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Arabia
Al-Qaida’s Committee in Saudi Arabia: 2002-2003
2005-12-03
pdf from Evan Kohlman with interesting bio data on Saudis Yousef Al-Ayyiri, Turki Nasser Al-Dandani, Nasser Bin Hamid Al-Fahad, Ali Abdelrahman Al-Faqasi Al-Ghamdi, and Abdelaziz Al-Muqrin
The sudden shift in behavior by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula following September 11, 2001 is primarily attributable to the subsequent defeat of Al-Qaida and Taliban forces at the Tora Bora mountain redoubt three months later. In December 2001, Afghan mujahideen forces with limited U.S. support engaged large groups of Al-Qaida fighters in a cave complex called Tora Bora in southeastern Afghanistan near the Pakistani border.

According to the former Al-Qaida press agency Azzam Publications, “The Tora Bora mountain range comprises of low foothills and lofty mountains. It was expected for the Americans to land at the lower foothills first. Therefore, the Commander of the Mujahideen gave the order for new and relatively inexperienced brothers to go to the higher mountains, leaving the experienced fighters at the bottom.” The strategy proved ineffective as a result of smothering U.S. tactical airstrikes: “there was no difference between the night and the day: the sky was raining fire and the Earth was erupting volcanoes.” Abortive attempts at regrouping and retreating caused the deaths of possibly hundreds of fleeing Al Qaida fighters caught underneath a hail of cluster bombs. As a result of the defeats at Tora Bora and three months later at Shah-i-Kot, “almost all remaining al Qaeda forces” fled across the border with Pakistan seeking refuge in the remote, mountainous, and “lightly governed” frontier provinces.
At the time, the bad guyz were claiming Shah-i-Kot as a victory, and the MSM did their best to buy into it.
Previously, when confronted with forced withdrawals from various global conflict zones, Arab-Afghan commanders had attempted to profit from the “exfiltration” of veteran mujahideen fighters by arranging for them “to be useful again in spreading the Jihad across other lands.” Likewise, between 2002 and 2003, an elite group of distinguished, mid-level Saudi Al-Qaida commanders abandoned their posts in the Afghan mountains and quietly returned to the Arabian Peninsula. Afterwards, an online Al-Qaida publication printed by senior Saudi Al-Qaida members would explain, “in its war with America, the Al-Qaida network adopted a strategy of expanding the battlefield
 This strategy has priceless advantages; the enemy who had only his own country to defend realizes that he now must defend his enormous interests in every country.
Posted by:Glitle Thunter1013

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