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Government
How the Navy’s Zumwalt-Class Destroyers Ran Aground
2016-12-22
On November 22, while the world watched, the U.S. Navy’s newest, most complex warship ground to a stop in the middle of the Panama Canal, both propellers seized. The USS Zumwalt (DDG-1000) had to be towed out of the canal. While not as embarrassing as watching our sailors being taken hostage by Iran and then publicly humiliated, nonetheless it was pretty embarrassing. Yes, all new classes of ships have teething problems, but this is at least the third major “engineering casualty” that the USS Zumwalt has experienced over the last few months, and it is emblematic of a defense-procurement system that is rapidly losing its ability to meet our national-security needs.

The Zumwalt was going to be the United States’ 21st-century, cruiser-sized, super destroyer that would allow us to dominate the world’s oceans and littorals for the next 50 years. The Navy made big promises: The two overarching goals for the program were that the ship would be very stealthy and that it would set new standards in reducing crew size. Another major element was that it would be able to supply the Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) capability the Navy has been promising the Marines since it retired the last of the modernized Iowa-class battleships in 1992. Its 15,000 to 16,000 tons of displacement would be crammed full of new and revolutionary technologies. Its massive generating capacity would allow it to power the energy-hungry lasers and railguns of the future. Its defining glory, its stealth, would allow the Zumwalt to undertake missions that other less stealthy ships could not.

Based on the Navy’s 1999 assurances that each ship would cost just $1.34 billion and that the whole 32-ship program would come in at $46 billion, Congress committed to fund the program. But by 2001, cost growth prompted the Navy to lower the projected class size to only 16 ships. Flash-forward to today and the Navy has capped production at just three ships, with each costing over $4.2 billion in construction costs alone. Toss in over $10 billion for development costs, and you end up at more than $7 billion per ship.
Based on the Navy’s 1999 assurances that each ship would cost just $1.34 billion and that the whole 32-ship program would come in at $46 billion, Congress committed to fund the program. But by 2001, cost growth prompted the Navy to lower the projected class size to only 16 ships. Flash-forward to today and the Navy has capped production at just three ships, with each costing over $4.2 billion in construction costs alone. Toss in over $10 billion for development costs, and you end up at more than $7 billion per ship.

To make matters worse, this cost is still rising — the Navy actually took delivery of, and commissioned, a ship that is far from complete and years away from being ready for combat. Adding insult to injury, absolutely no one has been held accountable for this budget-busting debacle. In fact, every one of the Navy’s four original project managers were almost immediately promoted from captain to admiral upon completing their stint in charge. And the lead contractors for the Zumwalt program — Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, and General Dynamics — have received additional hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of defense contracts — even as costs soared, schedules slipped, and capabilities declined.

As we look across a range of big-budget defense programs, we see this pattern repeated over and over and over again. Not only is there zero accountability, but this behavior is rewarded. Indeed, in today’s military, successfully expanding a program beyond its initial budget is viewed highly favorably in terms of rank advancement, as well as being valued by defense contractors looking to hire “team players” who can effectively wield influence with their former colleagues on their behalf.

The Zumwalt is an unmitigated disaster. Clearly it is not a good fit as a frontline warship. With its guns neutered, its role as a primary anti-submarine-warfare asset in question, its anti-air-warfare capabilities inferior to those of our current workhorse, the Arleigh Burke–class destroyers, and its stealth not nearly as advantageous as advertised, the Zumwalt seems to be a ship without a mission.

If that’s the case, how will the Navy use the Zumwalt? Eric Wertheim, author and editor of the U.S. Naval Institute’s Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, noted that “with only three ships, the class of destroyers could become something of a [very expensive] technology demonstration project.” He is not alone in this verdict. Admiral Elmo “Bud” Zumwalt Jr. deserved better.
Posted by:Pappy

#4  Hmmm, maybe they should let the Air Force design the ships and pick the contractors and the Navy design the Aircraft/contractors then let the Marines have veto powers over the results. Sec. Maddog doesn't like either one, do over.
Posted by: Jeasing Creque5352   2016-12-22 15:08  

#3  To put it bluntly, when you haven't fought a real war in 70 years, you tend to do stupid stuff like this.

A few years back, I commented about the Navy being "a Fortune 100 Company in uniform." In front of a flag officer, his staff and my CO and her staff. It didn't go over well.

There are advantages to being a civil servant at times.
Posted by: Pappy   2016-12-22 08:53  

#2  The Navy, like the donks, needs to spend some time in front of a mirror trying to figure out what's wrong with it. A fair amount is 8 years of Obama flag promotions, but the problems go back much farther. And it's not just the Navy. Look at the F-35. At least the Army got out of the FCS early. But nothing has been done to improve the survivability of the branch that takes 80 percent of the casualties. I'd happily trade one Zumwalt for systems that would rescue infantry casualties by 50% while increasing their lethality. A swamp worth draining.
Posted by: Nimble Spemble   2016-12-22 08:08  

#1  They ran aground as soon as they put pen to paper.
Posted by: gorb   2016-12-22 00:41  

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