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Arabia
Saudi al-Qaeda weakened but still a threat
2005-01-12
Saudi Arabia's crackdown on al Qaeda militants has seriously eroded their forces and capabilities but the network will remain a threat in the world's biggest oil exporter for years, a U.S. research group said. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) said Saudi Arabia had arrested or killed 400 to 500 out of a total of 500-600 al Qaeda members, who have targeted Westerners and government sites in a series of attacks since 2003.
Do they mention how many of the 400-500 have been replaced by new, cheap and easily replaced cannon fodder?
But Saudi militants in Afghanistan, Yemen or Iraq could return to their homeland to reinforce the organization.
... along with the current crop of young 'uns hanging around the mosques...
Four of the network's five main cells in the kingdom have been destroyed, CSIS said in a report. "Despite the popular notion of al Qaeda as a hydra that can constantly grow new heads, there are indications that the organization has not been able to recover from the government attacks," said the report, released this month.
Somebody usually issues a statement like that a week or two before something major goes "kaboom"...
"At its peak, Saudi al Qaeda claimed between 500-600 members, scattered among the cells. Of these, roughly 250 were diehards. By the end of 2004, between 400-500 militants had been captured or killed, including all of the leaders." Diplomats and Western security officials say it is hard to put any precise number on al Qaeda's clandestine forces in Saudi Arabia, but agree it has been significantly weakened -- at least for now -- by the tightened security in the kingdom. But CSIS said recent attacks revealed al Qaeda weaknesses. The Riyadh strikes were largely unsuccessful, it said, and last month's storming of the U.S. consulate in Jeddah was "poorly orchestrated and executed." All the militants involved in Jeddah were killed or captured.
I guess I would consider that a plus...
It said the 2003 attacks were carried out after al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden's deputy Ayman al-Zawahri overruled the organization's local leader in Saudi Arabia, who had called for more time to establish his network before striking. The subsequent government crackdown eliminated al Qaeda's leadership and the movement could not find new recruits, CSIS said. It also "failed to articulate a viable alternative to the existing government" and suffered from lack of funds after Saudi Arabia tightened financial controls. "Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia is at a critical juncture in its fight against terrorism. The threat is unlikely to disappear for years to come," the CSIS report said. "Al Qaeda can draw on Saudis in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and Central Asia, as well as other members of al Qaeda who may be able to enter Saudi Arabia. The Iraqi and Yemeni border present serious problems in terms of infiltration."
Yemen presents a pool of bloodthirsty tribal yokels who're more than willing to run off and play jihad in the Tragic Kingdom. Assir province is chock full of al-Ghamdis, many of whom are just looking forward to being weaned so they can get their own jihad get-ups. But more important than either of those is the fact that Hawali and Co. remain in the religion business, and are honored members of Soddy society.
Posted by:Dan Darling

#3  I'm going to print out your explanation, 11A5S. I think I understand the gist, but I'm not accustomed to think in other than straight-line terms, I'm afraid (although my "straight" lines can be pretty curvy and even discontinuous). One take away though, is that the ambitious Suadi born into the wrong tribe and family, should choose to become a mullah.

Thank you!!
Posted by: trailing wife   2005-01-12 7:10:54 PM  

#2  Also, how many of al Qaeda's top guys are connected to certain Saudi princes? (I do realize that we aren't likely to know until after the Kingdom falls.)

I dunno. I think that with a little network analysis you could figure out a lot. The key nodes are probably the mullahs. Prince X's brothers worship at Mullah Y's mosque. Mullah Y's sermons are consistently quoted by Z al Ghamdi on his website, and so on.

Another way of looking at it would be like this:

Princes -> money, influence, strategic goals -> Mullahs -> money, ideology, tactical goals-> Tribal Muscle

As PD once pointed out here, being a Mullah is the only non-tribal path of upward mobility in these places. The mullahs become brokers between the princely tribes who have the money, but don't want to get their hands dirty and the poorer tribes that need the money and influence and are quite willing to get their hands dirty. And the mullahs are public figures. If you can find out who is in their congregations, you can make the connections.

All of which reinforces the sentiment often expressed here that first we need to hang the mullahs.
Posted by: 11A5S   2005-01-12 1:00:59 PM  

#1  The writer keeps talking about "captured or killed", as if that makes the total meaningful. It doesn't sound to me as if he is accounting for all the those who escaped from prison, or those released after repenting. (I repent the cookie I just ate. In a moment I will repent the next one.) Also, how many of al Qaeda's top guys are connected to certain Saudi princes? (I do realize that we aren't likely to know until after the Kingdom falls.) And since when do the Iraqi and Yemeni borders present more than a cheesecloth defence against infiltration? Or are they one-way filters? (Not bloody likely to my inexperienced eyes!)
Posted by: trailing wife   2005-01-12 11:07:20 AM  

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