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| Iraq-Jordan |
| Gaming Out Iraq |
| 2004-04-09 |
| Subscription required, so posting the whole article Analysis The United States is experiencing its greatest military crisis in Iraq since the fall of Baghdad on April 9, 2003. On the one hand, the Sunni guerrillas that the United States appeared to have defeated after the Ramadan offensive of October and November 2003 have not been destroyed. Although their role in triggering the March 31 attack against U.S. civilian contractors in Al Fallujah is an open question, they have benefited politically from the U.S. cordon around the city and have taken shots at distracted U.S. forces in the area, such as the U.S. Marines in Ar Ramadi. On the other hand, a Shiite militia led by young cleric Moqtada al-Sadr has launched an offensive in Baghdad and in a number of cities in Iraq’s south. U.S. intelligence expected none of this; L. Paul Bremer, the U.S. administrator in Iraq, had scheduled a trip to Washington that he had to cancel hurriedly. The offensives appear to challenge two fundamental strategic assumptions that were made by U.S. planners. The first was that, due to penetrations by U.S. intelligence, the Sunni insurgency was deteriorating and would not restart. The second, much more important assumption was that the United States had a strategic understanding with the Shiite leadership that it would contain anti-American military action south of Baghdad, and that -- and this is critical -- they would under no circumstances collaborate with the Sunnis. It now appears that these basic premises are being rendered false. Obviously, the Sunni guerrillas are still around, at least in the Al Fallujah-Ar Ramadi corridor. U.S. efforts in that area of the Sunni Triangle are aimed at finding those responsible for the deaths and subsequent public mutilation of four U.S. civilian contractors March 31. Current U.S. operations might be in offensive mode -- suggesting that the Baathist guerrillas have yet to fully regroup -- but as the siege of Al Fallujah drags on, the potential grows for the insurgency to acquire sympathetic recruits. Equally obviously, some of the Shia have taken up arms against the United States, spreading the war to the region south of Iraq. Finally, there are some reports of Sunni-Shiite collaboration in the Baghdad area. We might add that the outbreak west of Baghdad and the uprising in the south could have been coincidental, but if so, it was one amazing coincidence. Not liking coincidences ourselves -- and fully understanding the contingent events that led to al-Sadr’s decision to strike -- we have to wonder about the degree to which the events of the past week or so were planned. If current trends accelerate, the United States faces a serious military challenge that could lead to disaster. The United States does not have the forces necessary to put down a broad-based Shiite rising and crush the Sunni rebellion as well. Even the current geography of the rising is beyond the capabilities of existing deployments or any practicable number of additional forces that might be made available. The United States is already withdrawing from some cities. The logical outcome of all of this would be an enclave strategy, in which the United States concentrates its forces -- in a series of fortified locations -- perhaps excluding Iraqi nationals -- and leaves the rest of the country to the guerrillas. That, of course, would raise the question of why the United States should bother to remain in Iraq, since those forces would not be able to exert effective force either inside the country or beyond its borders. That would force a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. The consequences of such a withdrawal would be catastrophic for the U.S. grand strategy in the war against militant Islamists. One of the purposes of the war was to disprove al Qaeda’s assertion that the United States was actually militarily weak and that it could not engage in close combat in the Islamist world, certainly not in the face of a mass uprising. An American withdrawal would prove al Qaeda’s claims and would energize Islamists not only with hatred of the United States, but also -- and worse -- with contempt for American power. It would create the worst of all possible worlds for the United States. It follows that the United States is going to do everything it can to abort this process. It also might well be that the process -- as we have laid it out -- is faulty. The uprising in the Al Fallujah-Ar Ramadi corridor might have peaked already. The al-Sadr rising perhaps does not represent a reversal of Shiite strategic orientation, but is primarily a self-contained, internal event about al-Sadr’s relationship with other Shiite clergy. The reports of collaboration between Shia and Sunnis could be false or represent a small set of cases. These are the issues on which the conflict and the future of the U.S. presence in Iraq turn. It is the hope of the guerrillas -- Sunni and Shiite -- to create a situation that compels a U.S. withdrawal, either from the country or into fortified enclaves; it is obviously the intention of the United States to prevent this. The Sunni Threat The Sunni part of the equation is the least threatening. If Sunni guerrillas have managed to regroup, it is disturbing that U.S. intelligence was unable to prevent the reorganization. But there is a very real silver lining in this: One of the ways the guerrillas might have been able to regroup without being detected was by doing it on a relatively small scale, limiting their organization to hundreds or even dozens of members. Certainly, they have many more sympathizers than that, but a careful distinction must be drawn -- and is not being drawn by the media -- between sympathizers and guerrillas. Sympathizers can riot -- they can even generate an intifada -- but that is not the same as conducting guerrilla war. Guerrillas need a degree of training, weapons and organization. The paradox of guerrilla war is that the more successful a guerrilla offensive, the more it opens the guerrillas to counteraction by the enemy. In order to attack, they must communicate, come out of hiding and converge on the target. At that moment, they can be destroyed and -- more important -- captured. Throwing a large percentage of a guerrilla force into an attack either breaks the enemy or turns into a guerrilla disaster. The U.S. Marines west of Baghdad are not about to be broken. Therefore, if our assumption about the relative size of the guerrilla force and the high percentage that have been thrown into this operation is correct, this force will not be able to sustain the current level of operations much longer. If the guerrilla force is large enough to sustain such operations, then the U.S. intelligence failure is so huge as to be difficult to comprehend. Protests and riots are problems and create a strain on resources, but they do not fundamentally affect the ability of the United States to remain engaged in Iraq. The Shiite Threat It is not the Sunni offensive that represents a threat, it is the Shia. The question is simple: Does al-Sadr’s rising represent a fundamental shift in the Shiite community as a whole, or is it simply a small faction of the Shia that has risen? The U.S. command in Iraq has argued that al-Sadr represents a marginal movement, at odds with the dominant Shiite leadership, lashing out in a desperate attempt to change the internal dynamics of the Shiite community. For this analysis to be correct, a single fact must be true: Ali al-Sistani, the grand ayatollah of the Iraqi Shia, is not only opposed to al-Sadr, but also remains committed to carrying out his basic bargain with the United States. If that is true, then all will be well for the Americans in the end. If it is wrong, then the worst-case scenarios have to be taken seriously. The majority Iraqi Shiite population suffered greatly under the regime of Saddam Hussein, which was dominated by the Sunni minority. After the fall of Hussein, the Shia’s primary interest was in guaranteeing not only that a Sunni government would not re-emerge, but also that the future of Iraq would be in the hands of the Shia. This interest was shared by the Shia in Iran, who also wanted to see a Shiite government emerge in order to secure Iran’s frontier from its historical enemy, Iraq. The first U.S. impulse after the fall of Baghdad was that Americans would govern Iraq indefinitely, on their terms -- and without compromising with Iranian sympathizers. That plan was blown out of the water by the unexpected emergence of a Sunni guerrilla force. The United States needed indigenous help. Even more than help, it needed guarantees that the Shia would not rise up and render the U.S. presence in Iraq untenable. The United States and the Shiite elites -- Iranian and Iraqi -- reached an accommodation: The United States guaranteed the Shia a democratic government, which meant that the majority Shia would dominate -- and the Shia maintained the peace in the south. They did not so much collaborate with the Americans as maintain a peace that permitted the United States to deal with the Sunnis. The end state of all of this was to be a Shiite government that would permit some level of U.S. forces to remain indefinitely in Iraq. As the Sunni rising subsided, the United States felt a decreased dependency on the Shia. The transitional Iraqi government that is slated to take power June 30 would not be an elected government, but rather a complex coalition of groups -- including Shia, Kurds and Sunnis, as well as small ethnic groups -- that would be constituted so as to give all the players a say in the future. In other words, the Shia would not get a Shiite-dominated government June 30. It was for this reason that al-Sistani began to agitate for direct elections. He knew that the Shia would win that election and that this was the surest path to direct Shiite power. Washington argued there was not enough time for direct elections -- a claim that was probably true -- but which the Shia saw as the United States backpedaling on fundamental agreements. The jury-rigged system the Americans wanted in place for a year would give the Sunnis a chance to recover -- not the sort of recovery the Shia wanted to see. Moreover, the Shia observed the quiet romance between the United States and some key Sunni tribal leaders after the capture of Hussein, and their distrust of long- term U.S. motives grew. Al-Sistani made it clear that he did not trust the transitional plan and that he did not believe it protected Shiite interests or represented American promises. The United States treated al-Sistani with courtesy and respect but made it clear that it was not planning to change its position. In the meantime, a sea change had taken place in Iranian politics, with a conservative government driving the would-be reformers out of power. The conservatives did not object to the deal with the United States, but they wanted to be certain that the United States did not for a moment believe that the Iranians were acting out of weakness. The continual hammering by the United States on the nuclear issue with Iran convinced the Iranians that the Washington did not fully appreciate the position it was in. As Iranian Expediency Council chief and former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani bluntly put it Feb. 24: "They continue to send us threatening messages and continue to raise the four questions," referring to Washington’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear program, opposition to the Middle East peace process, alleged support of militant groups and human rights. "But they are stuck in the mud in Iraq, and they know that if Iran wanted to, it could make their problems even worse." Al-Sistani did not want the June 30 transition to go forward on U.S. terms. The Iranians did not want the United States to think it had Iran on the defensive. A confrontation with the United States under these circumstances was precisely what was in both al-Sistani and Iran’s interests. Both wanted to drive home to the Americans that they held power in Iraq and that the United States was there at the sufferance of the Shia. The United States had forgotten its sense of desperation during the Sunni Ramadan offensive, and the Shia needed to remind them -- but they needed to do so without a rupture with Washington, which was, after all, instrumental to their long-term plans. Al-Sadr was the perfect instrument. He was dangerous, deniable and manageable. U.S. officials have expressed surprise that al-Sadr -- who they did not regard highly -- was able to create such havoc. Obviously, al-Sistani could have dealt with al-Sadr if and when he wished. But for the moment, al-Sistani didn’t wish. He wanted to show the Americans the abyss they faced if they continued on the path to June 30 without modifying the plan. The Americans have said al-Sistani has not been helpful in this crisis. He is not ready to be helpful and won’t be until a more suitable understanding is reached with the United States. He will act in due course because it is not in al-Sistani’s interests to allow al-Sadr to become too strong. Quite the contrary: Al- Sistani runs the risk that the situation will get so far out of hand that he will not be able to control it either. But al-Sistani is too strong for al-Sadr to undermine, and al-Sadr is, in fact, al-Sistani’s pawn. Perhaps more precisely, al-Sadr is al-Sistani’s ace in the hole. Having played him, al-Sistani will be as interested in liquidating al-Sadr’s movement as the United States is -- once Washington has modified its plans for a postwar Iraq. The worst-case scenario is not likely to happen. The Sunni guerrillas are not a long-term threat. The Shia are a long-term threat, but their interests are not in war with the United States, but in achieving a Shiite-dominated Iraqi state as quickly as possible -- without giving the United States an opportunity to double-cross them. Al-Sistani demanded elections and didn’t get them. What he really wants is a different transition process that gives the Shia more power. After the past week, he is likely to get it. And Washington will not soon forget who controls Iraq. This will pass. But the strategic reality of the U.S. forces in Iraq is permanent. Those forces are there because of the sufferance of the Iraqi Shia. The Shia know it, and they want the Americans to know it. With Washington planning an offensive in Pakistan, the last thing it needs is to pump more forces into Iraq. In due course, al-Sistani will become helpful, but the price will be even higher than before. |
| Posted by:tipper |
| #44 Gotta agree with Mr. D - The Pope didn't tip the change, but was the proverbial camel's nose under the tent - that was the reason the Bulgariand had the hit on him arranged - at the behest of their Soviet masters. Poland WAS the tipping point, and along with Reagan standing tough with intermediate missiles, spending them into the dustbin with Navy, other improvements, they fell...of course, only IMHO :-) |
| Posted by: Frank G 2004-04-09 9:08:03 PM |
| #43 Angie, Oh, the Pope had nothing to do with the defeat of the Soviet Union? You might want to check with Lech Walensa about that. It would be tough to think of anyone who had more to do with the downfall of the USSR than Reagan and JPII. |
| Posted by: Mr. Davis 2004-04-09 8:45:02 PM |
| #42 Mr. Davis, Didn't somebody make the same observation about the Pope? Stalin. "How many divisions does the Pope have?" What happened to that country? It was eventually defeated. But not by the Pope. |
| Posted by: Angie Schultz 2004-04-09 8:06:49 PM |
| #41 According to the press, being supremely qualified military experts - the evidence is quite clear on this point, the enemy always has us preciely where he wants us and we're screwed. That's why we have lost every war where we didn't listen to them, and won the only one in which we did. Not. |
| Posted by: .com 2004-04-09 8:03:26 PM |
| #40 rsd, I sure wouldn't mind helping out (and in fact I would be surprised if Karl Rove doesn't have a couple of ads like that already in the can for political reasons) but for maximum effect the effort's got to come from the Iraqis themselves, presumably at the GC level for financial reasons. Here's an April 9 post from Iraq the Model: "A year ago, words failed me as I met the 1st American soldier, and I still remember his name, ?corporal, Adam? and all I could utter was ?thank you!? how could I ever put my whole life in few words? How could I have thanked that soldier enough? How could I have told him what it meant to me to see him and his comrades-who brought me back to life- at last? Thank you Adam, Lieutenant Antonio, Captain Brian Curtis and all the coalition soldiers who I can?t remember their names, and those I never met." Tresho, I have no idea how representative Zeyad is, but having come this far I'd like to give the Iraqis the benefit of the doubt. |
| Posted by: Matt 2004-04-09 4:37:22 PM |
| #39 loke=like preview! (writing it 100 times on a scrap of paper) |
| Posted by: rsd 2004-04-09 2:57:45 PM |
| #38 #30 Matt I like your idea, at least, it should be given a try. However, I think that it would be nice to help out, Iraqis loke Zeyad may not have as many nickels as needed to pull that off. How about setting a tip jar for that purpose? |
| Posted by: rsd 2004-04-09 2:56:23 PM |
| #37 re: Badr forces .. Weren't they the ones who stood up for Sistani last year in spring when Muqtada tried to control some of the holy shrines in Kerbala or Najaf (I forgot which one.).. |
| Posted by: lyot 2004-04-09 2:32:34 PM |
| #36 The article strikes me as odd, it comes off like a late night term paper written by two authors. |
| Posted by: ruprecht 2004-04-09 2:07:53 PM |
| #35 There's also a battle for Iraqi public opinion which is not being covered. Zeyad may or may not be representative of Iraqi public opinion. A lot of Iraqis seem to just want 1) no foreign occupation 2) their own faction to control the country. That they would only wind up with 3) another Saddam is something they are apparently incapable of figuring out. |
| Posted by: Tresho 2004-04-09 1:57:38 PM |
| #34 This Stratfor analysis also misses what was pointed out yesterday, that Sistani probably is not currently free to speak his mind. It's a pretty big mistake, IMHO. |
| Posted by: Phil Fraering 2004-04-09 1:32:58 PM |
| #33 1. regarding Sistanis "army" he does have security guards, but AFAIK no mass militia. The Badr brigades, however, aligned with the Shiite party SCIRI, are fairly close to Sistani, as is SCIRI and its leadership. 2. WRT Stratfor saying things are spinning out of control - yup they say that, then go on to say that it may not be as bad as all that,etc. Read it closely and in full. This is called covering all bases, and is the stock in trade of research institutes, consultants, etc. If one relies on their final judgement one will be disappointed. If, OTOH, one takes advantage of specific insights, one may profit from them. |
| Posted by: Liberalhawk 2004-04-09 1:01:00 PM |
| #32 There is also a piece in the WSJ oped page that says many of the same things regarding cause for the troubles in the South being the constitution and the inability for the Shiites to gain complete power. |
| Posted by: remote man 2004-04-09 12:35:12 PM |
| #31 I have read otherwise with regard to Sistani having a private army. I would be very surprised if he did not. One key point in this article is the statement by Rafsanjani. There is no doubt that Iran is behind what is going on in the South. It is quite possible that they are acting as the go-between building the cooperative relationships between Sunni and Shiite rebels. MRP is exactly right when he says that there will be no real stability until there is regime change in Iraq. |
| Posted by: remote man 2004-04-09 12:33:17 PM |
| #30 This article does not cover the main theater of operations, which is American public opinion. The Iraqis (e.g., Zeyad) who really want a free country with a representative form of government need to scrape together every nickel they can and start running commercials and newspaper ads thanking the American people and asking them to stay the course. Bloggers and the military aside, all the public is seeing right now is the usual "All Is Lost" horse puckey that CNN and the NYT delight in showing. One thirty-second spot from an Iraqi child thanking America for getting her father out of Saddam's prison would be equal in effect to deploying another brigade. |
| Posted by: Matt 2004-04-09 12:32:42 PM |
| #29 This is a very simplistic and misleading analysis. The only reason to read it is because it comes from an organization which makes a claim to insight. However, the hollowness of that claim is on display in this analysis. It illustrates why I dropped my subscription to Stratfor. I agree with B's opinion of the analysis in comment #4. The reality is that Muqtada Sadr does not command respect in Iraq, beyond his immediate followers and (possibly) young unemployed hotheads. Sadr has no political orgnaization, only his private army of thugs. By calling for calm, Sistani has spoken against a general uprising. So, it appears that the situation is not spinning out of control. It appears that the CPA took some effort to provoke Muqtada to take rash action -- first by closing his newspaper and then by issuing a murder arrest warrant. Bottom line - Muqtada Sadr has been a thorn in the Coalition's side for the past year -- now he been provoked to make the mistakes which will allow the Coalition to take action against him prior to the handover in June. |
| Posted by: Scenario A 2004-04-09 12:28:28 PM |
| #28 I just saw the pope...he was mumbling about something....no offense to Catholics or Christianity intended. I think that's a great idea. Let's give Al Sistani a nice block of land in Baghdad with his own post office, currency and throne. We can even promise him a Mullah Mobile. Hey...it's what he wants....adoring crowds, pilgrims and a little palace all to himself. What is the cost of a square mile of land in Baghdad anyway? It's got to be cheaper than any of the other alternatives. I like it. |
| Posted by: anon 2004-04-09 11:58:11 AM |
| #27 Someone, Didn't somebody make the same observation about the Pope? What happened to that country? |
| Posted by: Mr. Davis 2004-04-09 11:37:40 AM |
| #26 Lucky...hmmm...Freudian slip?? Did you mean shrewd or did you hit accidently hit the h instead of a c? If he's not careful - it will be the latter. |
| Posted by: B 2004-04-09 11:27:25 AM |
| #25 I thought sadr was in exile in Iran during saddam's rule. I think he was a loose cannon trying to make a name for himself. Prolly thinks he's got mass support from Iran. I'm sure Iran let him think so also. A useful idiot but soon of no consequence. If any coordination took place it was prolly due to Iranian cadres, or exiled Shia that have been salted about. I can't blame Sistani for being shrewed. |
| Posted by: Lucky 2004-04-09 11:20:33 AM |
| #24 oh...and someone...that Sistani, as has been noted here before, has no private army. that too is interesting....wish I understood the implications of that better than I do. |
| Posted by: B 2004-04-09 11:15:05 AM |
| #23 Someone - thanks. Raise up all Iraq. Uh, huh. That's easier said than done. What they can't get past is that the Iraqi people think the idea of living in a representative republic like the US is just fine with them. Now that was interesting and insightful article and he probably wrote it for free. How much do I pay for those cowering Stratfor analysts anyway. Too much, I'd say. |
| Posted by: B 2004-04-09 11:04:37 AM |
| #22 someone - yes thats good note this The most important thing about force is for it to be controlled force, guided by a intelligence and political goal. And the great thing about CENTCOM so far is they have not let their legs get ahead of their brains. |
| Posted by: Liberalhawk 2004-04-09 10:48:55 AM |
| #21 and Badr forces, aren't they controlled by Sistani's people ? |
| Posted by: Anonymous4102 2004-04-09 10:47:01 AM |
| #20 mhw: remember that Sistani, as has been noted here before, has no private army. |
| Posted by: someone 2004-04-09 10:43:21 AM |
| #19 mrp...agreed. I too thought the final paragraph was just hanging out there like some sort of wierd random thoughts each having little correlation to each other or the article itself. I think you nailed it 50% reasonable - 50% drek. |
| Posted by: B 2004-04-09 10:42:49 AM |
| #18 Wretchard is a lot briefer and a lot more sensible. Stratfor has been Chicken Little from 9/12. |
| Posted by: someone 2004-04-09 10:41:09 AM |
| #17 well, i reckon their analysis is most of the time insightfull.. I didn't find this piece pessimistic really.. In the end, there are not saying anything else than Sistani is using Sadr to promote Shia interests... |
| Posted by: Anonymous4102 2004-04-09 10:28:48 AM |
| #16 This analysis is 50% reasonable and 50% drek. Just look at a map. Iran now has US-Western troops based in Iraq and Afghanistan. Pakistan is at least nominally a US ally. Turkey is neutral, but a NATO ally. Across the Persian Gulf, Kuwait and the Emirates host major US bases. And the Saudis probably fear the Persians more than they hate the Americans. Bottom Line : The Iranians and their Syrian satellite will do anything and everything to make the US occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan untenable. There is zero (0) incentive for Iran to halt its nuclear weapons program. The article has a strange closing paragraph: But the strategic reality of the U.S. forces in Iraq is permanent. Those forces are there because of the sufferance of the Iraqi Shia. The first sentence makes the second sentence non sequitor, and doesn't take into account having permanence depend on the whims of the US Congress and successive Administrations. In addition to that, Sistani is an old man, and no matter what his personal opinions may be, they are not long for this world. There will be no peace (or the semblance thereof) until regime changes take place in Syria and Iran. |
| Posted by: mrp 2004-04-09 10:27:09 AM |
| #15 I am curious as to why Sistani would not immediately denounce the taking of civilian hostages. Also, frankly, the whole idea of substantive pre April 04 Sistani-Sadr coordination is shaky; Sistani could be that stupid but I doubt it. More likely, both men are being driven by agendas that they partially control and partially don't. |
| Posted by: mhw 2004-04-09 10:12:35 AM |
| #14 i agree with Mike - Stratfor's thinking is insightful, and their scenarios are always plausible, but usually without much solid evidence. Re this - theyre almost certainly right that Sistani will attempt to milk the Sadr situation for whatever he can get. He may have deliberately let Sadr run wild, to press the US, or he may have feared the consequences of using his own power to crush Sadr. Thats a state of mind question, and something we will probably NEVER know, as Sistani will probably take the secret to his grave. As for the pre-rebellion maneuverings, that sounds pretty accurate, though im not sure about the importance of US relations with Sunni tribal leaders. There IS a school of thought that Bremer has been getting TOO close to Sunni tribal leaders, at the expense of more genuine democractic forces - you will note not only Chalabi going over to Sistani, but sympathy for the Shiite position from pro neo-con Jim Hoagland of the Washington Post, and from the Weekly Standard. Yes minority rights need to be assured, but not by giving sunni tribal leaders who worked with Saddam veto over the future of Iraq. |
| Posted by: Liberalhawk 2004-04-09 9:54:56 AM |
| #13 I agree with Mike. The strategists seem to require the facts to fit their worldview rather than the opposite - similar to politicians and philosophers. |
| Posted by: mhw 2004-04-09 9:42:53 AM |
| #12 I'm not nearly as impressed by Stratfor as I used to be. I remember in late '01, just after the liberation of Kabul, they came out with a piece on how the Taliban had us right where they wanted us, the withdrawal to Kandahar was a trap, and so on: it was a perfect synthesis of pessimistic conventional wisdom ("the brutal Afghan winter," "the mighty Pashtun, humbler of empires," etc., all the stuff Mark Steyn is so good at skewering). It was also dead-ass wrong from start to finish. I'd put Stratfor in the same category as Debka: keep the salt handy. |
| Posted by: Mike 2004-04-09 9:27:15 AM |
| #11 and furthemore...just cause it's on official letterhead...it is still just opinion of some staff weenies somewhere. I don't agree with it....and I don't think the Bush Administration operates under the can't-do philosophy represented by their opinion as expressed in that article. JMHO. |
| Posted by: B 2004-04-09 9:24:13 AM |
| #10 Iyot - I realized that when I wrote it. But unless Strafor is supposed to take the most negative view possible (maybe it is, I don't know) I still stand by what I said. |
| Posted by: B 2004-04-09 9:16:44 AM |
| #9 Tipper, I'm already a Stratfor subscriber.. I hadn't thought of the possibility that this was a free newsletter..You are right.. |
| Posted by: lyot 2004-04-09 9:16:40 AM |
| #8 Tyot Re this subscription Yes it's OK It's a free weekly newsletter. They say "Please feel free to send the Stratfor Weekly to a friend or colleague." However if you subscribe, you will have to wait one week for the first newsletter. I just short-circuited that for you. However I would recommend that you go to the Stratfor site and sign up for their newsleter. It's free. |
| Posted by: tipper 2004-04-09 9:13:22 AM |
| #7 at B 2004 : this is a Stratfor.com analysis. |
| Posted by: lyot 2004-04-09 9:10:13 AM |
| #6 Posting subscription articles is inviting trouble. |
| Posted by: Mike Sylwester 2004-04-09 8:46:42 AM |
| #5 plus...I take issue with this key piece of his analysis: Perhaps more precisely, al-Sadr is al-Sistani’s ace in the hole. Having played him, al-Sistani will be as interested in liquidating al-Sadr’s movement as the United States is -- once Washington has modified its plans for a postwar Iraq. First...in order for democracy to work in Iraq...it has to be a democracy. Therefore, the Sunni's Kurds and others need a voice. Otherwise we are wasting our time and we will have just created another Iran. It is in Sisttani's long term interests to cooperate with the United States and I think it is a mistake of the Bremer types to pander to his desire to be the next king of Iraq. Sure, we need him, but he needs us. We are far more lethal than we have been to date. We are far from being stuck in the mud. If we REALLY wanted to, we could take off the gloves - we just don't see the need to yet. This analysis panders to Al Sistiani and gives him more credit than is his due. I think that is a critical mistake. This guy wrote an interesting and informed piece, but that is simply a false assumption ...he's wrong. We don't have to modify our plans to allow the people of Iraq to have a free democracy. Just because this yahoo thinks so, doesn't make it fact. |
| Posted by: B 2004-04-09 8:25:51 AM |
| #4 I didn't find this analysis to be that impressive. He doesn't seem to ever consider the possiblity that we will put down this rebellion and that we can turn over the power to the Iraqi's. I guesss he thinks the Iraqi's are too stupid or too incompetent for that to happen. Maybe he's right, but with the overwhelming pessimism that oozes from this piece, nothing positive would EVER be possible. I prefer to go forward with the assumption that the Iraqi's are functioning human beings that do not need the UN or US to act like their mommy's for ever and ever, in order to function as a society. While it's interesting...I quite frankly think this piece is so negative and pessimistic that - not only does it suck - but it's too negative to be useful. |
| Posted by: B 2004-04-09 7:56:06 AM |
| #3 And Kurdistan going independent. I think Kurds deserve a country. They arent crazy like Palestinians. |
| Posted by: Anonymous4075 2004-04-09 6:34:24 AM |
| #2 Any US withdrawl will result in at least one of; a civil war, an Iranian invasion, a Turkish invasion. Oil would go to well $50 a barrel and the world economy would experience a massive 1930s style slump. Oh and China would invade Siberia. |
| Posted by: Phil B 2004-04-09 4:42:33 AM |
| #1 technical question : is it allowed to post subscription based articles like this (cf. copyright).. I just like to know so I can start post these analysis as well.. |
| Posted by: lyot 2004-04-09 4:18:24 AM |