| Submit your comments on this article |
| Southeast Asia |
| Bali bombing: Rift emerges within Jemaah Islamiyah |
| 2002-12-11 |
| In a new report on Islamist extremism in Southeast Asia, the International Crisis Group (ICG) reveals a deep rift within the group suspected of carrying out the Bali bombings. Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates shows that the JI network may be far more extensive than previously imagined. It also shows how important the communal conflicts in Maluku and Poso were for motivating, recruiting and training the JI rank-and-file. As those conflicts have waned, ICG suggests, the object of JI's wrath may have shifted from Indonesian Christians regarded as responsible for the massacres of Muslims to Westerners seen as supporting the U.S.-led war on terrorism. This is a damned good report, at least given the cursory going-over I was able to give it. It's 50 pages of detail on JI... In an effort to better understand the network, ICG researchers have examined earlier bombings in Indonesia linked to JI. In particular, they looked at the Christmas Eve 2000 attacks in which more than 30 bombs were delivered to churches or priests in eleven cities, across six provinces, all wired to explode at around the same time. Some key findings emerged. The chief strategists of JI appear to be protégés of the late Abdullah Sungkar, the co-founder with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir of a religious boarding school at Ngruki in Central Java. They tend to be Indonesian nationals living in Malaysia and are often veterans of the anti-Soviet resistance or later fighting in Afghanistan. A trusted second tier are assigned as field coordinators, who deliver money and explosives and choose local team leaders. The bottom rung, those who drive the cars, survey targets, deliver the bombs and most often risk arrest, injury or death, are selected shortly before the attack is scheduled. They are mostly young men from Muslim boarding schools (pesantren) or Islamic high schools. Leadership, field commanders and cannon fodder. Standard layout. A deep rift has emerged between Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the formal head of JI who is under arrest in a Jakarta hospital, and younger JI leaders, mostly based in Malaysia, who find him insufficiently radical. ICG believes that while Ba'asyir undoubtedly knows far more than he is willing to divulge about JI operations, he is unlikely to have been the mastermind of JI attacks, including the Bali bombing. Finally, ICG found a curious link between Acehnese close to JI and Indonesian military intelligence. Both groups have a history of bitter opposition to the Acehnese rebel movement (GAM), which this week signed a peace agreement with the Indonesian government. This link raises questions about whether military intelligence had more access to information about JI than it has acknowledged to date. "The Indonesian police have done a superb job thus far in the Bali investigations but they're dealing with a large and amorphous network", ICG Indonesia Project Director, Sidney Jones, said. "The government needs to ensure that the intelligence capacity of the police, not the army, is strengthened to cope with this threat. The Indonesian government also needs to get more serious than it has thus far about corruption, with particular attention paid to the trade in arms and explosives". Interesting Definitely interesting. I intend to study the report in detail tonight... |
| Posted by:Steve |