© Kramnik I.A. , 02/07/2023
[IMEMO] The conflict in Ukraine has already become a reason for the revision of many concepts and constructions that were born in the interim period from the collapse of the USSR to the resumption of confrontation between the great powers. The view of the world of the future, as a world of exclusively local low-intensity wars that do not require significant stress on the economies and mobilization of industry, turned out to be too optimistic, and major powers are revising their production programs, including in anticipation of full-scale conflicts using conventional weapons.
The American Center for Strategic and International Studies ( CSIS ) released a report " Empty Bins in a wartime Environment : The Challenge to the U. _ S. _ Defense Industrial Base " (hereinafter - "Empty Bins") 1 with an attempt to comprehend what is happening in the context of the readiness of the US defense industry for war.
A number of provisions and conclusions of this report directly relate to Russia and may be of interest in the context of ongoing large-scale hostilities and escalation of confrontation with the United States and its allies, including, but not limited to NATO.
The report notes the chronic underfunding of the US defense industry and many of its allies. It is noted, in particular, that it may take many years to increase production and replenish spent stocks of weapons and ammunition, and even more time will take the construction of new industrial and infrastructure facilities, which makes it necessary to promptly make appropriate decisions. At the same time, the long-term cuts in military spending not only reduces the amount of weapons purchased in itself, but also entails the degradation of industrial capacities, which are reduced and liquidated in the absence of orders.
One of the consequences of this is the impossibility of achieving an increase in production by simply increasing the volume of purchases - such an increase sooner or later runs into a shortage of industrial capacity. The report notes, however,
This topic is not entirely new. A statement of the threat of a long, large, high-intensity war and the need for mobilization training for the defense industry resulting from this threat is also present in another CSIS 2 report prepared in 2020 and released in January 2021 under the leadership of one of the leading contemporary American military theorists Mark Kansian.
The need for a large stockpile of precision-guided weapons to wage large-scale conventional warfare against a major power is also articulated in a report released in November 2021 by the Mitchell Institute 3. As the author of this report, Mark Ganzinger, notes, in the event of a collision with Russia or China, the US Air Force will face the task of hitting a huge number (from 100 thousand) of targets at various distances, which will require a large arsenal of various precision-guided weapons, the production rate of which should be from several thousand to tens of thousands of units annually for each of the species.
Ganzinger states that at present this potential is not sufficiently developed in the United States, primarily because of the long period after the collapse of the USSR, during which new equipment was ordered in sharply reduced quantities compared to Cold War plans.
Returning to the " Empty Bins " report, one can see a statement of some of the consequences of this period. Thus, the authors of the report note that during the conflict in Ukraine, the United States transferred to this country stockpiles of weapons and ammunition in many positions, exceeding the total volume of their production over the past 20 years or more, which led to a sharp reduction in the stocks of the corresponding funds.
The problem is not exhausted by the Ukrainian crisis as such. The authors of " Empty Bins " note that the United States may face an even greater shortage of more sophisticated and expensive types of weapons and weapons in the event of a conflict with a major power, in the form of Russia or China. Thus, there is a particular shortage of long-range weapons that make it possible to influence from afar objects protected by air defense and the air defense systems themselves, which is especially important in the initial period of the war.
The authors of the report believe that the stock of conventional long-range missiles of the JASSM type , and then JASSM - ER and LRASM , accumulated since the end of 1998 , which by 2025 will be about 6500 units, will be exhausted within eight days of the conflict against a major power.
The authors of "Empty Bin" cite the absence of long-term contracts for the supply of ammunition as one of the reasons for this situation , while such contracts exist for ships and aircraft 7 . This leads manufacturers to limit investment in the relevant production facilities, not being sure that these investments can be justified by large enough contracts. This situation applies not only to weapons as such, but also to a number of components, from batteries and electronic components to casting and rolled products.
Turning to the foundry industry, the authors of the report state its importance for the defense industry and note the leadership in this area of ​​China, whose annual volumes of casting of ferrous and non-ferrous metals are almost five times higher than those of India and the United States, and more than an order of magnitude - Russia, which ranks fourth in the list. the largest powers in the production of castings.
Slightly digressing from today's events, one can notice that a comparison of the military-industrial potential of the largest powers through casting brings us back to the logic of comparing potentials before the world wars, where foundry production was one of the most important indicators of the power of the economy and its ability to meet the needs of the country during a major war, along with with energy.
Speaking about the consideration of the problems posed in the report " Empty Bins ", the following should be noted. Thus, the probable shortage of high-precision long-range weapons in the event of a conflict with an equal or close enemy ( near - peer ) was noted in the report of the US Aviation Industry Association 10 in July 2009. It is very interesting in itself - it notes the growing gap between the requests of the armed forces and the possibilities of their implementation in a reasonable time for reasonable money. This gap leads to a sharp rise in the cost of modern projects of weapons and military equipment and an increase in the expected timing of their implementation. The US Navy is in a similar situation. In January 2021, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael Gilday, stated the fallacy of the approach to designing new warships with an emphasis on the highest possible manufacturability.
In examining the capabilities of the US defense industry in the anticipated confrontation with the major powers, one cannot help but wonder what the level of military spending will be if mobilization training is deployed on a proper scale. At present, it is about 3.5% of the US GDP and, as follows from the above, is insufficient to meet the needs of preparing for a major war.
If we take examples when the United States was preparing for a big war using conventional weapons, then in the 1980s this level exceeded 6.5% , reaching 6.81%, and in the 1950s it could exceed 10% of GDP .
It should be noted that the development of the military industry during the Cold War was largely built on the most powerful foundation laid during the Second World War, starting with a number of fundamental inventions from radar to a jet engine and a nuclear bomb, and ending with production facilities that were operated many decades later. Currently, these capacities have been reduced or eliminated, and the resource of fundamental developments, which ensured the long-term development of weapons and military equipment, has been exhausted. This is already leading to fundamental changes in the development of new types of weapons and the search for opportunities for progress in other areas, such as unmanned systems, means of control and information exchange, weapons based on new physical principles, etc.
The question of how much this will be enough to prepare for a new confrontation, as well as what forms this confrontation will take, remains open.