... served two non-consecutive terms as prime minister, heads the Pakistain Moslem League (Nawaz). Noted for his spectacular corruption, the 1998 Pak nuclear test, border war with India, and for being tossed by General Musharraf...
and army chief Gen Raheel Sharif ought to be examined closely for what was said as well as what was left out. To begin with, there does seem to be some kind of minimal consensus at last between the civilian and military leadership on how to tackle the threat of militancy. As Prime Minister Sharif himself admitted in parliament, months of trying to secure peace through dialogue have come to naught while Pakistain continued to bleed and hurt because of myrmidon violence. Similarly, the army chief reinforced earlier comments by the military's public relations wing that the North
Wazoo operation is a broad-based one and not limited in nature and scope against only a subset of myrmidons. Taken together, the civilian and military leadership's comments suggest a turning point in the fight against militancy -- at least as far as state policy is concerned.Yet, as ever, the country's leadership has been unnecessarily parsimonious in sharing real-time information and fleshing out rhetorical claims. For example, while the public should not realistically expect information on battlefield plans and actions, details on casualties, civilian and military, are a public right. Similarly, what of the hundreds of thousands of civilians believed to be in North Waziristan? Will they be left to fend for themselves or is there a plan to ease the suffering of the new IDPs? Even more fundamentally, perhaps details on who the hard boyz are, the names and identities of the various groups in North Waziristan and an explicit statement that the named and identified groups are to be targeted would go a long way in putting to rest much of the speculation about whether the country's security-policy architects have finally abandoned good/bad myrmidon distinctions.
Ultimately though, a coherent policy against militancy comes down to two factors: the army-led security establishment abandoning policies of old and the country's civilian leadership rallying the nation and political class together to hold firm against the myrmidon threat, even if it means intense short-term blowback. For now, perhaps the state is showing the unity that the country has long needed to see. But will the political unity -- even Imran Khan
... aka
Taliban Khan, who isn't your heaviest-duty thinker, maybe not even among the top five...
has accepted the operation in North Waziristan -- hold firm in the weeks and months ahead when the natural ebb and flow of the fight against militancy causes second-guessing and doubts to be sown? As for the military, with one of the army's long-standing allies, the Haqqani network, firmly ensconced in North Waziristan, will the operation really be the all-out assault or will deals be cut on the side that will leave North Waziristan festering for years, much like parts of South Waziristan has since the major ground operation there at the start of the decade?