Does the U.S. Science-Based stockpile Stewardship Program Pose a Proliferation Threat?
Paine and McKinzie
http://www.princeton.edu/~globsec/publications/pdf/7_2Paine.pdf
Past state decisions to share weapons information (shown graphically in Figure 1) have served to influence the current international system. By and large, the rationale for these acts had been the strengthening of an ally. But alliances change: Moscow, for example, grew to regret its early nuclear weapons assistance to Beijing.
Figure 1: Venn diagram displaying the historical sharing of nuclear weapons knowledge
among declared nuclear weapon states (solid circles), undeclared nuclear weapon states
(dashed circles), and South Africa, a former undeclared nuclear weapon state. The num-
ber of explosive nuclear tests performed is given in parentheses. Area of overlap is not
strictly proportional to the degree of knowledge sharing, as this is difficult to quantify. The
Russia-U.S. overlap reflects the recent purchase by the U.S. Defense Special Weapons
Agency (via a detailed neotiated contract) of a large amount of data concerning the
former Soviet test program. Transfer of information from nuclear weapon states to non-
nuclear weapon states that would assist the latter "in any way' to acquire nuclear explo-
sive devices is prohibited under Articles I and II of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.