[MilitaryHistoryFandom] The Korean War (25 June 1950 – 27 July 1953) was a war between the Republic of Korea (South Korea), supported by the United Nations, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), at one time supported by the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union.
It was primarily the result of the political division of Korea by an agreement of the victorious Allies at the conclusion of the Pacific War at the end of World War II. That worked well for Berlin.
The Korean Peninsula was ruled by the Empire of Japan from 1910 until the end of World War II. Following the surrender of the Empire of Japan in September 1945, American administrators divided the peninsula along the 38th parallel, with U.S. military forces occupying the southern half and Soviet military forces occupying the northern half.
Continued on Page 47
Commentary by Russian military journalist Boris Rozhin:
[ColonelCassad] 1. It is worth noting right away that the Middle East war has not stopped. The genocide in the Gaza Strip, as well as the war of Israel against Hamas, continues. The Houthis' war against Israel also continues. Today, the Houthis have promised to continue to strike Israel as long as the genocide in the Gaza Strip continues. So talk of peace in the Middle East is extremely far from reality. The main problem for peace in the region is the Nazi regime in Israel.
2. The approach to negotiations was carried out through demonstrative strikes of dubious effectiveness. The United States struck Iran's nuclear facilities with bunker busters and cruise missiles, although there is no reliable evidence of their being disabled.
The Iranians directly state that they have not received critical damage and will continue to develop their nuclear program. Iran, in turn, attacked the Al-Udeid base in Qatar with ballistic missiles. However, there is also no reliable evidence of critical damage to the base. Both sides knew in advance about the strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities and about Iran's strikes on Al-Udeid. Both sides removed valuable assets from the attacked facilities in advance. Both sides declared successful strikes and unsuccessful strikes by their opponents.
3. Nevertheless, such a scheme allowed both sides to declare their victory and agree to a truce. This was evidence that all participants in the war are not ready to go all the way and wage a total war of destruction, which is a consequence of the heavy damage that Iran and Israel inflicted on each other, with the full understanding that there will only be more hits from both sides due to the weakening of air defense. Therefore, Qatar, as in 2020, was used as a mediator, only now it had to come to terms with the shelling of its territory, which it demonstratively but falsely took offense at.
The rest of the Arab League countries basically limited themselves to the same routine condemnations of Iran, as they had previously routinely condemned Israel and the United States. In fact, Iran has survived this war thanks to its missile arsenals and the internal stability of its society.
Without nuclear weapons. And without a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. The role of Russia, China and Pakistan, as well as the hypothetical assistance that could have been provided to Iran, remained behind the scenes. It is still unknown what Chinese military transport planes were carrying to Iran and what agreements the Iranians had with Pakistan. Russia has traditionally publicly taken the position of a peacemaker, providing Iran with active diplomatic support.
4. If we consider the situation from the point of view of results, then on the one hand it is obvious that Iran held out (especially against the background of hysterical cries at the beginning of the war about the imminent collapse of Iran), was able to restore the chain of command, establish some working air defense (which began to swing just before the ceasefire) and ensure the ability to painfully pound Israel until the last minutes of the war.
At the same time, the plans of the USA and Israel to overthrow the ayatollahs in Tehran collapsed (at least for now). Instead of overthrowing the regime, Iran's opponents got the Iranians to rally around the flag, which ultimately strengthened the Iranian authorities, at least in the short term. The Iranians clearly do not need the Shah's son in a kippah.
Rude!
At the same time, Iran suffered significant losses in air defense systems and radars, in the personnel of the army and the IRGC, lost a number of important leaders of the security forces, a number of important scientists, a number of industrial facilities, including nuclear ones.
The material damage to Iran is significant and it will take more than one year to eliminate all the consequences. Iran's main failure in this war is the complete failure of the Iranian special services, which resulted in problems with ensuring the protection of the leadership and valuable personnel, as well as the operability of the unified air defense system. Well, it is worth noting the naivety of Iranian diplomats who fell for Trump's manipulations, which led to a misunderstanding of the timing of the start of the war.
5. On the other hand, Israel also suffered serious material damage, which is clearly visible even in the footage that leaked through censorship. By the end of the war, Israel's air defense was working with reduced efficiency and Iran, launching fewer missiles, achieved a greater number of hits. Modern ballistics and hypersonics have proven themselves to be no less formidable weapons than American precision.
Israel also lost several expensive air defense systems, several important scientific facilities, and suffered serious damage to military, industrial and civilian infrastructure. The total economic damage is also very significant. At the same time, it was not possible to achieve regime change in Iran. It was not possible to guarantee that Iran will not have nuclear weapons. It was not possible to start a "new stage of development of the Middle East" with redrawing borders.
The Israeli lion jumped on the victim and tried to bite its neck, but the victim dodged and started poking the lion in the belly with a rocket knife. As a result, the situation from a blitzkrieg began to turn into a war of attrition, which threatened Israel with uncontrollable scenarios, so the owner of the Western zoo simulated a "crushing blow" and then rolled back the aggression against Iran.
6. This is certainly not the end. This is a pause.
We expected a hudna. We got a hudna. The depth of the Mullahs’ regrets over this decision remain to be seen — not whether they will regret it deeply, but just the exact dimension of their deep regret…though this assumes they will still be living at the end of their little adventure. So many of them already are ex-alive, after all.
This war has not eliminated any of the fundamental contradictions in the Middle East. The existential nature of the conflict has not gone away.
From the wheels of this war, they will immediately begin preparing for the next one. Israel will draw conclusions from the failures of its air defense, and also restore the thinned out agents in Iran for future operations to change the regime in Tehran and then break it up. Iran, in turn, in addition to the general restoration, will restore its air defense system (there will be attempts to buy air defense systems and radars from China and Russia), reform the special services and approaches to security, and churn out even more drones and missiles. Well, in the long term, the topic of Iran's nuclear program will not disappear anywhere. The Iranians have drawn conclusions from this attack and the role of the IAEA.
7. Of course, both Iran and Israel will face considerable internal problems after the war.
Actually, Bibi’s stock has risen so much that he is thinking about calling a snap election. Not being in imminent danger of fiery, radioactive death is awfully clarifying, donchaknow. And the reverse on the Iranian side, of course.
Iran will have many questions about the failures of the security forces and the preparation for war. Israel will have even more questions about Netanyahu, who promised victory over Iran, but ultimately led to the fact that local branches of Gaza were opened in a number of Israeli cities.
8. Questions hang in the air - How many launchers and missiles did Iran have left at the end of the war to strike Israel?
They were down 50% on launchers the other day. It may be only a third left now, which makes shooting off missiles more than little challenging. On the other hand, Israel destroyed missile caches and missile and drone factories, too, which does make replacing the things difficult…
How many anti-missiles and working air defense systems did Israel have left?
Iran has been going after Israeli residences and such — the terror factor, as the Prophet Mohammed commanded. So Israel’s manufacturing base is doing fine, as far as I am aware.
What and where did the Iranians take from their nuclear facilities? What is the real situation at the facilities in Natanz, Isfahan and Fordow? What losses did Israel suffer during those strikes that were not captured on photo/video?
None whatsoever.
What are the real losses of Iran and Israel among the military? In general, there are more questions than answers so far. So a more detailed analysis will come later, when the fog of war and military propaganda clears.
The fog is pretty clear, actually. Al Jazeera was broadcasting the map coordinates where Iranian missiles hit…
[IsraelTimes] By targeting top military figures, Israel delivered a symbolic and strategic blow, though experts warn that regime may now ‘move in a much more hard-line direction’ under the Guards
Hours before the sun rose on June 13, nearly 200 Israeli fighter jets roared into Iranian airspace, while Mosssd ...sees all, knows all, gets 'em all in the end... operatives on the ground released attack drones from secret bases.
The surprise Israeli strikes hit key Iranian nuclear sites as well as ballistic missile stores, which represented twin threats that Israel saw as existential. But its highly coordinated, precise attack didn’t only focus on Iran’s hardware.
Israel also spent years tracking the key figures at the top of the Islamic Theocratic Republic’s command structure and in the opening hours of the campaign, it assassinated many of them — some in their apartments, others reportedly lured to an underground command center.
Those killed on day one included the chief of staff of Iran’s armed forces, and the commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, the military’s central headquarters, the IRGC Aerospace Force and the IRGC air defenses.
It was a brutal blow to Iran’s ability to conduct its nuclear, ballistic missile, and proxy efforts, but for the Islamic Theocratic Republic, these leaders fulfilled a role beyond their military responsibilities. They also made up a veteran core of the Islamic Theocratic Republic’s leadership, a tight cadre of dedicated believers aroun Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei ...the very aged actual dictator of Iran, successor to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini...> who forged their ties in the Iran-Iraq War.
Israeli strikes in the subsequent days took out IRGC intelligence chiefs and other top military commanders. "These architects of terrorism are officially done terrorizing the world," the IDF declared six days into the campaign, sharing a video naming 11 military officials it had taken out.
Though a US-brokered ceasefire may mean that the dust is settling on the 12-day conflict, Iran now faces critical decisions about not only the future of its nuclear and missile programs, but also about its leadership, with far-reaching implications for the regime and the wider region.
‘PRAETORIAN GUARD’
Before rising to the top of the Islamic Republic, the men Israel assassinated fought in its first war.
Most of the regime’s senior leader, including those killed by Israel, emerged from the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, which broke out after the 1979 Islamic Revolution and shaped Iran’s security doctrine.
“Almost everybody who is anybody in the Islamic Republic’s political or military apparatus today cut their teeth in the Iran-Iraq war,” said Behnam Ben Taleblu of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
During the brutal eight-year conflict, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded Iran to seize disputed territory and defeat the nascent Islamic Republic. The war devolved into trench warfare, missile strikes on civilians, and large-scale chemical weapon attacks, resulting in hundreds of thousands of deaths and immense economic devastation in Iran.
That experience instilled a doctrine of “over-obsessive deterrence” against foreign adversaries, said Ben Taleblu, which over time formed into the five pillars of “the Iranian threat” — ballistic missiles, drones, nuclear development, maritime aggression and transnational terrorism.
Iran overtly ties its military ambitions to the legacy of the Iran–Iraq War. At a military parade in Tehran in September 2023 marking the conflict’s anniversary, Iran unveiled what it claimed was “the longest-range drone in the world,” alongside banners threatening Israel. The display came just weeks before Iran-backed Hamas launched its unprecedented October 7, 2023, assault on Israel from Gaza.
Now, just as it has been, the direction and implementation of post-revolution Iran’s security doctrine will in all likelihood remain the domain of the IRGC.
When Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini took control of Iran in 1979, he needed protection. Not just physically, but protection of the Islamist ideology in whose name he led the revolution.
With up to 190,000 active troops and nearly 600,000 volunteer paramilitary forces, the IRGC “has long been the Praetorian Guard to protect the supreme leader and the theocratic system,” said Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute.
In 2019, the US designated the IRGC, which controls Iran’s missile program, nuclear ambitions and network of proxy forces, a Foreign Terrorist Organization, the first time the label was applied to an entire wing of another government.
While the regular Iranian army is tasked with territorial defense, “the IRGC is about defense of the ideology,” targeting enemies both foreign and domestic, according to Rubin, which is “why America and Europe’s well-meaning belief in Iranian reformers was always so naïve.”
Over time, the IRGC’s reach, particularly its influence over the civilian economy, grew vast enough to rival even Khamenei’s direct authority. While experts debate whether the IRGC exercises its extensive power through or against the regime system, its stranglehold on policy is nearly undisputed.
Under Khamenei, the IRGC evolved into a “state within a state,” said Ali Alfoneh of the Arab Gulf States Institute, acquiring massive influence over national security decisions in exchange for shielding the regime. Its economic empire—including privatized state assets and megaprojects—provided both power and insulation from civilian oversight.
For decades, the IRGC, guided by its revolutionary doctrine, steered Iran to a dominant position in the region. It nurtured an obsessive focus on the Islamic Republic’s sworn enemy, Israel. Iran built up dangerous terror proxies on Israel’s borders, Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, while enabling more distant regional allies, Shiite militias in Iraq and Houthis in Yemen, to fully secure its reach.
After Hamas’s October 2023 attack, during which Palestinian terrorists massacred some 1,200 people and abducted 251 in the deadliest day for the Jewish people since the Holocaust, Israel abandoned its decades-long strategy of containment and began targeting the axis led by the IRGC head-on.
Beginning with Israel’s direct strikes on Iran last year and reaching a climax on June 13, “Israel had a clear shot to reset the nature of its strategic competition with the Islamic Republic, and to really deal a crippling blow to the sources of the Islamic Republic’s deterrent power,” Ben Taleblu said.
Iran’s decentralized military structure enabled the IRGC to survive Israeli decapitation strikes, Alfoneh said, but the results are still unclear amid the chaos.
“The same logic that governs Israel’s assassination of terror leaders applies to the targeting of IRGC leadership,” said Rubin. “Their elimination sows panic and paranoia within the upper ranks.”
While some commanders were valued more for ideological purity and others for military skill, two figures—Iran’s chief of staff Mohammad Bagheri and IRGC Air Force chief Brig. Gen. Amir Ali Hajizadeh—stood out as irreplaceable because of a unique blend of both loyalty and competence, Ben Taleblu added.
Hajizadeh, for instance, was the driving force behind the development of Iran’s ballistic missile program.
Additionally, the regime had spent years legitimizing its rule by promising citizens protection from oppressive foreign powers, making every blow by Israel a direct challenge to this social contract.
Nonetheless, the regime’s survival isn’t necessarily in danger, neither by the military loss nor public sentiment. “Zombie regimes can persist long beyond what wishful thinking in the West might suppose,” Rubin noted.
With the regime’s ability to violently suppress dissent, combined with public fear and years of infiltrating opposition groups, keeps the prospect of internal collapse uncertain. Such suppression efforts have often been carried out by the Basij paramilitary force, linked to the IRGC and targeted by Israel throughout the campaign, including in the hours before the ceasefire took effect.
“Ultimately, what matters is the willingness of those in the IRGC to fire on crowds in the street,” Rubin said.
WHAT COMES NEXT?
Perhaps counterintuitively, Israel’s decapitation of the military and the IRGC may well result in the latter further consolidating its power. Though many mid-level replacements are less competent than their predecessors, institutionally, the Guards will remain dominant.
When considering how Iran will reconstitute its power structure after Israel’s devastating campaign, “one probably can’t pick out personalities, but you can certainly say that the X factor is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,” said Ben Taleblu. “Looking ahead, the most important institution in Iran remains the IRGC, even though its leadership has been decimated.”
Effective command and communication within the regime may now be slower, Ben Taleblu added. “If Khamenei is in some bunker somewhere, it’s going to take time for an order to cascade.”
Now that a ceasefire has been declared, that may change.
Israel’s operation has also revived urgent discussions about succession. A clerical committee reportedly accelerated its work last week, focusing on two figures: Khamenei’s son Mojtaba, a hardliner, and Hassan Khomeini, grandson of the regime’s founder. The leadership crisis may push Khamenei to rely more on his son.
“The only real difference between the hardliners and pragmatists is questions of tactics, not ideology,” said Rubin, predicting “a purge among the hardliners as the regime seeks to root out the spies and infiltrators that may or may not exist.”
“Even though the Islamic Revolution rejected hereditary rule, I wouldn’t be surprised to see it make a comeback as Khamenei leans more upon his son, who is perhaps the only person he can any longer trust,” Rubin continued.
Despite its recent setbacks, experts said the regime seems like it will survive the US-Israeli campaign and will likely further sideline pragmatic voices.
“I would say that if the Islamic Republic survives this conflict…they will move in a much more hard-line direction,” said Ben Taleblu, noting that this would constitute “accelerating a trend which was already underway.”
Alfoneh echoed that view, predicting the regime will continue transforming into a military dictatorship, akin to Pakistan, saying he expects a future where “the IRGC distributes the national wealth – or increasingly, poverty – and takes the strategic decisions. The elected civilian leadership will be blamed for all the regime’s shortcomings.”
Though Khamenei remains in hiding, he has survived the fight. With a ceasefire now in place, the Islamic Republic has emerged battered but intact — and seemingly on a road to a more insular, militarized, and uncompromising future.
Continued on Page 47
Posted by: trailing wife ||
06/25/2025 00:00 ||
Comments ||
Link ||
[40 views]
Top|| File under: Govt of Iran
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. by Kirill Semenov
[REGNUM] The temporary pause in mutual attacks between Israel, the US and Iran so far leaves more questions than it answers.
Given that neither side has achieved its objectives,
…Iran has not erased Israel, but Israel has severely damaged Iran’s nuclear program, killed or wounded many of its civilian and military leaders, and made a severe dent in Iran’s war matériel, hindering both their ability to wage war and rule the country. Also, there’s that little thing about Israel wiping out most of the leadership, funding, and war matériel of Hamas and Hezbollah, and the ports used by the Houthis, severely reducing the ability of Iran’s catspaws to attack Israel at home, though they are thus far mostly untouched in Europe and the Americas…
a new escalation can be expected soon. Although it is also likely that Iran's opponents will move to a new stage and focus their efforts on subversion within the country in order to bring about a change of power and the dismantling of the Islamic Republic.
NEW METHODS OF OVERTHROW
In the event of a long-term truce, Washington and Tel Aviv are counting on the Yugoslav scenario being launched in Iran. Then, strikes on the country caused significant damage and, although not immediately, paved the way for a “color revolution” and a change of power.
Trump has most likely generally accepted Israel's view on the need to dismantle the political system of the Islamic Republic. At the same time, the range of possible actions to achieve this goal is very wide, including the assassination of Iran's supreme leader, which could trigger revolutionary events.
Therefore, what is happening is a serious challenge for Russia as well. Iran is being used to develop elements of future subversive activities against both us and China, Donald Trump's main adversary.
First of all, the creation and launch of not only effective terrorist and sabotage networks, but also cells engaged in subversive activities through the dissemination of narratives favorable to the United States and Israel and organizing protests in Iranian society is being tested.
Perhaps the previous principles and methods of "color revolutions" that worked against weak political regimes, such as those in Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, etc., have already been revised. They have proven ineffective against countries such as Russia or Iran.
It is also worth recalling that the subversive actions of the US and Israel in Iran occurred immediately after Operation Spider Web, when strategic aviation bases were attacked by sabotage terrorist groups using drones from Russian territory. And earlier, there were explosions of transport infrastructure, murders of Russian generals and public figures.
Both operations—the actions of cells in both Iran and Russia—followed similar algorithms, so they most likely had a single foreign coordination and decision-making center.
If we consider the geopolitical consequences, then, by continuing their subversive activities against the Islamic Republic, the United States and Israel also intend to destroy the “One Belt, One Road” and “North-South” transport corridor systems that are being built.
Therefore, the actions of the American-Israeli bloc are a common threat, and it would be good if it led to strengthening cooperation in the Moscow-Tehran-Beijing triangle with the possible involvement of Pakistan to the extent that it does not cost the break in the strategic partnership with India.
A LIBERAL SHOWCASE WITH RADICAL CONTENT
Naturally, if the enemies of the Islamic Republic aim to change power in the country, then they must prepare a leader who will personify a new Iran “without mullahs, hijabs and Sharia.”
The most acceptable candidate was chosen to be the shahzade, that is, the prince, the son of the last shah, Muhammad Pahlavi, who, like his grandfather, the founder of the dynasty, bears the name Reza.
As early as February 2025, Pahlavi was chosen by various fringe factions of the Iranian opposition as their leader and head of a future transitional government “until the formation of the first national assembly and the beginning of democratic rule through free elections.”
In reality, however, his supporters do not wield any real influence within the country. Reza, like his father, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was never a popular leader.
Reza Pahlavi, the grandfather, the first shah of the dynasty, essentially usurped power after a military coup and declared himself the new monarch in 1925, rather than establish a republic in Iran. In this sense, both shahs resemble the father and son of the Assad family in Syria, who led the country to collapse and revolution.
Therefore, the legitimacy of the Pahlavis themselves is very conditional - they came to power through a coup and, by historical standards, soon lost power through a revolution. It is not possible to compare them with the Romanovs in Russia or other dynasties - overthrown, but having deep foundations for legitimacy.
At the same time, there are more serious opposition forces in Iran, which, unlike the freak monarchists, have their own networks of influence and can really lay claim to power in the event of a hypothetical collapse.
This includes, for example, the Organization of the Mujahideen of the Iranian People (OMIN), a revolutionary leftist-Islamist organization that waged armed struggle against the Islamic Republic for a long time while in Saddam Hussein's camp. The ideology of this organization is a mixture of Marxist, Leninist and Islamist positions.
The MEK participated in the Islamic Revolution in Iran, but then lost the struggle for power to the "Khomeinists" and its supporters were subjected to repression. The mujahideen responded to this with a wave of terror and mass murder of supporters of the new authorities.
The MEK had its own National Army of Liberation of Iran (NAL), based in Iraq and numbering 7,000 fighters. In 1988, six days after Ayatollah Khomeini announced his acceptance of a UN-brokered ceasefire, the NLA advanced under heavy Iraqi air cover, crossed the border, and captured the city of Islamabad-e-Gharb. But it was then driven back with heavy losses.
In 2003, the MEK and NAO, still based in Iraq, fought on Saddam's side against the US and its allies who had attacked Iraq, but a ceasefire was then agreed upon.
However, since 2009, the new Iraqi government, close to the Islamic Republic, has demanded that MEK leave Iraq. Then, pro-Iranian Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki announced that the group would be banned from basing itself on Iraqi territory. He backed up his statements with repression and arrests of its members.
After that, the US began to remove the organization's fighters from Iraq. At the same time, OMIN was removed from the terrorist lists, and the US was able to convince Albania to accept the remaining 2,700 NAO members who were brought to Tirana between 2014 and 2016. It is obvious that the CIA, by showing such patronage over OMIN, expected to use its resources in the future.
A 2008 report by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center said the MEK operates a large network of supporters in Iran, sparking debate among intelligence experts about whether Western powers should use the opportunity to better build their own intelligence picture of the Iranian regime’s goals and intentions.
Iran has also carried out operations to expose MEK networks, for example, in 2010 and 2011, Ali Saremi, Mohammad Ali Hajj Aghaei and Jafar Kazemi were executed for collaborating with the organization .
Donald Trump, even during his first presidency, wanted to use MEK against the Islamic Republic. In January 2018, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani called French President Emmanuel Macron and asked him to order the expulsion of MEK from its French base in Auvers-sur-Oise, claiming that the organization had provoked the Iranian protests of 2017–2018.
The main base of the OMIN, however, remained Albania, where more than 4,000 of its members were located. There, during the Free Iran 2019 conference, former New York City Mayor and Trump’s personal lawyer Rudy Giuliani described the group as a “government in exile,” saying it was a ready-made alternative to lead the country if the Iranian government fell.
Moreover, the Trump administration then stated that it did not rule out the MEK as a viable replacement for the current Iranian regime.
In turn, OMIN networks in Albania were subjected to cyber attacks in 2022, which the Albanian authorities blamed on Iran, leading to a rupture in diplomatic relations between the countries.
Thus, if the Shah is a kind of “face” of the pro-Western opposition, then in reality the change of power in the Islamic Republic will be carried out by networks of radical organizations such as OMIN.
Of course, it now positions itself as a respectable structure that shares Western values, but in reality this group has hardly moved far from its previous principles.
Therefore, even if we assume that the West will succeed in dismantling the current state system in Iran, this does not mean that they will succeed in bringing to power their own supporters, who are not an organized force.
GUARDIANS OF THE REVOLUTION
At the same time, there are serious obstacles to such plans for a change of power in Iran. Thus, despite the split in Iranian society, its pro-government part has united around the supreme leader.
It is a foundation that can withstand any pressure, even from the majority of Iranians themselves, who are unable to crack it until it cracks itself. However, its foundation still appears monolithic, despite attempts to drive wedges through military actions by the US and Israel.
At the core of this foundation is the very ideology of the Islamic Republic, the guardians and cement of which are the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Unlike the CPSU and the Komsomol of the late USSR, the IRGC is not just a party of supporters of the Islamic regime or special services, which are also there. The IRGC is a multi-million army, an armed force of supporters of the Islamic Republic and the ideas of the Islamic revolution, whose tentacles are present in all spheres of society, holding it back from disintegration.
And the opposition, even one as organized as OMIN, has nothing to counter this “monster” with.
It is pointless to look for complete analogues of the IRGC: this is a purely Iranian specificity. The formation of the Corps took place without looking back at any Western examples. And what it has now become - with its own industry, aviation, navy and special services - was clearly not envisaged at the time of its creation.
The IRGC emerged primarily as a military structure, a kind of guard during the war with Iraq. At that time, assault battalions were created from the most zealous Muslim supporters of the Islamic Revolution, which were then united into the divisions of "Prophet Mohammad", "Imam Hussein", "Ashura" and "Najaf", which became some of the most combat-ready during the Iran-Iraq war.
Initially these were formations designed to fight Iraq on the battlefield, but were recruited from motivated volunteers who later found wider use.
Thus, the IRGC rather reflects the Middle Eastern, Islamic specificity, and the most similar to it is probably the National Guard of Saudi Arabia. It arose from the religious militia of zealous Wahhabis, the "Ikhwan" (not to be confused with other "Ikhwan", the "Muslim Brotherhood").
The Saudi Ikhwan might have also secured for themselves powers as broad as those of the IRGC in Iran, if not for their conflict with the king, the unsuccessful uprising in 1929, and the transformation of those of them who remained loyal to the monarch despite their own understanding of religion into the National Guard. Instead of guardians of religion, they became guardians of the oil fields and borders of the House of Saud.
That is, both the Saudi Ikhwan and the IRGC are, first and foremost, defenders, guardians of religion and a state based on religious principles. And they must protect religion from enemies, both external and internal.
This is the main difference between the IRGC and the Iranian army. If the army must protect the state as a territory, then the IRGC stands guard over the Islamic revolution, its goals and ideals. Therefore, they are called upon to act both inside the country and far beyond Iran. That is why the range of tasks of the IRGC is much wider.
For example, for the "export of the Islamic revolution" there is the Al-Quds command - an organization with its own structure. It is intended for foreign operations, support of allied movements and countries.
That is, if we imagine the IRGC as a matryoshka doll, as a state within a state, then Al-Quds is also a state, a matryoshka doll, but already within the “IRGC state”. With its own separate intelligence structures, special forces, ground forces. And it seems that it will be difficult to find a suitable analogue for this.
The IRGC has its own intelligence and counterintelligence, but so does the Quds Force command. At the same time, the Islamic Republic itself as a state also has its own intelligence and counterintelligence, not connected to the IRGC.
But functions similar to those of, for example, our Federal Security Service are concentrated in the IRGC. The Ansar al-Mahdi unit operates to protect senior officials and religious centers, and the Supreme Leader himself is protected by the Wali-e Amr unit.
The IRGC also has rapid reaction forces and special operations forces that duplicate the army special forces, including the Saberin Takavor Brigade, the 110th Salman Farsi Special Operations Brigade, the 33rd Al-Mahdi Airborne Brigade and separate battalions in provincial corps. While in the Army, the Special Forces are represented by the 55th and 65th Brigades.
The IRGC's ground forces are organized into 32 infantry territorial corps, which were deployed from regular divisions from the Iran-Iraq War, combined with regular battalions and militias from the Basij command.
Unlike the army divisions, the IRGC divisions are mostly infantry. Although they do have tank units, they are significantly fewer than the army. There are probably 8 IRGC "operational" divisions deployed at all times in peacetime, but in wartime there may be more than 40.
The core of the land component in the provinces is the "Hussein Battalions", which are part of the Basij and serve as the basis for the reserve infantry divisions in wartime that will be deployed from the militias. These battalions can also be used as expeditionary forces. They have, for example, participated in the fighting in Syria.
Therefore, the Basij is not only the militia and reserve of the IRGC, but also the regular units. This includes the first-priority reserve and the so-called “army of 20 million” - a broader, mass militia that can be called up to suppress internal threats.
If the Hussein Battalions are the backbone of the IRGC ground forces, the equivalent of a territorial army in the provinces, then the Ali Battalions of the Basij Command are the equivalent of a gendarmerie aimed at suppressing unrest and counter-revolutionary rebellions. They work closely with the police and security forces.
The IRGC has created a multi-layered presence in Iranian society and has engaged in its activities in one form or another millions of people who are ready to stand up for the Islamic revolution at the first order. At least, this is what is expected of them.
This is the foundation, the basis on which the Iranian regime relies. And even if its supporters are in the minority, their unity and organization will most likely allow them to withstand the challenges and threats of internal destabilization.
A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.
...sees all, knows all, gets 'em all in the end...
