Written by a Russian militiaman, resident of Rostov, Russia, who served with the separatists in Donetsk 2014-2015. Call sign "Shakespeare." From his Facebook page:
By Pavel Kukhmirov
[Sevastopol] Despite the fact that the negotiation process (for better or for worse) has finally come to naught, the forces counting on a diplomatic settlement remain in our society, including at the intra-elite level.
How good such an outcome would be in principle - I will not argue. But how is it even possible? Under what circumstances is it possible to update the process, as a variant of the development of events?
There can be two prerequisites for this (the possibility is actualized both in the presence of one, and both at once).
First: a large-scale military defeat of one of the parties. Russia or Ukraine - it's not so important here.
Second: a massive political change in the US. At the elite level.
The current situation in the theater of operations can be described as a positional war. Russia and Ukraine collect reserves and throw them into battle, carry out attacking and counterattacking actions, suffer losses in manpower and equipment.
The fact that Ukraine's losses are many times greater does not matter in this case. This is a positional war without much change in the picture. Russia and Ukraine still have a lot of resources to continue in the same spirit.
The situation is in equilibrium, in which both sides do not seek a settlement. But if the picture changes, this will change too.
For example, if there is a big victory for Russia in the Donbass arc, such as the capture of the Kramatorsk-Slavic agglomeration or Nikolaev/Zaporozhye/Kharkov, or, conversely, a serious counteroffensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the capture of, for example, Kherson (which is also possible, we like it or no) - in this case, opportunities for diplomacy may open up.
The collapse of the Ukrainian Donbass front will enable the allied forces of Russia and the People's Republics to significantly and, most importantly, rapidly advance in the southern regions of Ukraine and create a threat to Nikolaev and Odessa.
In turn, the capture of Kherson by the Kyiv regime will raise the fundamental question of a land corridor to Crimea, and of Crimea itself.
In both situations, external players will again begin to actively intervene, and at the same time, internal opposition groups will become more active both in Kyiv and in Moscow.
The changing domestic political landscape in the US is also a powerful factor that could potentially change the level of support for the Kyiv regime from Washington.
And we can not say that such an option is unbelievable.
In November, the United States will hold elections to both houses of Congress. At the moment, the Democrats have control over both chambers, but rather shaky. The Senate is 50 to 48 in favor of the Republicans, plus 2 for independent Democrats, but Vice President Kamala Harris has a decisive vote in a tie vote, and thus the Democrats still control the upper house.
The House of Representatives has a direct majority of Democrats. But the fall in the ratings of Biden and the Democratic Party as a whole is already clearly leading to a loss of control over Congress in both chambers.
Powerful problems in the US economy (first of all, rising fuel prices) have given the Ukrainian issue special significance - now this is almost the only area where Biden can demonstrate the power of the United States, tritely trying to distract voters from internal problems.
But the loss of Congress could drastically reduce NATO's pressure on the Ukrainian direction.
Theoretically, this could loosen the American leash and allow European countries to try to find a diplomatic solution.
The Republicans will definitely begin to curtail support for the Armed Forces at the expense of the US budget, publicly burying Biden's policies with a clear eye on the US presidency in 2024. And even impeachment - this can also be.
Although, in principle, Biden can also give the go-ahead to look for a diplomatic solution, if the Russian armed forces make a decisive turn in the hostilities and begin a rapid advance.
After all, they also always loved to play the role of "peacekeepers".
Actually, this is the schedule. I note that there is nothing wrong with the diplomatic settlement itself. The only question is the conditions. And they will simply depend on how things turn out at the front. And no matter how the negotiations go (if they resume again), this will still remain primary.