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| Iraq-Jordan |
| Talking with the enemy |
| 2005-02-21 |
| The secret meeting is taking place in the bowels of a facility in Baghdad, a cavernous, heavily guarded building in the U.S.-controlled green zone. The Iraqi negotiator, a middle-aged former member of Saddam Hussein's regime and the senior representative of the self-described nationalist insurgency, sits on one side of the table. He is here to talk to two members of the U.S. military. One of them, an officer, takes notes during the meeting. The other, dressed in civilian clothes, listens as the Iraqi outlines a list of demands the U.S. must satisfy before the insurgents stop fighting. The parties trade boilerplate complaints: the U.S. officer presses the Iraqi for names of other insurgent leaders; the Iraqi says the newly elected Shi'a-dominated government is being controlled by Iran. The discussion does not go beyond generalities, but both sides know what's behind the coded language. The Iraqi's very presence conveys a message: Members of the insurgency are open to negotiating an end to their struggle with the U.S. "We are ready," he says before leaving, "to work with you." In that guarded pledge may lie the first sign that after nearly two years of fighting, parts of the insurgency in Iraq are prepared to talk and move toward putting away their arms—and the U.S. is willing to listen. An account of the secret meeting between the senior insurgent negotiator and the U.S. military officials was provided to TIME by the insurgent negotiator. He says two such meetings have taken place. While U.S. officials would not confirm the details of any specific meetings, sources in Washington told TIME that for the first time the U.S. is in direct contact with members of the Sunni insurgency, including former members of Saddam's Baathist regime. Pentagon officials say the secret contacts with insurgent leaders are being conducted mainly by U.S. diplomats and intelligence officers. A Western observer close to the discussions says that "there is no authorized dialogue with the insurgents" but that the U.S. has joined "back-channel" communications with rebels. Says the observer: "There's a lot bubbling under the surface today." Over the course of the war in Iraq, as the anti-U.S. resistance has grown in size and intensity, Administration officials have been steadfast in their refusal to negotiate with enemy fighters. But in recent months, the persistence of the fighting and signs of division in the ranks of the insurgency have prompted some U.S. officials to seek a political solution. And Pentagon and intelligence officials hope the high voter turnout in last month's election will deflate the morale of the insurgents and persuade more of them to come in from the cold. Hard-line islamist fighters like Abu Mousab al-Zarqawi's al-Qaeda group will not compromise in their campaign to create an Islamic state. But in interviews with TIME, senior Iraqi insurgent commanders said several "nationalist" rebel groups—composed predominantly of ex-military officers and what the Pentagon dubs "former regime elements"—have moved toward a strategy of "fight and negotiate." Although they have no immediate plans to halt attacks on U.S. troops, they say their aim is to establish a political identity that can represent disenfranchised Sunnis and eventually negotiate an end to the U.S. military's offensive in the Sunni triangle. Their model is Sinn Fein, the political wing of the Irish Republican Army, which ultimately earned the I.R.A. a role in the Northern Ireland peace process. "That's what we're working for, to have a political face appear from the battlefield, to unify the groups, to resist the aggressor and put our views to the people," says a battle commander in the upper tiers of the insurgency who asked to be identified by his nom de guerre, Abu Marwan. Another negotiator, called Abu Mohammed, told TIME, "Despite what has happened, the possibility for negotiation is still open." But can such talks succeed? A senior official in the U.S. embassy in Baghdad says the nationalist insurgents "want to cut a deal, thinking we get ours and they get theirs." Any deal with the insurgents would be up to the new government, but embassy officials say they believe that reaching an accord should be the new government's top priority. Behind the scenes, the U.S. is encouraging Sunni leaders and the insurgents to talk with the government. A tougher job may be to convince the leaders of political parties about to assume power—many of whom were brutalized by Baathists now coordinating the insurgency—that it's in their interests to reach a peaceful settlement with their former tormentors. In the U.S. command, there is increasing skepticism that the insurgency can be defeated through military might alone. Says a senior U.S. officer: "The Iraqis are the solution to the insurgency, and they are the solution to our departure." Insurgent sources say both sides have been feeling each other out for months. Some of the earliest advances were made last year through Jordanian intelligence officers, but insurgents balked at the idea of meeting in Jordan. U.S. diplomats also initiated contact with conservative Sunnis known to have influence with the insurgents, such as Harith al-Dhari, the head of the Association of Muslim Scholars. Insurgent sources say that last summer a loose amalgam of nationalist groups—Mohammed's Army, al-Nasser al-Saladin, the 1920 Revolution Brigades and perhaps even the Islamic Army of Iraq—met to discuss forging a common political platform. Meanwhile, some Americans showed openness to a dialogue. In meetings with Sunni tribal leaders, Lieut. Colonel Rick Welch, the senior special-operations civil-military affairs adviser to the commanding general of the 1st Cavalry Division in Baghdad, put word out that the military was willing to talk to hard-liners about their grievances and that, as Welch says, "the door is not closed, except for some very top regime guys." Welch, a reservist and prosecutor from Morgan County, Ohio, told TIME, "I don't meet all the insurgent leaders, but I've met some of them." Although not an authorized negotiator, Welch has become a back channel in the nascent U.S. dialogue with the insurgents. Insurgent negotiators confirm to TIME that they have met with Welch. What do the insurgents want? Top insurgent field commanders and negotiators informed TIME that the rebels have told diplomats and military officers that they support a secular democracy in Iraq but resent the prospect of a government run by exiles who fled to Iran and the West during Saddam's regime. The insurgents also seek a guaranteed timetable for U.S. troop withdrawal, a demand the U.S. refuses. But there are some hints of compromise: insurgent negotiators have told their U.S. counterparts they would accept a U.N. peacekeeping force as the U.S. troop presence recedes. Insurgent representative Abu Mohammed says the nationalists would even tolerate U.S. bases on Iraqi soil. "We don't mind if the invader becomes a guest," he says, suggesting a situation akin to the U.S. military presence in Germany and Japan. As promising as such proffers might sound, it's far too early for optimism. The new U.S. policy of engagement is aimed at driving a wedge between nationalist insurgents and the jihadists. But al-Zarqawi and his allies have silenced nationalists by threatening to kill them if they negotiate. The Western observer close to the discussions says, "Al-Zarqawi keeps pulling the process away from 'fight and negotiate' to 'pure mayhem.'" The engagement strategy faces another obstacle: the new Iraqi government. Leaders of the victorious political parties say they have no interest in continuing dialogue with the insurgents. "The voters gave us a mandate to attack these insurgents, not negotiate with them," says Humam Bakr Hammoudi, a political strategist for the dominant sciri party. U.S. negotiators say they believe the new government will eventually realize that only a political settlement will subdue the insurgency—which may soon direct its wrath at the new Iraqi rulers if it believes its interests are being ignored. While some in the Bush Administration might find the idea of backing an accord with archenemy Baathists distasteful, the Western observer says, "I think you've got a pretty flexible [U.S.] government." Now it's up to the others to follow. |
| Posted by:Dan Darling |
| #23 The thing the Arabs need to remember is that we're always nastier the second time around - just look at Germany. It's not a good idea to treat us in a way that would make us WANT to come back a second time. Unfortunately, I don't think there are enough Arabs intelligent enough to understand that. |
| Posted by: Old Patriot 2005-02-21 6:08:37 PM |
| #22 We killed between 5% and 10% of their populations before we got their submission. 3 percentum seems to be the key number. |
| Posted by: Shipman 2005-02-21 4:03:31 PM |
| #21 'You can't buy an Arab's friendship, you can only rent it.' The list of groups for which this is not true is much shorter than the list of those for whom it is. |
| Posted by: Mrs. Davis 2005-02-21 2:56:35 PM |
| #20 Someone once said, 'You can't buy an Arab's friendship, you can only rent it.' |
| Posted by: phil_b 2005-02-21 2:50:04 PM |
| #19 shouldn't that be, My client is an orphan who murdered his parents? |
| Posted by: 2b 2005-02-21 12:20:26 PM |
| #18 disenfranchised Sunnis My client is an orphan whose parents were murdered. |
| Posted by: Shipman 2005-02-21 9:10:48 AM |
| #17 I agree. You make a good point about that list of demands. Lots of bluster to save face, but the last one, "tolerating bases" may be their idea of a kiss blown our way. |
| Posted by: 2b 2005-02-21 5:32:47 AM |
| #16 2b: But it seems to me that it simply isn't so with the people we are dealing with in these countries. A hudna? Completely meaningless. While it's true that in other wars, agreements were broken, a cease-fire generally meant something. Hudnas only work with Westerners. The Shiites or Kurds aren't going to fall for a hudna - Middle Easterners play for keeps - they have the mass graves to show for it. Uncle Sam is the prison guard - the Sunnis are the fresh-faced skinny new kid on the prison block - fresh meat for the Shiites and the Kurds. Once the Sunnis figure out that they have lost, I think they're are going to be acting real clingy with Uncle Sam. |
| Posted by: Zhang Fei 2005-02-21 5:27:06 AM |
| #15 oooh....well then...I agree! :-) |
| Posted by: 2b 2005-02-21 5:21:18 AM |
| #14 2b: The the orginal point was that you said that the Sunni's might become our best friends. I was using the phrase "our new best friends" as an ironic turn of phrase - in the sense that they are going to come groveling to us as if we had been good friends all along and that all the bad blood from them having sent over a thousand of our boys home in body bags is ancient history. Not because they like us - but because they know they're beaten and fear what comes afterwards - if Uncle Sam leaves. |
| Posted by: Zhang Fei 2005-02-21 5:19:10 AM |
| #13 And one last point - I don't mean to demean all Turks, Sunni's etc. etc. There are many, many, good honest people there. But there is a distinct cultural difference in terms of the binding nature of a "deal". Lying is much more accepted and lacks the shame or embarrassment it brings in western societies. Their culture is based on a buyer beware mentality. All agreements are are subject to change, if possible. It's to be expected. |
| Posted by: 2b 2005-02-21 5:16:40 AM |
| #12 I see them..not seem them |
| Posted by: 2b 2005-02-21 5:08:35 AM |
| #11 There is a difference between the tryrants that create wars of aggression and ordinary people who, sans the tyrant would happily operate within an honest society. A tyrant is a tyrant - evil by nature. In most western societies and in Japan, business and governments can and do run on trust. Just like e-bay. The majority of the people are honest. But it seems to me that it simply isn't so with the people we are dealing with in these countries. A hudna? Completely meaningless. While it's true that in other wars, agreements were broken, a cease-fire generally meant something. The the orginal point was that you said that the Sunni's might become our best friends. I seem them about as useful of friends as the Turks. Don't turn your back or take your hand off your wallet. Maybe we are just arguing over the meaning of the word, "friends". Can they possibly useful to us in the future..perhaps. Friends - never. |
| Posted by: 2b 2005-02-21 5:05:42 AM |
| #10 2b: The reason I bring this up is that unlike Japan or Germany, that do have a culture of honor...or whatever word you want to use to describe the concept of honoring "deals" for the long term consequence of being able to secure additonal "deals" in the future based on trust - the Arab world seems incapable of understanding the benefits of honoring agreements as a bargaining chip for future negotiations. The Japanese and the Germans broke deals all the time. They conquered one region after another in this way - signing non-aggression treaties that they broke one after another. They stopped breaking deals after we stopped making deals with them - accepting nothing but unconditional surrender - butchering their armies and burning their cities to cinders. They had no choice about submitting - their alternative was for us to turn both countries over to the Russians. We killed between 5% and 10% of their populations before we got their submission. We flattened their cities. Think of Iraqi with 2 million dead, 80% of the housing wrecked and most of the population starving. An war-weary, impoverished and hungry population is a meek population - just ask some of the most ruthless and despicable opponents on the face of the planet - the Germans and the Japanese. What we're seeing in Iraq has nothing to do with honor - we simply did not kill enough Iraqis or inflict enough destruction. |
| Posted by: Zhang Fei 2005-02-21 4:45:46 AM |
| #9 But Iraq is the accidental nation - the land of the three tribes - Kurds, Sunnis and Shiites. When Sunnis kill Shiites, they don't think they are killing their own people (and vice-versa). interesting point. And the Sunni's are educated making it possible for many of the Sunni people to work with the US. But I suspect they will be more like the French - unable to cope with the loss of their own sense of greatness and squander opportunities to achieve real but moderate gains. Like a gambler having lost big - trying to win it all back in increasingly risky bets...but ever spiralling downward believing the next roll will be the one - because it just can't be that he's lost so much. Maybe not, but one difference I see that makes it almost impossible to predict what will happen in the "Arab" world is their lack of honor as compared to Western or Japanese civilization. Words, truces, deals are virtually meaningless. "Deals" are meant to secure something today..right now. You give me something, I'll give you something. The West doesn't seem to understand the mindset that when they secure a deal with promises - that's the deal....you got words in exchange for whatever it was that they got. The reason I bring this up is that unlike Japan or Germany, that do have a culture of honor...or whatever word you want to use to describe the concept of honoring "deals" for the long term consequence of being able to secure additonal "deals" in the future based on trust - the Arab world seems incapable of understanding the benefits of honoring agreements as a bargaining chip for future negotiations. Ok...I'm getting too deep into this, but my point is that I just don't think you can look at Germany or Japan and predict outcomes in the Arab world. |
| Posted by: 2b 2005-02-21 4:18:18 AM |
| #8 2b: That's a good point about the willingness to "tolerate bases" but I'm not so sure that they will become our new best friends. Germans and Japanese didn't indiscriminately kill their own citizens or cut their own services. There were a few million hard-core fascists in Germany and Japan supported passively by tens of millions of the population. At war's end, there might have been tens of thousands of them left. Note that both regimes practised the same kind of thing that Saddam did - opponents were tortured to death or assassinated. The reason they did not revolt en masse was because they were tired of war - too many of their men had been killed, and too many of their cities had been burned to the ground. Overall, the Japanese and the Germans were far more vicious than Iraq's Sunnis. There is simply no comparison. And to talk about Iraqis Sunnis killing their own citizens is to misunderstand what Iraq is all about. You can talk about Germans killing their own citizens, or Japanese killing their own citizens - these nations had a well-developed sense of nationhood as of WWII. But Iraq is the accidental nation - the land of the three tribes - Kurds, Sunnis and Shiites. When Sunnis kill Shiites, they don't think they are killing their own people (and vice-versa). As to the Sunni habit of killing collaborators, the Nazis and the Japanese executed suspected traitors with great cruelty. |
| Posted by: Zhang Fei 2005-02-21 3:44:50 AM |
| #7 That's a good point about the willingness to "tolerate bases" but I'm not so sure that they will become our new best friends. Germans and Japanese didn't indiscriminately kill their own citizens or cut their own services. The Sunni's aren't "the Germans", they are the Nazis. |
| Posted by: 2b 2005-02-21 3:16:25 AM |
| #6 2b: Insurgent representative Abu Mohammed says the nationalists would even tolerate U.S. bases on Iraqi soil. "We don’t mind if the invader becomes a guest," he says, suggesting a situation akin to the U.S. military presence in Germany and Japan. This isn't the Sunnis being broad-minded - it means they've accepted that they're not going to win even if American forces pull out. It's a major psychological milestone for the Sunni community. Now that Sunnis have accepted inevitable defeat, with or without GI's, I think they are finally starting to figure out that having American troops on Iraqi soil is the Sunni community's best insurance policy against mass reprisals by the Shiites or the Kurds. Having understood the inevitability of Iraq's demographics, Sunnis are starting to come to the same conclusion that led to their forebears siding with the Brits during the 1920's. If the Sunnis work it right, I predict that they could become our new best friends in the years ahead. If the Japanese and the Germans could become reconciled to their new American friends after their cities were burned to the ground, the Sunnis can become reconciled to American forces after the comparatively soft peace they've gone through. |
| Posted by: Zhang Fei 2005-02-21 3:09:50 AM |
| #5 2b...I would go further and say if Time prints it never count on it! Their record of fact and prognostication is an infinitesimally smaller percentage than random. |
| Posted by: rag 2005-02-21 3:09:36 AM |
| #4 What do the insurgents want? Top insurgent field commanders and negotiators informed TIME that the rebels have told diplomats and military officers that they support a secular democracy in Iraq but resent the prospect of a government run by exiles who fled to Iran and the West during Saddam’s regime. The insurgents also seek a guaranteed timetable for U.S. troop withdrawal, a demand the U.S. refuses. But there are some hints of compromise: insurgent negotiators have told their U.S. counterparts they would accept a U.N. peacekeeping force as the U.S. troop presence recedes. Insurgent representative Abu Mohammed says the nationalists would even tolerate U.S. bases on Iraqi soil. "We don’t mind if the invader becomes a guest," he says, suggesting a situation akin to the U.S. military presence in Germany and Japan. LOL! You'll get nothing and like it. |
| Posted by: 2b 2005-02-21 2:54:54 AM |
| #3 The very fact that they run to TIME magazine shows they can't be trusted. |
| Posted by: 2b 2005-02-21 2:50:07 AM |
| #2 Sinn Fein succeeded at the ballot box long before the current NI peace process. |
| Posted by: phil_b 2005-02-21 2:42:36 AM |
| #1 Article: Although they have no immediate plans to halt attacks on U.S. troops, they say their aim is to establish a political identity that can represent disenfranchised Sunnis and eventually negotiate an end to the U.S. military’s offensive in the Sunni triangle. Their model is Sinn Fein, the political wing of the Irish Republican Army, which ultimately earned the I.R.A. a role in the Northern Ireland peace process. "That’s what we’re working for, to have a political face appear from the battlefield, to unify the groups, to resist the aggressor and put our views to the people," says a battle commander in the upper tiers of the insurgency who asked to be identified by his nom de guerre, Abu Marwan. Another negotiator, called Abu Mohammed, told TIME, "Despite what has happened, the possibility for negotiation is still open." IRA-style negotiations work when you're doing IRA-style attacks. IRA-style negotiations in conjunction with mass casualty attacks? These guys are dreaming, and soon they'll be resting - in freshly-dug graves. |
| Posted by: Zhang Fei 2005-02-21 2:34:51 AM |