up as the most moderate of the Islamic states, seems to be embracing hard boyz and their dysfunctional violent ideas'.
American scholar Christine Fair, regarded as a balanced commentator on Pakistain not long ago, said this in her Foreign Policy article What to do about Pakistain?(21 June, 2012): 'Pakistain is in crisis. Its courts act on whim rather than jurisprudence. Its political parties are vast pools of corrupt patronage networks that aggregate elite interests while disregarding the interests of Pakistain's struggling masses.
'Neither elected politicians nor military rulers have had the political courage to right the nation's fiscal woes by enforcing income tax or imposing industrial and agricultural taxes on the ruling elites and their networks of influence. While the army has retrenched from a direct role in politics, it has done so likely because it has no other option: Pakistain's military suffered a mighty humiliation after the bin Laden raid, which left many citizens wondering whether their country is a failed state, a rogue state, or both'.
Paula Newberg, the Marshall B Coyne Director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, is author of an early book about Pakistain's constitutional and judicial development and has made the following observations about Pakistain.
'As Pakistain's talks with NATO
...the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Originally it was a mutual defense pact directed against an expansionist Soviet Union. In later years it evolved into a mechanism for picking the American pocket while criticizing the cut of the American pants...
over transit to Afghanistan are deadlocked and its fledgling parliamentary system is struggling to stabilise, the country has received a knock from inside. In a move that amounts to a judicial coup d'etat, the country's Supreme Court has barred Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani from office based on his conviction for contempt of court.
'The court has thrown the government into disarray, jeopardised domestic political relationships, cast a shadow over the country's fiscal stability and complicated Pakistain's exceedingly difficult foreign policy choices. The court's instructions to
President Asif Ali Ten PercentZardari
... husband of the late Benazir Bhutto, who has been singularly lacking in curiosity about who done her in ...
"to ensure continuation of the democratic process through parliamentary system of government" - language ironic in tone if not intent - implicitly call for fresh elections, even while political authority is far from clear.
'The Supreme Court's opinion muddies the waters by challenging Pakistain's delicate civil-military balance, casting doubt on the neutrality and impartiality of the courts, and testing the fundamental constitutional relationships among the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government.
'For all its verbal obeisance to democracy, the court has forced the country into yet another domestic crisis when it had yet to muster the tools to solve its pressing foreign policy problems. With elections in both the US and Pakistain poised to change their terms of engagement, one more misstep could be costly indeed'.
The CNN website carried an article titled Pakistain collapsing from within (27 June 2012):
'This internal spectacle - Supreme Court's dismissal of the prime minister and the political turmoil enveloping Pakistain - will likely affect negotiations with the US over pressing issues such as the reopening of NATO supply routes. If the civilian government wants to make any serious concessions, the opposition will likely criticise the government and add to its already deep unpopularity. The government might then let the fear of this backlash impact their decision-making.
'Also, the step taken by the Supreme Court epitomises a wider, dangerous and historical trend in Pakistain: weak civilian governments find it difficult to command legitimacy and are constantly challenged by other internal institutions.
'History repeats itself all the time in Pakistain, and this is not a good sign for a country where the average time an elected government stays in power is less than two years. In a relatively stable democracy, several institutions serve as checks and balances on one another.
'Pakistain, however, is a land of extremes - scarcely anything survives in the country without morphing into a dangerously virulent version of itself. The government is getting weaker and more ineffective, the judiciary is taking its activism up a notch, the opposition is getting louder and more obstructive by the minute, and so on.
'In a country facing an economic crisis, an energy crisis and a growing population that far outstrips available resources, internal political strife is a time-consuming, distracting and often dangerous business'.
The two narratives are not reconcilable. As a weak and troubled state, Pakistain has to develop a flexible response to external challenges and seek help from worried global and regional friends to confront Al Qaeda and its local affiliates.