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Syria-Lebanon-Iran
Damascus Plays Dodgeball
2005-12-09
A gunbattle erupted Dec. 8 in the town of Maaret al-Nouman in Edleb province north of Damascus, Syrian state news agency SANA reported. Eight Sunni militants were reportedly killed in the clashes, three of whom killed themselves with explosive belts. While Syrian security forces were battling militants, Syrian officials attending the summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference discussed with fellow Arab and Muslim leaders how to resume peace negotiations with Israel that crumbled in 2000.

These efforts constitute part of the bulwark of military and diplomatic maneuvers Damascus is using to counter the wave of allegations of Syrian involvement in the Feb. 14 killing of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri. Adding urgency to Damascus' efforts is the Dec. 15 deadline for lead U.N. investigator Detlev Mehlis to release a follow-up report on al-Hariri's assassination. Damascus might find its efforts complicated, however, by the actions of Hezbollah and of Sunni militants operating out of Lebanon.

Reports of Syrian security forces clashing with Islamist militants are nothing out of the ordinary. Since April, SANA has reported 10 alleged firefights between security forces and militants across Syria. Most of the reports fail to specify who these mystery militants are, and what faction they belong to, though they have referred several times to the obscure radical Islamist group Jund al-Sham. Jund al-Sham has portrayed itself as a jihadist group, but we have called its legitimacy into question based on several dubious claims by the organization.

The inclusion of one key detail made the Dec. 8 report particularly intriguing -- namely, that a cache of explosive belts was uncovered when security forces launched a raid against the group, and that three of the militants blew themselves up using such belts during the firefight. Though no name was given to the alleged Sunni Muslim extremist group, the mention of suicide belts indicates the militants belong to the jihadist strand of militant Islam.

Syria has a strategic interest in making itself appear as victim of jihadist activity. Though the Mehlis investigation has pretty much fizzled out, and though Syria has held its ground against the U.S.-led campaign to isolate Damascus, Washington continues to demand that Syria play a more active role in stemming the flow of militant traffic into Iraq -- a flow that has continued to fuel the insurgency. Just as the battle against "terrorists" at Mount Qassioun in July was staged by the Syrian Republican Guard, the latest reports of clashes represent the same intent to demonstrate Syria's vulnerability to terrorism, thus countering allegations that Damascus would sponsor foreign militants.

The latest report also raises the question of the identity of the militants that the Syrian security forces are going after. We see three possible culprits.

1. Opponents of the Alawite-Baathist regime that the Syrian Republican Guard has decided to target and label as "terrorists." These are indigenous radical dissenters who are not actively taking up arms against the regime.

2. Affiliates of al Qaeda in Iraq chief Abu Musab al-Zarqawi who have used Syria as a staging ground for infiltrating Iraq. These are militants to whom Damascus has largely turned a blind eye as a part of the Syrian regime's tacit support for the Iraqi resistance.

3. An al Qaeda node trying to establish itself in Syria. This is the theory Damascus wishes to promote to deflect pressure from the regime.

Though the Dec. 8 report likely embellishes what actually took place, sources have indicated that several small radical Sunni Islamist groups are operating in the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp near Sidon and in Sunni areas of Lebanon. The unconfirmed report maintains that an al Qaeda node has set up a special command unit in several Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, such as Burj al-Barajinah in the south, Biddawi near Tripoli and Mar Elias in Beirut, and military training takes place in Ain al-Hilweh. Should this fledgling Sunni militant movement decide to target the Alawite-Baathist regime indirectly in Lebanon and directly in Syria, a major military crackdown ordered by the Syrian regime should come as no surprise. The increasing number of reported clashes with militants may constitute a means for the Syrian regime to legitimize an imminent clampdown, and to help bring Washington to the negotiating table.

Syria's concerns may not end there. In neighboring Lebanon, Shiite militant Islamist group Hezbollah may complicate Syria's efforts to reduce external pressure. The recent flare-ups between Israel's armed forces and Hezbollah along the southern Lebanese border were Hezbollah's way of raising its profile and reminding its constituency of the movement's military prowess. An intense debate is taking place within Hezbollah as to how to maintain the group's image as a resistance movement while becoming a more legitimate part of the Lebanese government now that Syria's protective umbrella is gone. Though Damascus has retained a tactical relationship with Hezbollah, it has an interest in ensuring that the militant group refrains from provoking a major conflagration with Israel, especially at a time when Syrian President Bashar al Assad is attempting once again to restart negotiations with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.

For his part, Sharon is far from interested in talking to the Syrians now. While Israel is not about to write off the Syrian military threat, it views Syria as a problematic neighbor that could be whipped into shape with relative ease through a conventional military operation, should the need arise. Sharon would like to resolve the dispute over the Golan Heights, but would first like to beat the Syrians militarily one last time to create the ideal (from the Israeli perspective) political atmosphere for final negotiations over the territory. Al Assad is unlikely to do Israel the favor of provoking the Jewish state into launching a swift conventional war against Syria, a move that would galvanize Israel's right wing and would cripple Damascus' negotiating position. Hezbollah's handlers in Tehran will thus help restrain the militant group to prevent this scenario from becoming a nightmarish reality for Syria.
Posted by:Steve

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