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| Debate over how much of CIA review to publish |
| 2005-08-27 |
| With a report this week apportioning blame at the C.I.A. for intelligence failures before the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, the fight over who did what before the hijackers struck is increasingly about history. Most of the central figures faulted in the C.I.A. inspector general's report, notably George J. Tenet, the former director, retired last year. In response to previous reports on the 2001 attacks, the Central Intelligence Agency has been subordinated to a new director of national intelligence in the biggest reorganization of spy agencies since the C.I.A.'s creation in 1947. "At this point, it's really about reputations," said Gregory F. Treverton, a former vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council and now a senior analyst at the RAND Corporation. Yet leaders of the families of those who died in the attacks repeated their demand for individual accountability, which is what prompted Congress to ask John L. Helgerson, the C.I.A. inspector general, to begin his investigation nearly three years ago. On Thursday, the September 11 Advocates group demanded the immediate declassification and release of Mr. Helgerson's report, whose harsh conclusions have been disclosed only in limited leaks. "To shield C.I.A. officials from accountability and to continue to cover up deficiencies in that agency puts the safety of our nation at risk," the group said in a statement. "Four years post-9/11 this is truly unacceptable." Far from being punished for his agency's failure to prevent the attacks, Mr. Tenet was given the Presidential Medal of Freedom by President Bush in December, eight months before the inspector general's assessment of his record went to Capitol Hill. "I'd like to see public accountability hearings, and I'd like to see him return the Medal of Freedom," said Kristen Breitweiser, whose husband died at the World Trade Center and who is an organizer of September 11 Advocates. Ms. Breitweiser said her study of the government's conduct persuaded her that Mr. Tenet showed "reckless and abysmal judgment" before the attacks. On the other side, Mr. Tenet and some of his colleagues have been fighting for months behind the scenes to soften the report's tough judgments, which they consider unfair, distorted and uninformed. His supporters will not speak for the record because the report remains classified, but they point to a finding of the national 9/11 commission last year: "Before 9/11, no agency had more responsibility - or did more - to attack Al Qaeda, working day and night, than the C.I.A." Mr. Tenet has written a lengthy response to Mr. Helgerson's report. That response, which has not been made public, may take on more importance now that he has abandoned a plan to publish a memoir. Mr. Tenet had negotiated to sell a book on his C.I.A. experiences for a reported $4.5 million, but he decided early this year not to sign the contract. A close associate said on Friday that Mr. Tenet might still write a book but was not working on one at present. Mr. Tenet's supporters say the inspector general report is seriously flawed because his investigators never talked to policy makers to get their views on the C.I.A.'s performance. Even some key people inside the agency were not interviewed, they say, including Charles E. Allen, whose title in 2001 was assistant director of central intelligence for collection. In 1998, after Al Qaeda's bombing of two American embassies in East Africa, it was Mr. Allen whom Mr. Tenet assigned to organize the agency's efforts against the terrorist network, according to testimony Mr. Tenet gave last year. He said that at the advice of Mr. Allen, he created a special unit with officers from the C.I.A., the eavesdropping National Security Agency and the satellite photo agency to meet daily and focus on Al Qaeda's leaders and headquarters in Afghanistan. Officials who have seen the report or been briefed on it said Thursday that it faulted Mr. Tenet as failing to develop a strategic plan against Al Qaeda and carry it out. His backers are asking how the inspector general could reach such a conclusion without interviewing the top aide responsible for such a plan. Mr. Helgerson and his assistants said through the C.I.A. public affairs office that they would not respond to criticisms of the report. Frederick P. Hitz, who served as the agency's inspector general from 1990 to 1998, said that, while he had not seen the report, he thought it was important to have a full accounting of individual responsibility for any failures. "My only regret is that it's taken so long," Mr. Hitz said. "It's a long time to keep those people who are being subjected to criticism in limbo." Mr. Hitz noted that his report on how the agency failed to detect the treachery of Aldrich H. Ames, the C.I.A. officer who sold the agency's secrets to the Soviet Union, was completed in October 1994, just eight months after Mr. Ames was arrested. To criticize Mr. Tenet and others now for failures that occurred four, five or six years ago may seem unfair but is still necessary, Mr. Hitz said. "It's an impossible situation," he said. "But what they ought to do is declassify the report, release it and let the chips fall where they may." Mr. Treverton, the former National Intelligence Council official, said he thought it would be pointless now to punish Mr. Tenet and other retired and still-serving officials, saying, "It wasn't malfeasance, after all." But he, too, said the report should be declassified and made public. "The more we get out, the more we'll understand about what really happened," Mr. Treverton said. |
| Posted by:Dan Darling |
| #1 Intelligence is a messy business. My end, the imagery part of it, was usually pretty cut and dried: the enemy was either visible at some place, and in such and such a strength, or he wasn't. It wasn't always easy finding him, but we did more often than not. Human Intelligence was much more tricky. You never knew whether someone was giving you good information, or feeding you disinformation. Even electronic intelligence intercepts could be phony, and more than a few times, were deliberately used to create confusion: RE, the phantom armies in England prior to D-Day. The biggest problem with intelligence is that some people won't believe it, no matter how much confidence the rest of the community puts into it. There are a LOT of bureaucrats in the CIA, as with any other political organization. Their main objective in life is to go as high as they can, and retire. In order to do that, they don't EVER make waves. If something's too controversial, or isn't quite what they expect, they have a habit of "losing" it, or applying pressure to have the reports changed to something less controversial. I've personally experienced this not once, but dozens of times. The old "CYA" attitude has destroyed more good intelligence than any other single factor. The CIA needs a good housecleaning, and the deadwood dropped overboard. That will ONLY happen if someone imposes it from without. No internal activity will work. That goes twice for the NSA and NPIC/NISC/NIMC. |
| Posted by: Old Patriot 2005-08-28 00:03 |