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| Terror Networks & Islam |
| The politics of jihad |
| 2005-10-24 |
| Experts and intelligence observers differ on the likely authenticity of a letter published by U.S. intelligence, which they say was written by al-Qaida's Number Two and chief ideologue, Ayman al-Zawahiri, to the group's leader in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Some seem sure it is a fake, despite the high confidence that U.S. officials say they have in it. Others are equally convinced it is genuine. Most remain agnostic, even if leaning one way or the other. But one thing they are all agreed on is that -- if real -- the document offers some amazing and unique insights into the private world of the man who has been the political and ideological driving force behind al-Qaida since it was founded. That ideological certitude is manifest at numerous points in the manuscript. "The strongest weapon which the mujahedin enjoy -- after the help and granting of success by God -- is popular support from the Muslim masses," the letter reads. But those masses "for many reasons -- and this is not the place to discuss (them) -- do not rally except against an outside occupying enemy, especially if the enemy is firstly Jewish, and secondly American," which accounts, in the author's view, "for the popular support the mujahedin enjoy in Iraq." And this bond with the masses must develop once the Americans are expelled, he argues -- going as far as advocating participation in elections. Al-Qaida in Iraq should seek to share power with other Islamic forces, the letter says, advocating "an appeasement of Muslims and a sharing with them in governance" and the making of laws. The power-sharing forum would be an Islamic council known as a Shura, which should be "elected by the people of the country to represent them and overlook the work of the authorities in accordance with the rules of the glorious Sharia." The author goes on to argue that losing its bond with the masses is the worst thing the mujahedin have to fear from "the secular, apostate forces that are controlling our countries." "These forces... are stealthily striving to separate (the mujahedin) from the misguided or frightened Muslim masses." To counter this, he concludes, "Our planning must strive to involve the Muslim masses in the battle." This strategic calculation is at the heart of the author's widely noted critiques of beheading hostages when "we can kill the captives by bullet," and of what he calls "attacks on ordinary Shiites." Shiism, he writes "is a religious school based on excess and falsehood," and confrontation with them "will happen sooner or later. This is the judgment of history." But in the meantime, he cautions, "The majority of Muslims don't comprehend this and possibly could not even imagine it." As a consequence, "Many of your Muslim admirers amongst the common folk are wondering about your attacks on the Shiites." Likewise, he writes of the video-taped beheadings that have become Zarqawi's gory trademark, "the feelings of the Muslim populace who love and support you will never find (this) palatable." Although the author is clearly taking issue with Zarqawi on a number of fronts, he is careful to repeatedly demonstrate his humility. "In my view," he writes, "which I continue to reiterate is limited and has a distant perspective upon the events..." He also asks again and again for news of the insurgency -- an eerie echo of the letters sent a century ago by exiled Bolsheviks to their party comrades back in Russia. But in the era of the global electronic news media, the author's pleas for news have been interpreted as a sign that he is cut off from communication with the outside world. "We sense Zawahiri's isolation," wrote Washington Post columnist David Ignatius. "He can't see television or read newspapers easily. He complains frequently of being out of touch." Ben Venzke, a terrorism analyst whose firm Intel Center consults for U.S. agencies, cautions against reading too much into the author's constant requests for news. "What he's looking for is more direct reporting from the ground. More detail," he told United Press International. Venzke says the letter needs to be seen alongside Zawahiri's other recent communications, including video and audio tapes. All-in-all, "based on his awareness of current events, It is unlikely that he is completely cut off from the news media," he said, adding that -- in addition to wanting more detail -- Zawahiri "clearly doesn't trust the news sources he has access to." That's not all he doesn't trust. "Please take every caution in... meetings," he writes, "especially when someone claims to carry an important letter or contributions. It was in this way that they arrested (al-Qaida number three) Khalid Sheikh (Mohammed)." KSM, as he is known, was seized by U.S. and Pakistani forces at a safe house in Rawalpindi on March 1, 2003 and has been in CIA custody at an undisclosed location ever since. The author also cautions Zarqawi about meeting aides "in a public place or in a place that is not known to you." It was in this way, he says, that that Abu al-Faraj al-Libi -- "May God set him free and release him from his torment" -- was caught, "lured by one of his brothers, who had been taken into custody, to meet him at a public location where a trap had been set." At other points, he complains that of 21 audiotape messages he sent out through "the brothers" only 15 were broadcast "for one reason or another. "We ask God for acceptance and devotion," he concludes. He also bemoans the fate of his very own "Mein Kampf" -- the autobiographical "A Knight Under the Prophet's Banner." The author says he gave a copy of the manuscript to a fellow jihadi and then lost the original. "Al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper published it truncated and jumbled," he grumbles, surmising that the paper was provided with the text from his laptop computer by U.S. intelligence because the serialization "coincided with a publication of messages from my computer in the same newspaper." Finally there is the matter of money. "Our situation ... is good by the grace of God," the author writes, "But many of the lines have been cut off. Because of this, we need a payment while new lines are being opened. So, if you're capable of sending a payment of approximately one hundred thousand, we'll be very grateful to you." Some observers have counted this among the signs of weakness that they say the author shows -- so uncharacteristic of Zawahiri. But Venzke again cautions against reading too much into this passage pointing out that it that it is prefaced, "The brothers informed me that you suggested to them sending some assistance" -- suggesting that it was Zarqawi who offered his support, rather than Zawahiri who is requesting it. "This is not a desperate plea," he said. "It's more like a request for some bridging finance." |
| Posted by:Dan Darling |
| #1 sooo, it's fake but accurate. |
| Posted by: 2b 2005-10-24 13:47 |