| Submit your comments on this article |
| India-Pakistan |
| Why Pakistan cannot stop anti-Indian operations |
| 2003-11-28 |
| Many thousands of Pakistanis have fought in Afghanistan (during the anti-Soviet campaign of the 1980s) and Kashmir over the past decade or more as members of jihadi outfits. After the US attacked Afghanistan in late 2001, it was largely predicted that these outfits - which are loyal to the Taliban and al-Qaeda - would rush back to lend their support, and that they would also rebel against Musharraf. This assessment proved to be a huge misconception. The jihadi outfits were in fact a part of the ISI’s operations and the brainchild of late dictator General Zia ul-Haq and General Akhtar Abdul Rehman. The purpose was to develop a para-military force that would assist the Pakistan army in the event of war. However, in the course of the 1989 uprising in Kashmir, these jihadis played so vital a role that they outdid the army, so in the 1990s it was decided that they would act as a front-line force in any India-Pakistan war. This policy was also seen in the 1971 war in Bangladesh, when the Pakistani Army was supported by local Islamists who had been organised into militias like Al Badr and Al Shams, which proceeded to massacre tens of thousands of civilians, especially Hindus. First-hand observations in Azad Kashmir camps confirm that the jihadi outfits are in fact paramilitary troops. Each unit has a commander who reports to an army officer. Each jihadi commander is given funds and the brief to devise a strategy for his unit’s combat operations. The commanders have lap top computers in which they store their data, from which they generate summaries of their operations for their military officers. The summaries include targets, operations and results. The jihadi commanders and army field officers always coordinate their efforts. Pro-jihadi clerics, like Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai, are used to deliver sermons, and they are not allowed to utter a single word more than the topic on which they have been told to speak. Generally, the Jihadis do what they are told, but a few of the go rogue, and form groups like the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. Throughout the 90’s, the authorities projected the idea that the sectarian outfits were different from the Jihadis, when in reality they were identical, and much of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi’s leadership lived at Jihadi training camps in Afghanistan in the Taliban days. After September 11, 2001, ties between the army and the jihadis were at a crossroads, but they emerged as friends. Meetings were held at ISI offices in Karachi, where Shamzai and others were told the limits of their anti-US demonstrations. These clerics always abide by such guidelines. Shamzai was also taken by the ISI to North-West Frontier Province when tribals had blocked highways in support of the Taliban, and he forced them to remove all blockades. Mufti Shamzai is arguably the most important Jihadi cleric in Pakistan, and by extension, the region, because he runs the Binori madrassa, the largest, most prestigous, and one of the most militant madrassas in the country. He and his associates serve as the patron-in-chiefs, or spiritual leaders, or supreme leaders of various Deobandi outfits, like the Jaish-e-Mohammad, Harkat, Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Rashid Trust. They serve as the elder council of the Pakistani Jihadis, and unlike Qazi, Sami and other Islamist politicians, these men are some of the most important religous scholars in the country, so their words carry a lot of theological weight. Interestingly, some diehard jihadis with "original" thoughts came out in favor of Osama bin Laden, including Maulana Abdul Jabbar of the Jaish-i-Mohammed. Their jihadi fellows pointed this out to the ISI, which advised him against such support. When he did not give up, he was detained. The ISI reasoned with the jihadis that they had to compromise on al-Qaeda as Pakistan did not have any strategic interests with the network. However, Pakistan did have interests with the Taliban, the ISI pointed out, so it would persuade the US to give them a role in the government in Afghanistan. In essence, then, the so-called jihadi-clerics are no more than the ISI’s proxies, rather than committed "ideologues". Most of the clerics make a very good living by recruiting and sending off young men to die, people like Hafiz Saeed have become millionaries, with vast holdings in land and property. Under the rules of Jihad, Emirs are allowed to keep 20% of all the groups assets, so they have a nice religous justification for living in luxury. Apart from strategic interests, the Pakistan army has interests in the "jihad of Kashmir", from non-commissioned officers right up to the major-general who looks after Forward Section 23. It has funds to run training camps, including recruitment (Rs 10,000 for each recruit), and transportation and accommodation costs. It also has a special fund for each "mujahid" when he enters into Kashmir (Rs 20,000). Should he die, there is a special fund for compensation (Rs 50,000 in the first year and Rs 24,000 in next two years) for the bereaved family. For Pakistan then, the ISI, the jihadis and the army are in one mind that the struggle in Kashmir will continue. All that is happening for now, under US pressure, is a shift in tactics, with Karachi becoming a center of activities. Realistically, the ceasefire along the Line of Control in Kashmir cannot therefore be expected to hold. |
| Posted by:Paul Moloney |
| #3 It's hard to say, either Pakistan will end up being nuked, or it may fracture into a whole bunch of countries, which may be disarmed of their nukes. |
| Posted by: Paul Moloney 2003-11-28 5:10:02 PM |
| #2 Either this defies simplification, or it's about a smokin' hole. Come to think of it, in the bit where the Saudi Ambassador asks Dubya why there are no Arabs in the Star Trek movies and Dubya chuckles and sez, "Because it's in the future!" -- it occurs to me that there are no PakiWackis in them, either. Mercs, Millionaire Mullahs, State Intelligence Service collaboration and planning, Bloods, Crips - this has a Hollywood High 1999 feel to it. Oops, just noticed Frank has posted a comment before I hit submit - with the smokin' hole a prominent feature. Yup. Great minds... I'm OK with that too, Frank! Paul - what do YOU think is the endpoint of this Mullacratic macabre miasma of Machiavellian machinations? (Sorry, feeling alliterative, today!) |
| Posted by: .com 2003-11-28 1:34:24 PM |
| #1 I have a feeling that the problems posed by Paki jihad will only be solved when they grab the reins of power, overstep, and become a smoking hole (Roentgen soup, Al-Aska Paul?) in the Subcontinent.....and I'm OK with that |
| Posted by: Frank G 2003-11-28 1:24:40 PM |