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| U.S. General Maps New Tactic to Pursue Taliban | |
| 2004-02-18 | |
The commander of American-led forces in Afghanistan said Tuesday that the military had adopted new tactics to combat Taliban and Al Qaeda militants in the country. The officer, Lt. Gen. David W. Barno of the Army, said that in the past three months, American units down to the level of 40-soldier platoons had been dispatched to live in villages where they can forge ties with tribal elders and glean better information about the location and activities of guerrillas. In the past, he said, American forces typically gathered intelligence about hostile forces, carried out focused raids for several days against those targets, then returned to base to plan and prepare for their next mission. "What we’re doing is moving to a more classic counterinsurgency strategy here in Afghanistan," General Barno told reporters at the Pentagon in a videoconference from his headquarters in Kabul, the capital.
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| Posted by:Paul Moloney |
| #10 The Marines used eleven-man teams in I Corps during the Viet Nam war. They were most effective, and, as could be imagined, were the first to be pulled out when the Marines left. |
| Posted by: Tancred 2004-2-18 4:22:50 PM |
| #9 OTOH We received the very cream of their population who started off way the bejesus underemployed and are now lookiing to buy several southern states. (And yes I admire the hell out of them) (And have you noticed how the second generation has gotten... larger?) |
| Posted by: Shipman 2004-2-18 4:11:16 PM |
| #8 LH, I think this strategy would have worked in Vietnam, had we called up the reserves to stiffen public resolve and not cancelled funding to the South Vietnamese as soon as we were all the way out. It was probably quite easy to steamroller a government with no cashflow with a force heavily backed by China and the Soviet Union. If we had done that, we would now have an entire half-country that was as prosperous as South Korea and probably hate to boot. I, personally, would rather have millions of fat, happy and unappreciative Vietnamese instead of an entire country with a repressed population that will take another 50 years to free. |
| Posted by: Super Hose 2004-2-18 2:26:27 PM |
| #7 why use the americans on the ground. There are only about 5800 Afghan National Army troops thus far, not enough to take on this task. Goal is 10,000 by June. Even then will that be enough to do this really aggressively? Re De Gaulle - not really analogous - the colons were 10% or so of the total population. Local friendlies in Afghan, while less reliable than colonists/settlers, are far more numerous. Even if we walked out theyd keep fighting - heck, the Taliban NEVER controlled the Panshir valley and the northeast corner of Afghanistan - that was ALWAYS Northern Alliance territory. Given the changed balance since 9/11, theres no realist prospect of a Taliban return to Mazar and Herat, or even Kabul. The real questions are 1. How fast can we move to an election in Afghanistan, which would look real good for us, and bad for the Taliban (oh, and would embarras the black hats in Teheran) 2. Can we insure that the Taliban dont regain control of the countryside in the southeast, and even Kandahar (which would be major embarassing for us, and would reinvigorate AQ and allies world wide, especially in Pakland) 3. Can we clean up the border areas enough to take the fight directly or indirectly, to Paklands NWFP, where considerable AQ leadership remains? SH also makes some interesting points both about grand strategy, and about small wars tactics. |
| Posted by: liberalhawk 2004-2-18 1:43:18 PM |
| #6 If We stay for the long haul, then the people will come to trust the Merkins. However, our history of support for indigenous allies has, so far, been poor and dishonorable. Trolls will mention that, and demand that we pull out. I say that we should regain honor by staying the course, staying in, and whacking the terrorists regardless of how much squealing the trolls do when they see their relatives being cut to pieces. |
| Posted by: Ptah 2004-2-18 11:55:24 AM |
| #5 This strategy will work because the insurgency is being funded from the outside - other than the opium trade. By opening up another front in Iraq, the funding was syphoned off. If Iraq had not been invaded, Afghanistan would have been the quagmire that many predicted. Another significant invasion will draw outside support away from the Iraq conflict. By that time the 40 man teams should have established local militias that are effective and provide self-sustaining local security. A local presence will stiffle local lawlessness. Many of the bad guys aren't out in the countryside living off the land - they are villagers. |
| Posted by: Super Hose 2004-2-18 10:46:07 AM |
| #4 Then DeGaulle takes office, reviews the situation, and surmises that - in the end - nationalism will win out - and orders the withdrawal of French Army from Algeria. This means the FLN will win, and will basically slaughter all the "collaborators" who aided the French. Actually, De Gaulle decided he would win points with the Arab world by withdrawing from Algeria. This coincided with a gradual disengagement from Israel, which had previously been an important buyer of French arms. |
| Posted by: Zhang Fei 2004-2-18 10:44:01 AM |
| #3 Only if he wins, LR. |
| Posted by: Anonymous2U 2004-2-18 9:32:53 AM |
| #2 LR good post! |
| Posted by: phil_b 2004-2-18 8:05:20 AM |
| #1 This is a truly great way to root out an insurgency, but only so long as you have absolute commitment to see the process through, all the way to completion. The risk is to recreate what happened in Algeria in 1962 - the French Army on the ground was well on its way to defeating the FLN, with the aid of the "pied noir" (loyal French) citizens of Algeria - who happily helped the French Army hunt down the FLN (who pursued a terrorist bombing campaign eerily similar to recent times). The French army secured the backing of the loyal Algerians by swearing that they would see the process through. Then DeGaulle takes office, reviews the situation, and surmises that - in the end - nationalism will win out - and orders the withdrawal of French Army from Algeria. This means the FLN will win, and will basically slaughter all the "collaborators" who aided the French. Then - an amzing thing happened - the elite French units on the ground in Algeria - ordered to pull out and leave their former allies to the revenge of the FLN - banded together and decided that they could not walk out on their previous commitment - and thus was formed the OAS - elite French troops that soon found themselves fighting both the FLN, and the rest of the French Army - and not being paid (and having their assets back in France seized). See "Day of the Jackal" about the way part of that story played out. 'Funny - as an Infantry CPT at IOAC at Ft. Benning in 1985, I wrote a paper about the lessons the US Army learned from the revolt of the French Army in Algeria - one of which was about the downside of letting your soldiers get too close to the local people, in fighting an insurgency, when political will might not be absolute. Let's hope that political will is absolute this time (and I have some reason to feel it is). |
| Posted by: Lone Ranger 2004-2-18 5:38:50 AM |