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| Iraq |
| The view from the inside of Saddam's regime |
| 2006-03-15 |
| EDITOR'S NOTE: The fall of Baghdad in April 2003 opened one of the most secretive and brutal governments in history to outside scrutiny. For the first time since the end of World War II, American analysts did not have to guess what had happened on the other side of a conflict but could actually read the defeated enemy's documents and interrogate its leading figures. To make the most of this unique opportunity, the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) commissioned a comprehensive study of the inner workings and behavior of Saddam Hussein's regime based on previously inaccessible primary sources. Drawing on interviews with dozens of captured senior Iraqi military and political leaders and hundreds of thousands of official Iraqi documents (hundreds of them fully translated), this two-year project has changed our understanding of the war from the ground up. The study was partially declassified in late February; its key findings are presented here. THROUGHOUT THE YEARS of relative external peace for Iraq after Operation Desert Storm, in 1991, Saddam Hussein continued to receive and give credence to optimistic assessments of his regime's prospects dished up by his top military officers. Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz described the dictator as having been "very confident" that the United States would not dare to attack Iraq, and that if it did, it would be defeated. What was the source of Saddam's confidence? Judging from his private statements, the single most important element in Saddam's strategic calculus was his faith that France and Russia would prevent an invasion by the United States. According to Aziz, Saddam's confidence was firmly rooted in his belief in the nexus between the economic interests of France and Russia and his own strategic goals: "France and Russia each secured millions of dollars worth of trade and service contracts in Iraq, with the implied understanding that their political posture with regard to sanctions on Iraq would be pro-Iraqi. In addition, the French wanted sanctions lifted to safeguard their trade and service contracts in Iraq. Moreover, they wanted to prove their importance in the world as members of the Security Council -- that they could use their veto to show they still had power." Ibrahim Ahmad Abd al-Sattar, the Iraqi army and armed forces chief of staff, claimed that Saddam believed that even if his international supporters failed him and the United States did launch a ground invasion, Washington would rapidly bow to international pressure to halt the war. According to his personal interpreter, Saddam also thought his "superior" forces would put up "a heroic resistance and . . . inflict such enormous losses on the Americans that they would stop their advance." Saddam remained convinced that, in his own words, "Iraq will not, in any way, be like Afghanistan. We will not let the war become a picnic for the American or the British soldiers. No way!" |
| Posted by:Dan Darling |
| #6 Which apparently started right before the Gulf War (to build "Arab solidarity"). |
| Posted by: Whumble Whater5278 2006-03-15 21:42 |
| #5 In reference to your Excellency's instructions regarding the large exercises at the Public Center, having strong faith in the only God of our hearts, and God's permanent support to the believers, the faithful, the steadfast, and with great love that we have for our great homeland and our Great Leader, our Great Leader has won God's favor and the love of his dear people in the day of the grand homage. Your enthusiastic soldiers from our courageous armed forces have executed Golden Falcon Exercise number 11. In this exercise we have tested our readiness and confrontation plans against any who attempt to make impure the lands of civilization and the homeland of missions and prophets. This exercise is the widest and most successful in achieving the required results. Soldiers from the III and IV Corps have participated in this exercise. Certainly a hell of a lot of god-bothering in that considering we're constantly told how secular Saddam was. |
| Posted by: Robert Crawford 2006-03-15 15:21 |
| #4 Actually, trailing wife, it "only" gives a military-oriented look at the state of Iraq in the Gulf Wars, with what seems to be a command/control emphasis. This doesn't seem to make the case for war so much as report the juicy bits from the declassified portions of a USJFCOM study based on interviews with former-regime officials. I wouldn't use this as the case for war, or for it even being productive, but as a military study... Here's wondering if more of the USJFCOM report will be declassified. Gletch, I noticed the "rule" of twos as well. Incidentally, today I was reading about (post-Perry's-1853-Japan-expedition) Tokugawa Nariaki's belief in Japanese spirit as a victory factor in advocating war with the foreigners... why's that suddenly sound familiar? ;-) |
| Posted by: Edward Yee 2006-03-15 15:08 |
| #3 From Foreign Affairs. So this will be read by those who, up till now, did not believe the invasion was necessary, and was even counterproductive. Good. |
| Posted by: trailing wife 2006-03-15 14:45 |
| #2 The only possible (And sensible) way to follow those orders is to never engage the enemy. |
| Posted by: Redneck Jim 2006-03-15 14:15 |
| #1 I hesitate to use the word, but this is absolutely fascinating reading. Gotta back up, digest, and re-read it. This bit certainly jumped right out: "Any section commander will be executed, if his section is defeated; any platoon commander will be executed, if two of his sections are defeated; any company commander will be executed, if two of his platoons are defeated; any regiment commander will be executed, if two of his companies are defeated; any area commander will be executed, if his Governate is defeated; any Saddam Fedayeen fighter, including commanders, will be executed, if he hesitates in completing his duties, cooperates with the enemy, gives up his weapons, or hides any information concerning the security of the state." Typical back-asswards Arab / Soviet / Third World thinking: motivate by fear. |
| Posted by: Glert Thetch2165 2006-03-15 10:05 |