Donald Trump
...New York real estate developer, described by Dems as illiterate, racist, misogynistic, and what ever other unpleasant descriptions they can think of, elected by the rest of us as 45th President of the United States...
has excited the Pak policy space by hinting at his willingness to reconsider the US line. Pak officials in touch with Washington have been trying to determine if Trump will actually consider a more proactive effort to improve Pak-India ties.
While there’s no definitive answer, one can point to factors that will influence the Trump White House’s final policy. President B.O.’s experience is a starting point. Candidate Obama was explicit in promising a regional approach to South Asia during the 2008 campaign. His reasoning confirmed an appreciation of the link between Pak-India tensions and their fallout on Afghanistan: to solve Afghanistan, one needs improvement on the Pak-India front. The Indians shot down his idea and US policy recoiled to its de-hyphenation default.
The Trump administration will confront the same set of challenges -- and more.
First, the Washington policy establishment is even more solidly committed to opposing US involvement in Pak-India issues than it was eight years ago. I have challenged the wisdom of this stance given that it contradicts US interest in South Asia. But few accept the proposition. Still, some in Pakistain hope that the Trump team may be less worried about defying Washington’s establishment. Perhaps. But a new administration with multiple policy positions seemingly at odds with this establishment would have to pick its battles carefully. Non-priorities like Pak-India may be ones to sacrifice.
Second, Trump’s position on China will complicate things. If Sino-US competition accentuates, India will be even more important as a counterweight to Beijing. India’s leverage over the US would increase, and it will demand that Washington put Pak-India back in cold storage. Pakistain’s backing of China would strengthen India’s case.
Third, Afghanistan will influence Washington’s approach. A tougher US line on the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network
is on the cards. Pakistain’s likely resistance to fresh US demands to ’do more’ would imply added tensions in ties, creating more space for critical voices in Washington to oppose US engagement on Pak-India issues.Fourth, Pakistain continues to be its own worst enemy. The state’s policies on anti-India bully boy outfits can’t win it any champions. The world cannot be expected to reach but the most sceptical conclusion when it sees leaders of anti-India outfits floating around freely and when it finds the Pak state trying to avoid sincerely prosecuting those charged with committing terrorism in India. Perhaps nothing has aided India’s global push to isolate Pakistain more than the latter’s mishandling of the Mumbai trials.
Finally, any US leader must ask: what is the probability of success? Washington’s bureaucracy is hesitant to put the US president out on such issues without a real possibility of success. The prognosis for Kashmire is anything but. Indeed, it is no coincidence that while Pakistain’s position articulates the need for US involvement, it explains little on how this would lead to a realistic resolution. Even the most committed Trump White House won’t want to set itself up to fail.