Text taken from the Telegram channel of harry_homolsky
[ColonelCassad] In the wake of the Iranian-Israeli events, the domestic blogosphere has once again started talking about foreign agents who “suddenly” don’t want to die for their new homeland.
And here I want to ask a question not to them, but to you, dear opinion leaders: how did it happen that now they are such-and-such, but before February 22nd they were quite ok?
Well, that is, I first watched “Radio Day”, where the foreign agent Misha Kozyrev plays himself, when I was still a young student of the journalism department. And even then everything was clear to me.
And a couple of years later I went into journalism and saw a great many such characters. Needless to say, in 2013 none of them let me down?
Who is Misha Kozyrev in absolutely all the TV series and films where he plays himself? A mean, cowardly, petty and absolutely unprincipled eccentric who simultaneously pretends to be terribly inspired and sells his own ass to anyone who is ready to pay.
Many colleagues who defected, by the way, did exactly that: they poured out spirituality, principles and struggle to the girls in the bar, and "denimed" for everyone.
I never heard that word before, but apparently it means wearing blue jeans. What it is meant to imply in this context, I have no idea.
And many decent people preferred to close their eyes to this, since it was the same party.
Yes, there are such interesting types, concentrated, as a rule, in more or less creative spheres. Yes, they are always visible in advance. Yes, they will sell you, and mom, and the Motherland, and then find a thousand and one excuses for this.
It is useless to pressure them with arguments and facts, since in the end you will inevitably hear "yes, that's the kind of shit I am."
So don't waste your time. You blinked once, and now just forget it.
#2
Freed in 1865 from the Democrats, then slapped with 100+ years of Jim Crow Laws, lynching, and continued discrimination. Only to have Black voters continue to overwhelmingly support and vote for the same Democratic Party, that enslaved their people, 160 years later.
It's amazing what a few well funded sellout Race Pimp Black Reverends accomplished for the Democrats.
#6
Black or white doesn't make much difference. We all, as a society, suffer very badly from collective amnesia. Far too many people, black and white, only remember what they've seen on TV in the last 24-hour news cycle.
Posted by: Abu Uluque ||
06/20/2025 11:39 Comments ||
Top||
[TomCooperSarcastosaurus] Expect every truck, tank, and vehicle to look like the mast of a naval ship in the near future.
NOTE: Below is a practical analysis about how to defend against fiber optic drones. I won’t bury the lede. Defense against any and all small-cheap-drone is based on first seeing/sensing it. It’s all about the sensors. There is no new tech here. We have everything we need to sense a drone in enough time to shoot it down. As with everything, is it scalable? Yes. I think so. Is there something on the market now? No, but many systems are being tested. There are many systems for shooting down cruise missiles and Shaheds. But nothing yet that is modular for good point and convoy defense vs small-cheap-drones. Why don't we already have this on the battlefield? EW has, until now, worked very well. Fiber drones changed this.
On today’s battlefields, fiber-optic guided drones present one of the most difficult detection challenges faced by defenders. These drones don’t emit radio-frequency signals, making them invisible to standard electronic warfare systems that rely on RF detection and jamming. Controlled via an ultra-thin tethered cable, they fly low, use terrain for cover, and exploit gaps in conventional sensor systems. Both Ukraine and Russia have deployed these “unjammable” drones for reconnaissance and precision strikes.
Detecting fiber-optic drones requires a layered approach. No single sensor can cover all the weaknesses these drones exploit. The solution lies in combining acoustic, radar, and optical sensors into a single fusion system. Each sensor type has its strengths and weaknesses, but together they can compensate for each other and create a viable detection umbrella.
Text taken from a patarames blogpost
[ColonelCassad] As we can see, this material from five years ago has almost completely come true. Iran's strikes on Israel are now fully consistent with its missile doctrine, which took into account, among other things, the disorganization of the country's top leadership. Despite the damage suffered from attacks and sabotage, Iran retains the ability to inflict costly targeted damage, as it planned 5 years before the war. Today's strikes on the center of Tel Aviv have become quite indicative.
INTERPRETATION OF IRAN'S MISSILE DOCTRINE
Non-nuclear weapon states may have the highest conventional military capabilities, but this is always considered insufficient when it comes to nuclear war.
This intuitive view is based on two main ideas:
There is no reliable defense against nuclear weapons
Conventional weapons cannot provide a significant counter-response to the use of nuclear weapons.
Iran’s 21st century missile warfare doctrine relies on three main capabilities:
Ballistic missiles precise enough to deliver pinpoint strikes (~50 m) against key enemy assets. These could be critical targets such as power plants and other critical infrastructure, or military targets such as missile silos or missile defense early warning radars.
The launch and deployment options for ballistic missiles are designed to survive the decapitation of the military-political leadership by an adversary's nuclear attack and to accomplish the mission of inflicting serious damage on the adversary.
The damage to the adversary is inflicted at a high enough rate that any counter-campaign aimed at neutralizing Iran's missile forces will be ineffective. Once this capability can be neutralized, it has already exhausted its ballistic missile arsenal and can no longer participate in the conflict.
Once this capability is achieved, the adversary's nuclear option is neutralized by two facts:
A nuclear preemptive strike will not deprive Iran of the ability to counterattack, and what survives is sufficient to inflict damage on a scale that the adversary cannot afford.
The scale of damage, due to the ability to strike critical and high-value targets at a pinpoint level, reaches a level high enough to be comparable to what was previously possible only with nuclear weapons or, at least, with complete air superiority.
THE BASIS OF SURVIVABILITY.
In August 2020, Iran revealed a new method of basing solid-fuel ballistic missiles in underground launchers. This concept is based on the ambiguity of true and false sites, as well as the large spaces that can be exploited at so-called “missile farms.”
For a nuclear preemptive strike to neutralize these weakly defended sites, it would be necessary to strike large areas, which would increase the number of nuclear weapons needed.
Other solid-fuel ballistic missiles in Iran’s arsenal include:
Autonomous vehicles that can launch a missile quickly upon receiving an order (e.g., Sejil).
Or off-road launcher-transporters that can hide in the terrain (e.g., Dezful).
Iran’s mountainous terrain is particularly well suited to the latter of the two launch methods. Deep valleys eliminate line-of-sight for the standoff reconnaissance assets that would need it, and also provide some protection against conventional and nuclear weapons.
Another means Iran uses to improve the survivability of its missile systems is to design them small enough to disguise them as civilian trucks, for example by using plastic containers.
LIQUID-FUELED MISSILES ARE A MORE COMPLEX MATTER.
Iran prefers to retain and even expand its liquid-fueled ballistic missiles despite the availability of solid-fueled missiles for three main reasons:
The superior performance of liquid-fueled intermediate-range ballistic missiles allows for heavier payloads and longer ranges in the same size.
They can be safely stored without the risk of explosion or catastrophic cascade, making them attractive for deep tunnel construction. This is primarily due to the physical separation of the fuel and oxidizer tanks and the warheads.
When stored dry and without fuel, their service life without significant maintenance is enormous. Thus, the investment in the arsenal is designed to last for several generations, and the life cycle costs make such conventional liquid-fueled ballistic missiles attractive.
However, the problems that liquid-fueled missiles pose are also significant: A well-trained crew is needed to fuel and handle the missile.
Iran’s new generation of missiles use fuel and oxidizer combinations that cannot be used at the high temperatures typical of Iran.
So while the solid-fueled Sejil-2 can travel hundreds of kilometers disguised as a civilian truck and hide anywhere, a similar liquid-fueled missile cannot operate very far from its base.
MISSILE CITIES
The concept of storing a valuable arsenal of ballistic missiles in deep tunnel complexes is not new, with China, North Korea and Iran being the countries that have made the most extensive use of this basing concept. Iran calls such complexes “missile cities” due to their scale.
These bases are often buried so deeply in the mountains that their arsenal is protected from nuclear strikes. However, nuclear strikes on the entrances to such bases could potentially disable them for the remainder of a high-intensity conflict or reduce their value because they cannot operate their missiles until the damage is repaired.
In conventional attacks on such missile tunnel complexes, excavators and other construction equipment either reopen the entrance within a short period of time or create alternative emergency exits if necessary.
High-quality tunnel linings made of high-performance composite concrete are also used at the entrance sites.
The damage caused by conventional bunker buster bombs to such entrance structures is less than often intuitively assumed. This is true for both bunker buster bombs that can be delivered by manned aircraft and for special means such as the GBU-57.
Thus, while tens of meters of soft rock can be penetrated by such weapons, including several concrete slabs, penetration values drop sharply to a few meters or less when dealing with hard granite rock formations and/or high-performance composite concrete.
The impact of such conventional weapons on critical targets inside the tunnel complexes is virtually non-existent due to the overlying rock thickness, typically 50-100 m for the least fortified of them.
Therefore, reliable capability for rapid repair and continuous operation is guaranteed against conventional bunker buster bombs.
Here it is necessary to emphasize the criticality of the operation of such missile-tunnel systems. Since their sole purpose is to launch the entire arsenal of stored ballistic missiles, for an opponent who has aviation as the only platform for delivering bunker buster bombs, a dilemma arises: in order to deliver a bunker buster, it is necessary to suppress the enemy's integrated air defense system and ensure that it is degraded to a sufficient extent to enable successful delivery of the weapon to the target.
The range of Iran's ballistic missiles allows for the placement of missile cities deep in the central regions of Iran, which is a huge country.
The distance that aviation must survive, flying through enemy airspace without a single damage or destruction, is hundreds of kilometers. Evasive maneuvering with such a heavy payload is often equated to mission failure.
The time-critical nature of ballistic missile warfare does not allow for a sustained SEAD/DEAD campaign to disable an enemy’s integrated air defenses.
Iran’s integrated air defenses and their capabilities have reached a technological level that can effectively counter low observable techniques that are primarily used by Western air forces against high-value targets.
Iran's objective would be to defend a point target (missile city) which is much easier to defend than a random area target. Subsonic cruise missile delivered warheads would suffer most in such a scenario against a point/node defense system.
COUNTERING MISSILE CITIES
The solution to the problem posed by such a missile city would be nuclear warheads delivered by precision ballistic missiles. In the future, this could be hypersonic bunker busting conventional missiles or low yield ground penetrating ballistic missiles.
Granite rock formations can withstand a 300 kt contact blast delivered by thermonuclear ballistic missile warheads (~100 m) if the depth/overburden is
~300 m if anchor bolts and mesh lined tunnels are used. This is typical for very deep missile storage areas and low risk transit tunnel sections that can withstand damage.
100m using high grade concrete lining. This is typical for critical areas with sensitive equipment and personnel.
030-50m using high strength concrete structures for entry areas. Such transit sections can withstand damage and spalling/debris and simply need to remain passable.
Entry areas, which almost always have less granite overburden than the 30-50m mentioned, can be heavily damaged due to the risk of total tunnel collapse. It takes a significant amount of time to free and clear such entry sections for continued launch operations. Multiple hits over a long period of time can completely disable a missile city for the duration of the war. Thus, although the missile arsenal cannot be destroyed by enemy nuclear weapons systems, effective actions against such missile tunnel complexes are possible in the event of a conflict.
NUCLEAR-RESISTANT MISSILE CITIES
Missile cities that can withstand nuclear strikes and continue launch operations are of the cave silo type.
This concept does not require an entry zone or opening large enough for the launchers to operate, and instead launches missiles from inside a mountain through a vertical shaft that can be several tens of meters long.
As long as the shaft remains clear, launch operations can continue, and the nature of this concept allows it to survive multiple hits from precision (e.g. Trident II) nuclear weapons and remain operational.
Since Iran lacks a nuclear triad and expensive delivery platforms like SSBNs, it can focus its resources on developing a complex and expensive basing method like cavern basing.
During the basing study for the US MX Peacekeeper ICBM, cavern basing was rated as the most successful basing concept in terms of robustness, but also one of the most expensive.
Only Iran and possibly North Korea are known to use the cavern launch concept.
However, the rock formations of such Iranian systems are likely not suitable for multiple nuclear hits due to the relatively shallow barrel depth.
The examples of such systems shown so far have been firing one missile at a time, which does not meet the timing parameter that is most important in a high-intensity missile war.
In early November 2020, Iran unveiled a new concept for launching and loading ballistic missiles. A high mobility electric railcar carrying 5 ready-to-launch liquid-fueled missiles loaded into a semi-automated erector system. It is best described as a multi-launch carousel magazine loading and launch system that allows for continuous parallel loading operations.
The IRGC Aerospace Force has not revealed how or where the missiles are launched.
The launch method could be a combination of the previously disclosed cavern launch concept, potentially a vertical shaft more than 100 meters deep.
However, it appears Iran has opted for a more down-to-earth, far less complex and resource-intensive concept that maintains the nuclear resilience requirements of the facility.
The concept is based on the following features:
The cavern is deep enough to be unaffected by the force of the blast, overpressure, and radiant heat.
Small enough to pose a very low risk of a direct hit from a nuclear bomb into the cavern.
Deep enough to require a steep-angle-of-attack weapon trajectory to hit the critical lower portion of the cavern where the rails and tunnel door are located.
Situated deep in a valley to complicate the weapon's trajectory and use natural barriers to deflect the blast.
The launch silo is bored into solid granite rock, reinforced and lined with high-performance concrete structures. Such relatively small structures can be well protected from nuclear weapons, just as ICBM silos are designed to remain intact from a close-in thermonuclear warhead (~300 m).
Unlike a standard ICBM silo, the Iranian silo does not contain sensitive equipment and serves no function other than to facilitate the delivery of a missile through a special door and subsequent launch. Consequently, it is not only more resistant to damage, but can also be repaired by improvised engineering means if necessary.
The purpose of this type of silo is to contain the erosion caused by a nuclear blast to a level low enough to leave the door and launch pad intact. The surface explosion, the primary mechanism for destroying hardened nuclear weapons, must remain within the limits of the yield to prevent the last 10–30 m of the missile transit tunnel from being irreparably damaged. Vibration levels in this section of the tunnel can be neglected, since a simple door collapse and malfunction must be avoided.
Multi-megaton nuclear warheads have a more adverse effect but are not used for counter strikes, mainly because they are either fewer in number or heavier. Earth-penetrating nuclear bunker busters are primarily used for air delivery, as a ballistic missile strike is considered less effective.
NEWLY OPENED COMPLEX
In addition to this new basing and launch concept, the tunnel complex also has conventional silos as a secondary launch option. The huge complex has deep missile storage bays with anchor bolts and mesh lining, polymer-lined compartments where sensitive equipment is protected and ground impacts can cause only minor damage. Warhead mating and missile loading areas, where warheads pose a concentrated risk of catastrophic cascade effects, must be separated from the rest of the complex.
Transit tunnel sections where damage and spalling are acceptable, and anchor bolts and mesh are used.
Critical areas and low cover entry areas where high quality lining is used.
In addition to these details, to estimate the overall firepower it would be necessary to know how many loading bays, how many carrier cars, and how many launch silos there are.
If it is a large complex, as is assumed, hundreds of different ballistic missiles could be stored, which would be done in the deepest bays. These inexpensive anchor and mesh lined sections have a granite cap of 300-600 m and are therefore considered impervious to nuclear attack.
Liquid fuel missile types that are likely present and compatible with minor modifications include:
SRBM Qiam with a range of 800 km with precision strike, MaRV, and warheads with submunitions. Primarily for use against air bases of neighboring countries to destroy specific sites or to ensure the impossibility of operations due to accidental interval strikes with submunitions of warheads that require removal due to the risk of unexploded ordnance and accidental placement.
SRBM Emad with a range of 1,700 km with a precision warhead MaRV for key military and high-value sites of a regional adversary.
Heavy SRBM Khorramshahr with additional ammunition and MaRV warheads With a payload that is approximately 3 times higher than the Emad and Ghadr-H missiles, this new ballistic missile with a heavy warhead(s) will be available in greater numbers. In terms of cost and benefits, one Khorramshahr with a 1.8-ton submunition warhead causes the same damage as three Gadr-H, which is a significant advantage. The range is up to 2,000 km.
In terms of firepower generation, depending on how many parallel loading sites are available in the complex to load the unmanned automatic wagon magazine, the value can vary greatly. Since the location of this static system is known and modern missiles do not require a turntable for azimuth alignment, loading is relatively fast.
Compared to Iran's tactical solid-fuel missiles, the liquid-fueled missile arsenal is launched at predetermined targets, so if the conflict is very intense, these missiles will be launched as quickly as possible.
CONCLUSION
In the past, Iran sought protection from nuclear explosions with its concept of basing liquid-fueled missiles in a vertical silo in a cavern.
The new concept of launching and loading five missiles can also be applied to this concept, but it is expensive and requires a very mature missile system with the highest reliability.
It is expected that in combination with the concept of a separate silo launch pad, a sufficient degree of protection against a nuclear explosion will be achieved.
This allows the existing missile cities to be retrofitted with this capability at an affordable cost and within a reasonable time frame.
This and other various cladding methods show that the IRGC Aerospace Force is very confident that this is necessary to achieve a specific goal with high cost effectiveness.
The dynamics of the development of this basing method are very different from those of other countries:
Iran is not a nuclear power; it requires a huge amount of precision firepower to make a difference in a conflict and ultimately deter an adversary from a first nuclear strike. In this case, silos with single missiles do not make sense, since hundreds to thousands of ballistic missiles are required in each theater. The absence of nuclear weapons, as well as various basing concepts for them, with the highest potential and most expensive option - SSBNs - allows resources to be concentrated on conventional missile forces.
Iran has the necessary sparsely populated areas, as well as high mountain topology and suitable rock formations to use such a basing method. This concept brings Iran closer to achieving a capability that no other country has: deterring nuclear powers from a preemptive preventive conventional nuclear strike. Iran is limited to a missile range of about 2,000 km. Previously, this range was the maximum that could be achieved with a relatively cost-effective single-stage missile.
As Iran's missile program rapidly improves in technology, a liquid-fueled, two-stage ICBM with direct deterrence and continental US strike capability may become a reality at some point, and the missile basing method shown is probably already quite good in its current state.
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. by Kirill Semenov
[REGNUM] In response to the Israeli attacks on Iran on June 13, the Islamic world demonstrated a rare degree of diplomatic consolidation.
Verbally, anyway. Mustaches were cursed, shoes thrown en masse. Beyond that, they haven’t stopped Israel from flying through their airspace on the way to flattening hundreds more key buildings somewhere in Iran.
This was expressed in a joint statement by twenty countries, led by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, the UAE and Pakistan. But behind the rare unity in condemning Israel lies a complex mosaic of positions reflecting deep regional contradictions.
The collective document qualified Israel's actions as a gross violation of Iran's sovereignty and international law, especially given the targeted strikes on nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.
The signatories unanimously warned that such actions create an extremely dangerous precedent, threaten the stability of the entire Middle East and jeopardize the safety of shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, which is critical to the global economy and through which a third of global oil supplies pass.
GULF STATES UNDER THREAT
The current conflict is of particular concern to the Gulf states, which are watching with growing alarm the prospect of further escalation and expansion of the confrontation between Israel and Iran.
In recent days, the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have made their position very clear: they categorically do not want to be drawn into a large-scale armed conflict that they did not provoke and do not seek.
This position is not dictated by abstract concerns.
The presence of major US military bases and vital strategic infrastructure, including oil terminals, ports and logistics hubs on their territory, makes the Gulf states potential targets if the Donald Trump administration joins Israel's actions.
The leaders of the Arab monarchies understand that escalation could spread quickly to their own cities, jeopardizing not only the safety of their populations, but also the very foundations of their economies, which are deeply integrated into global energy supply chains.
Against this backdrop, discontent is growing in Arab capitals with Trump’s approach to current events, his de facto support for Israeli aggression, and even plans to join it. For the GCC states, this essentially means the US abandoning its own promises to prevent regional escalation – assurances Trump gave to Arab leaders during his May visit to the Gulf states.
Now, Israel's actions and the US administration's failure to contain Netanyahu do not guarantee the GCC countries' security even if they maintain consistent neutrality.
Israeli air force attacks on Iranian nuclear infrastructure raise concerns about potential expansion of strike targets. The Gulf littoral states' main nightmare is a strike on Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant.
The location of this facility just three hundred kilometers from the coast of Arabia makes the scenario of radioactive contamination catastrophically real. A release of radiation into the Persian Gulf would have immediate and long-term devastating consequences.
Radioactive contamination will inevitably affect the desalination plants from which the Gulf countries receive the bulk of their drinking water, creating a direct threat to the livelihoods of millions of people.
Water contamination will destroy fish stocks and cause irreparable damage to aquaculture, undermining an important economic sector and food security. The consequences for the unique marine ecosystem of the Persian Gulf will be irreversible.
In light of these risks, the message from the Gulf monarchies is extremely pragmatic and urgent.
They call for the need to contain the escalation of the conflict between Israel and Iran at all costs and to protect the critical energy flows from the Persian Gulf, the stability of which is vital for the global economy. It is fundamentally important for them to prevent the involvement of other regional players in the conflict, but above all the United States, which would inevitably turn a local confrontation into a regional and even global conflagration.
Whether Washington and Tel Aviv respond to this call will be the decisive factor in determining the region's prospects.
At stake is a test of the fundamental strategy that monarchies have pursued in recent years - hedging, balancing between global powers, economic diversification and attempts to reduce dependence on oil.
Will these carefully constructed buffers and alternatives be able to withstand the onslaught of a full-scale regional war, or will the entire strategic project collapse in the chaos of a large-scale conflict, setting the region back decades?
The answer depends largely on the ability of the international community to hear and respond to the alarm bells coming from the Gulf. But it is clear that grandiose transformation programs like Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 are now under renewed threat.
In fact, Saudi Arabia was forced to make peace with the Houthis precisely because of the stalled implementation of this program, which requires “greenhouse conditions,” and any security challenges put it at risk.
Now, however, a new war, started without any participation from Riyadh, is proving even more destructive for the country's modernization projects.
It is obvious that if the US is drawn into the conflict, Iran's missile salvoes against US bases in the Gulf countries will set their programs back many years, and they will lose their investment appeal for many years. And it is not worth thinking that all Iranian missiles will end up in Israel.
The Islamic Republic has only used medium-range missiles that can reach the Jewish state for retaliatory strikes, while its vast stockpiles of tactical missiles have not been used. But they could be used if Trump decides to join Netanyahu.
Thus, the consequences of the June 13 attacks create serious systemic risks for the region, and possible US intervention will push Tehran to an asymmetric response that could also destabilize Lebanon and Iraq, where Iranian influence remains.
Even if Washington does not join the Israeli attacks, the US passivity in containing Israel and Donald Trump's indirect support for it are damaging American plans for the Gulf Arab monarchies, forcing them to continue to distance themselves from the Abraham Accords.
The economic threat is existential for them: a potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran would paralyze the oil exports of the Gulf countries, whose budgets are critically dependent on energy revenues.
The deaths of prominent nuclear scientists such as Abdolhamid Minouchehr can only accelerate Iran's development of nuclear weapons in underground complexes like Fordo, creating a new source of global instability and forcing Arab countries to rethink their security strategies.
CONFLICTING CONVICTIONS
Türkiye has seemingly taken the most radical position, openly calling for sanctions against Israel and essentially supporting Iran's military response as a right to self-defense.
“Iran’s right to defend itself against banditry and state terrorism from Israel is completely natural, legitimate and legally justified,” Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said at a meeting of the parliamentary faction of the ruling Justice and Development Party.
At the same time, the territory of the Turkish Republic can still be used by US and NATO aircraft to collect intelligence information in the interests of Israel.
In turn, the State of Qatar insists on an immediate international investigation into Israel's actions under the auspices of the UN, expressing direct solidarity with the victims of the attacks in Iran.
Saudi Arabia, despite its historic rivalry with Tehran, has suddenly issued a strong condemnation, using the rhetoric of the “Muslim Brotherhood” and criticizing the West’s “double standards,” in a desperate attempt to prevent a chain escalation that could derail the kingdom’s economic diversification plans.
Pakistan also supported this line, calling Israel's actions aggression, a challenge to all Muslims and demanding collective measures of defense.
"Israel has set its sights on Yemen, Iran and Palestine. If the Islamic world does not unite now, we will all face the same fate," Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Asif said. And Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif spoke by phone with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and assured him of unwavering support.
In contrast, the UAE and Egypt have shown noticeable restraint.
Abu Dhabi has called for dialogue to “prevent the conflict from widening,” while Cairo has offered to act as a mediator to resume talks on the nuclear deal, indirectly acknowledging ongoing concerns about Iran’s nuclear program.
Indonesia and Morocco have joined the OIC's general rhetoric but avoided making specific commitments, demonstrating caution in the face of geopolitical turbulence.
Oman, which traditionally acts as a regional peacemaker, took a special position.
Sultan Haitham bin Tarek Al Said called on both sides in a telephone conversation with Pezeshkian to exercise "maximum restraint and immediately return to the negotiation process," warning of the catastrophic humanitarian and economic consequences of an escalation for the entire region.
He reiterated Muscat's readiness to open its diplomatic channels for de-escalation, recalling Oman's historic role in mediating between Iran and the US, including talks disrupted by the June 15 attacks.
However, the Grand Mufti of Oman, Ahmad al-Khalili, took a tougher stance: “We were stunned and shocked by the aggression of the Zionist entity against Iran. Despite this, we believe and are confident that Allah Almighty will defeat them [Israel] and will do so through the hands of the Iranian armed forces – something that the souls of believers aspire to.”
And in the next message, Al-Khalili said: “The Iranian response to the Zionist aggression was firm and decisive, calming hearts after it achieved results. It opened the door to hope that the hated Zionist occupation of the Holy Lands will end irrevocably, if God allows.”
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES
At the same time, deep fault lines within Islamic solidarity became apparent in the first hours after the attacks.
Not a single country, including Israel's most vocal critics – Turkey, Qatar and Pakistan – has offered Iran real military support, limiting itself to rhetoric and diplomatic demarches.
Despite the fact that there are American military facilities on the territory of these countries that could be used against Iran, and may already be used for intelligence purposes.
Significant differences also emerged in the interpretation of the nuclear issue.
While Saudi Arabia and Egypt have been insistent on the need to control Iran's nuclear program, Pakistan and Qatar have deliberately ignored the issue, focusing exclusively on "Israeli aggression."
The neutrality of Algeria, Morocco and Malaysia, which abstained from signing the joint statement, once again confirmed the caution of many Muslim countries, who are not ready to sacrifice relations with the West for the sake of demonstrating unity.
It is significant that Algeria, previously Israel's most consistent opponent and Iran's close Arab partner, expressed its position only after the country's Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf took a phone call from Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi.
"Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf reiterated Algeria's unwavering position, which, while condemning Israel's aggression, stresses the need for the UN Security Council to assume responsibility for ensuring compliance with international law and the principles of the UN Charter in order to stop Israeli attacks," the official statement said.
Thus, the Islamic world's reaction to the Israeli-Iranian standoff reflects the paradox of tactical unity amid strategic fault lines.
Condemnation of Israel, based on principles of sovereignty and fear of a regional conflagration, has allowed for temporary consolidation. However, unresolved contradictions – from the age-old Sunni-Shiite rivalry to fundamentally different approaches to relations with the US and assessment of the Iranian nuclear threat – block the transition to real collective action.
Oman's position, balancing between solidarity with Iran and pragmatic mediation, serves as a clear illustration of this duality.
The June 13 attacks have fueled anti-Israel rhetoric, but they have not addressed the underlying conflicts that make the “Muslim consensus” extremely fragile.
However, further escalation could reformat the entire system of regional alliances, pushing even moderate regimes into confrontation with Israel and its allies, which threatens the Middle East with destabilization on an unprecedented scale.
A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.
