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| Arabia |
| Insurgency in Waiting |
| 2005-11-15 |
| Iraq may be the jihad Superbowl, but Saudi Arabia is still al Qaedaâs top prize. Watch closely, because the quiet in the kingdom today may be the calm before the storm. With all eyes on Iraqâs bloody insurgency and last weekâs hotel bombings in Amman, Jordan, itâs easy to forget that al Qaedaâs ultimate goal is to snatch the reins of power from the House of Saud. Osama bin Ladenâs top lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has argued that the militant Islamic movement cannot win without a base at the heart of the Arab Middle East. And though Iraq or Egypt might fit the bill, neither can claim to be the worldâs top oil producer or the site of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Al Qaeda went underground after bombing a Saudi National Guard compound in 1995, killing five Americans. But in May 2003, it reopened the Saudi front by bombing foreign housing compounds in Riyadh, killing 35. Emboldened by that attack, the insurgents launched audacious assaults on petrochemical sites and even the Riyadh headquarters of the Saudi security forces. In the last two years, approximately 140 people have died in battles between security forces and insurgents. Riyadh spends billions on defense and internal security forces every year, but it may not have what it takes to defeat a determined insurgency. Al Qaedaâs kinship with the Wahhabi religious establishment makes it popular within the kingdom and provides fertile ground for recruitment and operations. The Wahhabis also have a longstanding relationship with the royal family, through which they accept oil largesse in exchange for providing political and religious legitimacy to the regime. The Saudi government would like to see the lull in insurgent activity in 2005 as evidence that they have a firm handle on matters. Unfortunately, the recent quiet may be the calm before the storm. When bin Laden called in December 2004 for a new phase in his campaign to oust the regime in Saudi Arabia, he urged his followers to mount a revolution in the kingdom. But he also told them not to miss a âgolden and unique opportunityâ to kill Americans in Iraq. Today, many young Saudi men are too busy with endeavors in Iraq to make trouble back home. But those who survive will eventually come home trained and battle-hardened. While the al Qaeda insurgency in Saudi Arabia is likely to grow, the reliability of Saudi internal security is in doubt. Anecdotal evidence suggests that al Qaeda already has a strong presence within the Saudi security forces. An al Qaeda computer recovered during the 2001 U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan contained classified Saudi government documents apparently stolen by al Qaeda sympathizers within the government, according to Michael Scheuer, a former chief of the CIAâs bin Laden unit. The May 2003 bombings of residential compounds in Riyadh required insider knowledge that was almost certainly provided by the Saudi security detail at the compound, according to Saudi Arabia expert John Bradley. In a November 2003 attack on another Riyadh housing compound, the terrorists were dressed in police uniforms. In June 2004, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula announced that elements in the Saudi police provided official uniforms and police vehicles to the group that carried out the execution of the American worker Paul Johnson, and set up false roadblocks as well. There is also precedent for mutiny in the ranks. In 1979, troops from the Saudi National Guard took part in an extremist uprising. Unfortunately for Riyadh, vetting the security forces is extremely difficult because militant ideology has deep roots in Saudi society, especially in the lower socioeconomic rungs of society that provide most personnel for the kingdomâs fighting forces. Coming Home to Roost The problem will only get worse as Saudi insurgents begin returning from Iraq, ready to employ their on-the-job training. Saudi nationals comprise a large percentage of the foreign insurgents in Iraq, and are heavily represented in lists of suicide bombers posted on extremist Web sites. It doesnât help that much of the Saudi religious establishment advocates jihad in Iraq. Last year, 26 Saudi imams signed a statement urging Muslims to join the insurgency against U.S. forces in Iraq. In the 1980s, the Saudi government generally knew which Saudis were fighting in Afghanistan and who the trouble makers might be. This time, it doesnât. Tackling this entrenched problem will require political skill, grit, and determination. So far, itâs not clear that the aging and conservative Saudi leadership is up to the task. King Abdullah, touted by many as a reformer, is 82 years old and unlikely to implement significant political reforms or challenge the Saudi religious establishment any more than his predecessor, King Fahd, did. Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef declared in 2002 that there were no al Qaeda cells in Saudi Arabia and repeated the allegation that Israel was behind the 9/11 attacks. Coming from the head of Saudi internal security, these comments suggest that the keen analysis necessary to an effective counterinsurgency campaign may be lacking. Some Saudi watchers suspect that Riyadh may have even paid al Qaeda to keep the insurgency outside of the kingdom. There is hope that younger princes more clearly see the dangers posed by al Qaeda and militant Islamist ideology. In the summer of 2004, the Saudi ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, wrote an unusual article in the Saudi government newspaper Al Watan, in which he called for Saudi public support for a jihad against al Qaeda in the kingdom and warned against hesitation. Hoping that terrorists will âcome to their senses,â he wrote, is a recipe for defeat. Riyadh needs to dedicate more resources to collecting and analyzing intelligence to target al Qaeda cells inside the kingdom. They also have to skillfully delegitimize the militant Islamist ideology in Saudi society and reign in the religious establishment that stokes it. The danger for the Saudi regime is that bold efforts on these fronts could spark a popular backlash by the many Saudi citizens who feel alienated by the regimeâs reputation for corruption and isolation. It is uncertain how many younger princes share Bandarâs assessment or even how much influence they could have in shaping the regimeâs counterinsurgency campaign. Itâs not even certain that Bandar himself will have much influence in his role as secretary-general of the newly created National Security Council. Many apparently grand political moves in Saudi Arabiaâsuch as counterterrorism conferences and municipal electionsâhave been more show than substance. Given a choice, the aging Saudi leadership is more likely to opt for a conciliatory approach to al Qaeda and the path of hesitation that Bandar fears. In Iraq, U.S. commanders are rightly doing everything in their power to defeat the insurgents. If they succeed, and an Iraqi government can handle security on its own, Washingtonâs list of headaches wonât necessarily be any smaller. The insurgency may simply move south. Richard L. Russell teaches at the National Defense Universityâs Near East and South Asia Center for Strategic Studies and is the author of Weapons Proliferation and War in the Greater Middle East: Strategic Contest (New York: Frank Cass, 2005). |
| Posted by:Steve |
| #1 Hopefully, some of the saner princes will spend the resources to compile a thorough list of the troublemakers, and create a small army of very loyal personnel. Then, if they try something, to have a grand "night of the long knives", in which a few thousand of the troublemakers meet an untimely end. |
| Posted by: Anonymoose 2005-11-15 19:16 |