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| Iraq-Jordan |
| Description of Marines’ Combat to Take Fallujah and Karmah in April |
| 2004-05-31 |
| From The Wall Street Journal, an article by Robert D. Kaplan When Bravo Company of the First Battalion of the Fifth Marine Regiment led U.S. forces into the heart of Fallujah in the predawn hours of April 6, I was the only journalist present. ... Whenever the Marines with whom I was attached crossed the path of a mosque, we were fired upon. Mosques in Fallujah were used by snipers and other gunmen, and to store weapons and explosives. ... But only after repeated aggressions was any mosque targeted, and then sometimes for hits so small in scope that they often had little effect. The news photos of holes in mosque domes did not indicate the callousness of the American military; rather the reverse. The overwhelming percentage of the small arms fire--not-to-mention mortars, rockets and rocket-propelled grenades--represented indiscriminate automatic bursts of the insurgents. Marines responded with far fewer, more precise shots. It was inspiring to observe high-testosterone 19-year-old lance corporals turn into calm and calculating 30-year-olds every time a firefight started. There was nothing fancy about the Marine advance into Fallujah. Marines slugged it out three steps forward, two steps backward: the classic, immemorial labor of infantry, ... As their own casualties mounted, the only time I saw angry or depressed Marines was when an Iraqi civilian was accidentally hit in the crossfire--usually perpetrated by the enemy. By April 7, two sleep-deprived Marine battalions had taken nearly 20% of Fallujah. The following day a third battalion arrived to join the fight, allowing the first two to rest and recover their battle rhythm. Just as the three well-rested battalions were about to start boxing in the insurgents against the Euphrates River at the western edge of the city, a cease-fire was announced. As disappointing as the cease-fire was, the Marines managed to wrest positive consequences from it. It would free them up to resume mortar mitigation, a critical defense task today in Iraq. Mortars and rockets rain down continually on American bases. Furthermore, as soon as the First of the Fifth Marines departed Fallujah they headed for Al-Karmah, a town about half the size of Fallujah, strategically located between Fallujah and Baghdad. Al-Karmah was no less hostile than Fallujah. I went there several times in March with the Marines. The streets always emptied upon our arrival, and we were periodically fired upon. After the Fallujah operation, the Marines didn’t just visit Al-Karmah; they moved inside, patrolling regularly, talking to people on the streets, collecting intelligence and going a long way toward reclaiming that city. As one company captain told me, "it’s easily the most productive stuff we’ve done in Iraq." If Al-Karmah is reclaimed, if Fallujah itself remains relatively calm, if the Marines can patrol there at some point, and if mortar attacks abate measurably--all distinct possibilities--the decision not to launch an all-out assault on Fallujah could look like the right one. The article continues with much criticism of how the was is being reported in most of the media. |
| Posted by:Mike Sylwester |