FSA and Islamist groups that controlled oil fields in eastern Syria, for example, did dedicate some of the revenue to run schools and supply electricity, telecommunications, water, food, and other services.
Some villages and towns saw a decline in such services because ISIS distributed oil revenue to other towns under its control in Syria and Iraq, establishing its own pan-territorial patronage system.
As a result, in oil-rich areas, warlordism--a side effect of strictly localized rebel governance-- dropped steadily.
ISIS also forced municipality personnel to work, unlike previous groups that had allowed Syrian state employees to continue to receive their salaries (mostly from the regime) while they sat at home and did nothing, no doubt with attendant kickbacks. "The streets are cleaner now; 70 percent of the employees were not working, even though they received salaries," said a former media activist with the FSA from Deir Ezzor.
"They cancelled the customary day off on Saturday; they're supposed to make Thursday the day off instead." Regulations and price control are another area in which ISIS's governance proved successful. It banned fishermen from using dynamite and electricity to catch fish.
It also prohibited residents in the Jazira from using the chaos of war to stake new land claims, principally in the Syrian desert, where they had tried to build new homes or establish businesses, much to the chagrin of their neighbors. ISIS also limited the profit margins on oil by-products, ice, flour, and other essential commodities.