Did the Hangu drone strike violate the oral commitment by the B.O. regime to hit the pause button on drone strikes during peace negotiations between Pakistain and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistain (TTP)? From a legal perspective, the US could well argue that the assurance was only applicable to drone attacks targeting the TTP leadership "when the peace talks were taking place". Since the talks have yet to be initiated given the TTP's refusal to enter into any peace dialogue with Pakistain and the Afghan Taliban, particularly the Haqqani network leadership, rather than the TTP cadre was targeted, the US has not broken its pledge. Such a US stance may be legally tenable but appears to be diplomatic doublespeak, the implications of which Sartaj Aziz failed to grasp.
The escalation of drone operations outside FATA is a cause for serious concern and needs further deliberations. When Obama took over the US presidency he called for a review of the US Afghan war policy. His advisors identified Pakistain's North
Wazoo as the sanctuary of al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban forces, and recommended strongly that without neutralising them through concerted military action the US would fail to achieve its war objectives. Sending in US boots on the ground was the leading option and, if this was considered politically unacceptable, resolute and continuous strikes by armed drones was the next alternative. Obama opted for the latter and allowed the CIA to operate armed drones freely over FATA while exercising restraint when engaging targets outside. It appears that drone operations beyond FATA were reserved for very high value targets only. In the drone strikes in Bannu (2008) and Hangu (2013), the targets engaged were considered high value enough, where presidential approval to go beyond FATA was sought and given. If targets of the stature of Mullah Omar