by Vadim Bondar
[REGNUM] On Sunday, Exercise Dragon-24 kicked off in Poland, which will be a key element of the largest NATO exercise since 1988, Steadfast Defender 2024. A total of about 20 thousand troops and 3.5 thousand pieces of equipment from 10 NATO countries are participating in them. But scale is not the main thing here. This series of military maneuvers of the alliance is interesting primarily because for the first time, apparently in test mode, combat coordination and integrated management of all elements of a new type of war begin to be worked out.
Thus, in addition to the traditional types of armed forces and branches of the armed forces, Dragon-24 involves special forces, territorial defense (including semi-guerrilla formations), cyber troops, special information warfare units, as well as special groups of air and sea drones formed at the corresponding headquarters. According to the Polish Ministry of Defense, the exercise will test “interaction and execution of combat missions on land, in the air, at sea, and in cyberspace.”
Work is underway to speed up the flow of data from all types of reconnaissance, from satellite to electronic, directly to headquarters and units making decisions on inflicting one type of fire or another on the enemy. Battlefield headquarters for analyzing and processing all this intelligence data are still in test mode, but are already being equipped with elements of artificial intelligence. This allows you to respond very quickly and as adequately as possible to changes in the situation, assess the degree of threats and determine the priority of targets for strikes. Or, on the contrary, avoid enemy fire. The entire vertical of combat work is trained, from satellite to ordinary soldier. During the exercises, each intermediate link in this vertical is subjected to a thorough check to see how expedient and effective it is, how it specifically contributes to high-quality combat work, what shortcomings it has and how to eliminate them.
Two years of conflict in Ukraine, as well as military operations in the Middle East and the Red Sea, indicate that the armed struggle is entering a qualitatively new stage and requires conceptually new approaches. Our potential adversary understands this very well and is already trying to put these new approaches into practice. But these are all tactics and exercises in the field of operational art.
In strategic terms, there is nothing to work out yet. In this area, at the theoretical level there is still a painful search for the defining form of warfare against such an enemy as Russia.
Regarding the ongoing exercises, the Poles write that they “are not directed against any country, but are a demonstration of the ability to resist any aggressive policy,” including “provocative actions of the Russian Federation.” This is the usual political chatter, behind which one can see the absence of a new doctrine of war. What should it be, offensive or defensive, with or without nuclear elements, limited or comprehensive? This understanding obviously does not exist yet.
During 2009–2012, the US Department of Defense completed the development of the Prompt Global Strike (PGS) operational-strategic concept and intensified activities aimed at the practical implementation of key provisions of this concept. In particular, in November 2021, large-scale exercises of the aviation, sea and ground components of the US strategic offensive forces Global Thunder 22 were held, with the testing of BGU variants using nuclear weapons against Russia simultaneously from the western and eastern directions.
However, the emergence in Russia of new stations and satellites for a missile attack warning system, hypersonic weapons, new missiles with multiple warheads capable of penetrating any missile defense, as well as other elements of a global response, has cast doubt on the effectiveness of such a strike from the United States and NATO. Now this concept is being “creatively rethought.” In particular, for this rethinking, American strategic reconnaissance drones RQ-4 Global Hawk are hovering near Crimea, Kaliningrad and other places, new swarms of small electronic reconnaissance satellites are being launched, and other events are being carried out. Ukraine, as a non-staff member of NATO, helps our Western “partners” a lot in these events.
Nevertheless, doubts about the previous doctrine have arisen and are growing. It is within the framework of these doubts and the nervousness they engender that the recent hysteria over Russia’s alleged plans to deploy nuclear weapons in space should be viewed. In fact, Americans and the West as a whole are not afraid of nuclear weapons themselves, which can be used to attack ground targets from space. This is already a fact. Last year, the British edition of the Daily Express wrote that the Russian Avangard missile system is capable of striking several targets in different parts of the world in less than half an hour, while the missile can be launched outside the earth's atmosphere and accelerate to a speed of 9.5 kilometers per second. They are afraid of new Russian developments in the fight against the enemy’s satellite constellation, which use certain nuclear elements. There is no open data on these developments, but Westerners are afraid and are rethinking their strategic concepts, obviously for good reason.
The next question is, if you try to fight with Russia without a global strike, within the framework of some “sobering and sending a signal” local operation, then what should it be, offensive or defensive?
And here, too, there is a thorough analysis, but of two years of fighting in Ukraine. The notorious counter-offensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces was developed and carefully prepared with the direct participation of Western commanders and military analysts. The West prepared personnel for this, trained personnel of strike brigades, supplied these units with weapons, equipment, ammunition, provided intelligence data, and in some cases directly remotely controlled high-precision fire systems and drones.
But the successes of this strategically important operation turned out to be insignificant and did not justify the conceptual plan. The Economist magazine writes with regret about this: “Russian defensive structures in the south and east of Ukraine have become the longest defensive structures in Europe since the Second World War.” Yes, but it’s not just about the structures themselves. The ability to effectively use these structures for their intended purpose is important. This also discourages Western strategists in a certain way.
Prior to this, NATO’s strategy in Europe was based on the principle of mobile defense with the harmonious integration of a disarming global strike (strikes) into the entire depth of enemy territory. Now the situation is changing. A global strike may be immediately followed by an equally global and more destructive irresistible retaliatory strike, and stationary defense has proven to be more effective than mobile defense, which is now pouring in along the entire length of the Ukrainian front. Now, as the Economist writes, NATO is thinking about whether to start building bunkers and some kind of multi-lane fortifications along the borders with Russia?
But a return to the Maginot, Siegfried and Mannerheim lines will not bring military success to Europe in the event of a clash with Russia. Here, as with the global impact, there should be no illusions either. The West again did not understand anything and made the wrong conclusions. We are not waging a war in Ukraine, we are conducting a local special operation with many reservations. If Russia begins to wage a full-fledged war, using the entire arsenal of what it has, and not sparing anyone, then these stripes will be torn apart in a few days. We must not forget that Russia in particular has the “father of all bombs” (ODAB-9000, a volumetric detonating aerial bomb with an explosive mass of about seven tons, the explosion power is 44–45 tons in TNT equivalent).
According to Western military experts, Russia is the only country that possesses such a powerful weapon, with characteristics close to a nuclear operational-tactical charge. The explosion of such a bomb completely destroys any fortified structures within a radius of 100 meters from the epicenter and unfortified reinforced concrete structures within a radius of 200 meters from the epicenter of the explosion. It is unknown how many such ammunition are in Russia's arsenal. There is no such information in open sources. But apparently more than one hundred, since these weapons are not for parades and are not a piece of experimental work, but a serial product.
There are other ammunition designed specifically for wormholes. For example, the newest glide bomb “Drill” is just perfect for opening all sorts of bunkers, tunnels and various buried fortifications. Finally, the Kinzhal system missiles, the reserves of which are now being actively replenished and accumulated. There are other developments as well. They are improved based on the results of the SVO experience. That is why Putin said: “We haven’t started anything seriously yet.” And this scares the West most of all. What will happen if they start in earnest? What to prepare for, what war? Russia must certainly lose. But how to achieve this? Which war should we play with Russia?
The West does not want a heroic war. Nuclear exchange of strikes even more so. I really wanted to implement the plan of the early forties so that Hitler would “tear to shreds” the Red Army and bleed himself dry. And the Anglo-Saxons then entered, finished off both of them and divided everything. But then the number did not go through. The USSR emerged from the war with an 11-million-strong experienced and motivated army, a huge amount of the most advanced equipment and incredible support among the population of many countries around the world. Including in Europe. Now they are trying to apply the same Hitlerite option, but with Ukraine and, possibly, their own hybrid participation, which is being practiced in exercises.
But they don’t yet know how to act strategically at the final stage of this plan.