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| Terror Networks & Islam |
| Zarqawi's strategy exposes a divide among jihadis |
| 2005-11-15 |
| Abu Musab al-Zarqawiâs terrorist network in Iraq attacks a broad range of targets, but his assault on the Shiite community has been particularly focused and devastating. Although Zarqawi swore an oath of allegiance to Osama bin Laden in October 2004, his targeting of Shiite civilians contradicts the strategy of al-Qaedaâs original leadership. A letter from al-Qaedaâs putative second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, dated June 2005 and released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence earlier this month, questions the political wisdom of terrorizing the Shiite community. But although Zawahiriâs objection received the most media attention, Zarqawiâs tactics had already garnered criticism and sparked a debate within jihadist circles. Zarqawiâs insistence on targeting Muslim civilians has created a divide within the Sunni resistance movement and may be alienating his public support base. Groups linked to al-Qaeda continue to target Shiites in isolated attacks, but since the early 1990s, bin Laden has urged tactical and logistical cooperation among like-minded Shiite and Sunni groups. Iran and Hizballah have frequently assisted al-Qaeda operatives. Hezbollah and al-Qaeda have overlapping contacts in South America, Africa, and the Middle East, and have cooperated in fundraising and training. Iran has provided financial support to al-Qaeda operatives, facilitated the travel of several of the September 11 hijackers, provided safe haven to al-Qaeda operatives including bin Ladenâs son Saad, and may have assisted in the 1996 bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. Despite his anti-Shiite rhetoric and terror campaign, Zarqawi has also availed himself of Iranian support. He has traveled through Iran essentially unmolested; key leaders of his group sought refuge in Iran during the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003; and senior military and intelligence officials in the United States and Britain believe that Iran provides explosives and other support for Zarqawiâs terrorist network. On September 14, Zarqawi issued an audiotape declaring âtotal warâ on the Shiite population in Iraq, announcing ex post facto a strategy he began to enact more than a year earlier. His letter to the al-Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan, published by the State Department in February 2004, already articulated his intention to attack Shiites with the aim of igniting a sectarian conflict. Zarqawi was certain the United States would withdraw quickly from Iraq, but wrote that Shiite militia members already dominated the new Iraqi army, putting his group on the defensive. The situation was dire enough in Zarqawiâs analysis that he was willing to risk a strategic break with bin Laden and Zawahiri. He wrote, âIf you agree with us on [targeting Shiites] . . .we will be your readied soldiers. . . . If things appear otherwise to you, we are brothers, and the disagreement will not spoil our friendship.â In December 2004, bin Laden issued an audio statement recognizing Zarqawi as a key al-Qaeda leader. One of the most brutal attacks on the Shiite community in Iraq followed closely on the publication of Zarqawiâs February 2004 letter. On March 2, 2004, Zarqawiâs group staged a series of bomb attacks on Shiites celebrating the Ashura holiday, killing at least 185 people. Since then, Zarqawiâs group has perpetrated a campaign of assassinations, kidnappings, and bomb attacks against Shiite civilians, including a suicide bomb attack on a Shiite mosque this July that killed ninety-eight people, and a suicide truck bomb attack targeting Shiite workers this August that killed more than one hundred. Though Zarqawi justifies targeting Shiite civilians on religious grounds, arguing that they are âapostates,â politics, rather than religion, motivates his assault on the Shiite community. He posted his September 14 declaration of war soon after the September counterterrorist raids on Tal Afar, in which five thousand Iraqi troops from the New Iraqi Armyâs Third Division killed 156 terrorists and captured 246 others. It is almost impossible to obtain accurate information about the ethnic and religious composition of Iraqâs army; however, Iraqâs Shiite majority and the terroristsâ efforts to discourage Sunni enlistment mean that Shiite soldiers almost certainly led the Tal Afar offensive. To Zarqawi, the raids must have confirmed his suspicion, articulated in his 2004 letter, that the Shiites had seized the strategic initiative and now dominated the âsecurity situationâ in Iraq. This helps explain why he broadened his groupâs mandate from attacking Shiites involved in direct assistance to the U.S. occupation, to targeting Shiites generally in a âtotalâ conflict. In an October 6, 2005, speech to the National Endowment for Democracy, President George W. Bush said, âWith every random bombing and with every funeral of a child, it becomes more clear that the extremists are not patriots or resistance fightersâthey are murderers at war with the Iraqi people.â Interestingly, Sunni clerics who support the resistance have begun to criticize Zarqawiâs tactics on similar grounds. Zarqawiâs Jordanian mentor, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, first questioned Zarqawiâs targeting of Shiite civilians in a statement posted on his website (www.almaqdese.com) in July 2004, and again in media interviews in July 2005. Maqdisi criticized Zarqawi on religious and political grounds. First, Maqdisi rejected Zarqawiâs classification of Shiites as nonbelievers, telling the satellite network Al-Jazeera that he did not consider ordinary Shiites as non-Muslims, and therefore it was âforbidden to equate the ordinary Shiite with the American in warfare.â Maqdisi then argued that attacking civilians and places of worship tarnished the reputation of the resistance. Zawahiriâs letter expressed the same concern that such tactics would alienate supporters, writing to Zarqawi that attacking Shiite civilians âwill not be acceptable to the Muslim populace however much you have tried to explain it.â After Zarqawiâs September declaration of war on the Shiite community, other proresistance Sunni groups condemned his tactics. One representative of an Iraqi Salafist group, Sheikh Zakariyah Mohammad Isa al-Tamimi of the Higher Committee for Dawa, Guidance, and Fatwa, noted that Zarqawi lacked the religious qualifications to interpret Islamic law. However, like Zawahiri, most critics question Zarqawiâs approach from a political, rather than a religious, standpoint. In Iraq, the Association of Muslim Scholars and several insurgent groups, including the Islamic Army in Iraq, issued public statements rejecting the targeting of Shiites because the attacks âdamage the image of the jihad [and] jeopardize the success of the . . . resistance.â Critics from abroad include the mufti of Saudi Arabia, who said in a statement published by Al-Hayyat that the effort to ignite a sectarian conflict in Iraq âfulfills the goals of the enemies who plot against Muslims.â The general public in the Middle East may share the Sunni clericsâ reservations. A spring 2005 poll taken by the Pew Global Attitudes Project 5 showed that support for suicide bombings had dropped precipitously in key Muslim countries, including Lebanon, Turkey, and Morocco. Pew conducted the poll in May 2005, prior to the summerâs intense suicide bombing campaign in Iraq, which suggests that support for suicide bombings against civilians may now be even lower. Zarqawiâs communiqués in response to criticism indicate that he will not change his tactics. But as the Bush administration revamps its public diplomacy efforts in the Middle East, this divide in the proresistance Sunni community provides an opportunity to emphasize the common interest in limiting terrorism. Bush has made the point before that Muslims suffer the most from terrorism in the Middle East, but ongoing debate in jihadist circles and evidence of waning public support for suicide attacks suggest that the point may finally be taking root with the target audience. |
| Posted by:Dan Darling |
| #1 The Sunni nightmare is for a Shia theocratic Iran, working with Shia theocratic Iraq to take over the Shia section of Saudi Arabia. Oil money and high populations compared to Saudi Arabias sand and insanity. No wonder Bin Laden doesn't like the plan that Zarqawi is slowly bringing about. |
| Posted by: rjschwarz 2005-11-15 13:37 |