[DAWN] BIG news can trigger a big debate, which is always a healthy process in itself. A well-articulated exchange of ideas has the potential to change our perceptions and positively contribute to the national discourse.At the joint parliamentary session this week, politicians spoke their mind and a few of them asked blunt questions about the continued presence and functioning of some banned bad boy groups in the country. Probably the most interesting comment on the politicians’ criticism of the state’s inaction against these groups that appeared on social media read: "the news [we have] waited for too long."
Some media reports suggested that the state plans to mainstream banned bad boy organizations. Many, however, doubt the possibility of such an action and deem it merely distractive rhetoric. Notwithstanding the civilian government’s concerns, growing diplomatic stress and fears of isolation, they do not believe the state actually has a plan to get rid of the banned
...the word
bannedseems to have a different meaning in Pakistain than it does in most other places. Or maybe it simply lacks any meaning at all...
organizations. Even if such a course of action is adopted, it will take more than a decade to dilute the effect that banned groups have had on society. Some are sceptical the establishment is changing its approach or that it believes these groups can be mainstreamed. Most analysts nevertheless agree that there is now an opportunity to completely neutralise such regressive forces.
These are important views in the debate about the future of non-state actors in Pakistain. Most of them are based on a very simplistic view of the bad boy groups. There is a common perception that these proxies of the state can be rolled back easily. The fact is, many other states have nurtured bad boy movements as strategic assets, but they later discovered it was a fallacy to assume they would continue to serve as proxies.
The issue of non-state actors is extremely complex in the Pak context. Many groups tagged as proxies not only caused diplomatic problems for the country, but gradually they also took control of state narratives to emerge as a new far right that is not only interfering in ’strategic affairs’ but also shrinking the space for mainstream politics. In fact, sometimes it becomes difficult to conceive of them within the narrow framework of a ’proxy’.
These bad boy groups were not merely used as foreign policy tools, but were also allowed to restructure the national identity. Some bad boy groups reoriented existing nationalism and further narrowed it to religio-nationalism and generated hyper religio-nationalism. This happened so slowly that the risks were not assessed until the damage was done. Religious nationalism is similar to ’purification’ -- it moves towards religious extremes to attain enriching ’self-righteousness’.
It is an exclusionary process that does not shape or follow the course of traditional nationalism. Instead, as it becomes more exclusionary, elements of religious sectarianism and socio-political hate narratives become part of its defining characteristics. Many religious nationalists become more faith-centric and ’nationalism’ becomes meaningless for them. Al Qaeda and the bad boy Islamic State
...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling
Allaharound with every other sentence, but to hear the pols talk they're not
reallyMoslems....
group would be examples of such extreme entities.
As far as the probability of mainstreaming or reintegrating non-state actors is concerned, the characteristics of non-state actors in Pakistain first need to be identified. There are five types of bad boy groups existing in the country; foreign, tribal, sectarian, new urban bad boys, and conventional bad boy groups. All these have many commonalities, but it is the conventional bad boy groups that are considered the proxies once used in Afghanistan and India-held Kashmire.
If the state is really considering the reintegration of the conventional bad boy groups, a three-fold strategy contingent on one important condition must be adopted. The condition is the complete disengagement between the conventional bad boy actors and the state institutions because no reintegration strategy can work otherwise.
As the first step of the strategy, the government can offer amnesty to banned groups that agree to abide by the Constitution; quit and denounce all kinds of violence and bad boy activities inside and outside the country; shun all criminal activities, including the propagation of hate material; and most importantly, register themselves with the relevant authorities/departments. A separate mechanism for their registration and monitoring can be evolved at the federal or provincial level.
The second step would be the monitoring phase in which the groups’ activities would be restricted and monitored. They would not be allowed to issue blurbs or publish any kind of material. Those among their leaders and members found to have been involved, in their individual capacity, in any act of terrorism, hate speech and other unlawful activities, should be made to face a court of law. This phase can last between three to five years depending on the group’s profile.
The risk of attrition always remains high in these groups and many individuals and small factions continue to break away and join other bad boy groups. A rehabilitation programme for splintering members should also be created. The army is running rehabilitation centres for bad boy detainees, but rehabilitation requirements for conventional turbans are different. They need ideological and political rehabilitation as well. This is the real challenge. Does the state have the politico-ideological resources to neutralise violent ideological tendencies among the conventional bad boy groups?
No doubt the reintegration of turbans should be a priority for the state but it should not be the only one. Comprehensively implementing the National Action Plan would serve to reduce the space for them further. These groups camouflage themselves in national narratives. They seek legitimacy from national crisis situations, such as earthquakes or floods, but regional hostilities remain their primary source of strength. Tensions between Pakistain and India in particular provide them the means to justify their existence. The result is massive confusion among the people as to who is the real custodian of the national interest.
Nevertheless, all this is for later. The first requirement is the absolute resolve of the state. When Gen Musharraf banned such groups in January 2002, it had triggered a similar kind of optimism. It was big news at that time, but with the benefit of hindsight, we know what transpired between then and now.