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| Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
| Idlib stumbling block. How to reconcile Syria and Turkey |
| 2023-06-24 |
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. by Kirill Semenov [REGNUM] In the capital of Kazakhstan, Astana, the 20th round of negotiations was held in the past days in the framework of the so-called. "Astana format" on the Syrian settlement. It was attended by delegations headed by the deputy foreign ministers of Russia, Turkey, Iran and Syria, as well as a delegation of the Syrian opposition headed by Ahmed Toma. The UN envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen, representatives of Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon were also present at the Astana negotiation platform as observers. This was the last meeting of the participants of the "Astana process" in the capital of Kazakhstan, as the country's leadership decided to stop holding the forum on its territory, which, by the way, was a big surprise for all participants in the event. Now the "Astana format" should decide on a new place for negotiations (previously there was a situation when the "Astana negotiations" were not held in Astana, but then the capital of Kazakhstan itself was called Nursultan). Most likely, the reason for such a decision by the Kazakh authorities is precisely the irritation with the format from the West, which Kazakhstan either faced or decided to play ahead of the curve. Indeed, in Astana, along with others, the problems of normalizing relations between Ankara and Damascus were discussed. As is known, the United States and EU countries are categorically against any steps aimed at reconciliation and restoration of ties between the Assad regime and its yesterday's opponents from among the states of the region. Actually, due to the rejection by the Europeans of the resumption of the membership of the SAR in the League of Arab States (LAS), the ministerial meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the EU member states and the Arab League has already been postponed. At the same time, the current format of negotiations on the Syrian settlement will continue and may gradually transform from the "Astana troika" of guarantor countries - Russia, Turkey and Iran into the "Moscow Four" (according to the first meeting place of the foreign ministers) - Russia, Turkey, Iran and Syria, where official Damascus will become a full participant in the process. Such a format will also push Turkey and Syria to direct contacts and, as a result, to the resolution of mutual disputes, and possibly speed up the search for a compromise between them. Actually, the whole course of the peace process will depend on whether the Turkish and Syrian Arab Republics will be able to agree among themselves, and whether it will lead to a breakthrough and a final solution to the Syrian conflict, or only to the extension of the current “freeze”. Turkey needs guarantees Naturally, the issue of the Turkish military presence in Syria remains a stumbling block between Ankara and Damascus. Despite the “road map” proposed by Moscow, apparently, the necessary algorithm that could push Assad to make concessions to the opposition, and Turkey to withdraw its troops from the SAR, has not been found. Here it should be borne in mind that the Turkish military presence in Syria is due to three key points, and without taking them into account, it is unlikely that Ankara will be able to withdraw its troops. The first is to prevent the influx of new waves of Syrian refugees into Turkey in addition to the 4 million already on Turkish territory. For example, if Turkey removes its troops, then the Syrian government forces will launch an offensive against Idlib. This will lead to the fact that up to 3 million Syrians can pour into Turkey from there (taking into account the fact that before the start of the civil war in the SAR, 800 thousand inhabitants lived in this region, and now there are more than 4 million). Basically, these are internally displaced persons (IDPs), one way or another fearing for their fate if they are under the control of the Syrian authorities. The second factor is directly linked to the first and concerns Turkish investments in the Syrian infrastructure of the northern territories. This includes large-scale construction, the construction of permanent housing both for IDPs and for the future return of Syrian refugees from Turkey. In addition, these are hospitals, schools, power lines, power plants, enterprises and other infrastructure facilities, up to the functioning of branches of Turkish universities in these areas, etc. Therefore, it is important for Ankara that all these investments continue to work for the benefit of Syrians in need, IDPs and for the return of Syrian refugees from Turkey. And this is also a matter of negotiations with the Syrian side. Finally, the factor of Kurdish left-wing radical groups associated with the PKK banned in Turkey and patronized by the Americans is directly linked to the problem of the Turkish military presence in the SAR. Turkey is unlikely to agree to withdraw its protective "umbrella" from the 30 km "Source of Peace" security zone in northeast Syria, as long as the United States maintains its presence in the region and supports the Kurdish forces. Parameters of the Turkish presence in Syria Turkish troops were deployed in Syrian Idlib based on an agreement reached at the "sixth" meeting in Astana in the fall of 2018. Then all three guarantor countries determined the parameters for the functioning of the de-escalation zone in Idlib, and one of these conditions was the creation of observation posts of the armed forces of Russia, Turkey and Iran along its perimeter. At the same time, Turkish checkpoints were located from the inner contour of the de-escalation zone, and Russian and Iranian from the outer. In addition, the agreements provided that in the event of a threat to the military personnel of the guarantor countries, they could take appropriate measures to ensure the safety of their observation posts. This provision was used by Turkey to introduce new units into the Idlib de-escalation zone after the start of the operation of the Syrian government forces “Dawn of Idlib II” in early 2020. Since that time, the Turkish presence in Idlib, originally provided for by the Astana agreements, has grown significantly (up to 8-10 thousand people). The situation in the de-escalation zone is further aggravated by the fact that outside the refugee camps controlled by the Turkish administration and Turkish military bases, around which the pro-Turkish Syrian National Army (SNA) formations are deployed, Idlib is controlled by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham terrorist group (HTS) . Solving the problem of this radical structure will also require the consolidation of efforts and flexibility on the part of Russia, Turkey and Syria. Despite the implementation of the JMD in Ukraine, Russian aviation still continues to strike this terrorist group from time to time. At the same time, Ankara refrains from fighting the HTS and supports both the group itself and the so-called. “Government of Salvation” (a civil administration affiliated with the HTS) indirect contacts, believing that a direct conflict with them will lead the Idlib region to destabilization and a new influx of refugees into Turkey. That is, to what the Turkish side is just trying to avoid. In addition to Idlib, Turkish military personnel are present (but in much smaller numbers) in the zones of Turkish operations "Olive Branch", "Euphrates Shield" and "Source of Peace" in Northern Aleppo. Turkish troops appear on this part of Syrian territory and deploy temporary observation posts. However, the purpose of this presence is joint patrolling of the border zone with the Russian military, which is provided for by the 2019 Sochi memorandum. As for the support of the armed formations of the opposition from the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), stationed in these areas, there is no need to place Turkish troops mixed with it. The Turkish army has every opportunity to keep a 30-kilometer strip along the Syrian border under fire control from its own territory, and in case of a threat, Turkish units can be brought here within a few hours. Framework for consensus between Ankara and Damascus At the same time, from the point of view of the Assad government, there is no opposition in these areas, and there are only Turkish mercenaries. In some ways, this position is true, since the SNA exist at the expense of Turkish funding. Nevertheless, the question of the future of the SNA, as well as of the entire opposition, is much more complicated and cannot be resolved within the framework of the concept of the slogan “No to Turkish occupation!” alone. Options for resolving the future of the Syrian opposition groups within the framework of a compromise between Ankara and Damascus seem possible. To do this, it is necessary to choose the right formula for reconciliation between the government and the opposition, taking as a basis the agreement between the opposition factions of the Southern Front in the provinces of Daraa and Quneitra and official Damascus. Then, in 2018, government units, such as, for example, the 8th brigade of the Fifth Corps, were deployed from some of the rebel armed formations with Russian participation. However, the problem lies in the fact that this project can be considered successful only very conditionally. If we compare the process of reconciliation in southern Syria with the same process in the Homs de-escalation zone, then there really were certain achievements here. In Homs, no separate formations of the Syrian government forces were created from the opposition groups, and most of the leaders who signed the reconciliation agreement were eventually arrested by the Syrian security services, which, of course, undermined the credibility of the reconciliation process itself. In the south, as already noted, units did arise that were entirely composed of former oppositionists, but here it happened rather contrary to the position of official Damascus - this decision was pushed through by the Russian side. It is significant that official representatives of the Syrian government structures on the sidelines continue to call the 8th brigade "terrorists" and "bandits" who allegedly have nothing to do with the Syrian armed forces. Therefore, for the groups in the north of Syria, a formula must be found that will convince Turkey that these formations will remain in one form or another within the framework of the Syrian government forces. And the “reconciliation” itself will not be an ordinary ploy to disarm the opposition forces, and their leaders to be gradually and gradually repressed. Of course, any formula for reconciliation cannot apply to the HTS terrorists, but the so-called SNA groups could eventually be formed from the SNA groups. 6th Corps of the Syrian Armed Forces. Talks about this have been going on for a long time, but the most important thing remains - to agree on all the formalities and get the consent of Ankara, Damascus and the opposition groups themselves to this step. Related: Astana format: 2022-09-28 Turkey Seeks Economic Normalization With Syria After Political Failure Astana format: 2022-07-24 United States miscalculated in an attempt to make Russia an outcast - FP Astana format: 2021-02-20 Russia, Turkey, Iran to continue joint effort to combat terrorists in Syria |
| Posted by:badanov |