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| Science & Technology |
| How Gadhafi Lost His Groove |
| 2006-05-16 |
| WSJ EFL The author is Judith Miller. Why would she want to give Kappes kudos? Then, in early October 2003, the U.S., the U.K., Germany and Italy interdicted the "BBC China," a German ship destined for Libya that the Americans had been tracking for nearly a year. A U.S. intelligence official informed the Libyans that the five 40-foot containers marked "used machine parts" that were offloaded from the ship contained thousands of centrifuge parts to enrich uranium, manufactured in Malaysia by the A.Q. Khan network. Stunned by the discovery, Libya fast-tracked its long-promised invitation to the British and U.S. experts to tour suspect sites. A 15-person team, headed by Mr. Kappes, then the CIA deputy director of operations, (who declined to be interviewed for this piece) entered Libya on Oct. 19 on a 10-day mission. While Col. Gadhafi could have claimed, as Iran now does, that the enrichment equipment was for a peaceful energy program, the pretense was shattered in November when U.S. intelligence gave the Libyans a copy of a compact disc that intelligence agencies had intercepted. According to Saif and Libyan officials in Tripoli, the CD contained a recording of a long discussion on Feb. 28, 2002, about Libya's nuclear weapons program, between Ma'atouq Mohamed Ma'atouq, the head of that clandestine effort, and A.Q. Khan. Denial of military intent was no longer an option. The inspection team returned in December 2003, with even greater access. They were astonished by what they learned during their visits to weapons sites, labs and dual-use and military facilities. Although Libya claimed that it had no biological or germ-weapons-related facilities, and that its chemical capabilities were less than the CIA had feared, U.S. intelligence had underestimated Libya's nuclear progress. Many analysts no longer doubted that Libya could have made a bomb, eventually, if the program had not been stopped and it had found a way to supplement its limited technical expertise. Though most of the rotors for the centrifuges were initially missing (many turned up months later on a ship near South Africa) experts said that had the centrifuges been properly assembled in cascades--always dicey in a technologically challenged state--Libya could have produced enough fuel to make as many as 10 nuclear warheads a year. . He said that Libyan experts had advised Col. Gadhafi that the programs no longer served Libyan national interests. "We had discussed many options for securing our state," Mr. Ma'atouq recounted. "I'm an engineer, a practical man. And I said: Let's assume we have these weapons. What would we do with them? Who is the target? Who would we use them against? The U.S.? We had no delivery system. Yes, nuclear weapons are a deterrent, but it's better to have nothing at all than a deterrent without a means of delivery." Initially, Mr. Ma'atouq said, Libya had tried to seek Russian help in building a complete nuclear-fuel cycle. But although the Soviets in 1981 had sold Libya the reactor at Tajura, Mr. Ma'atouq complained that they kept raising the price of related material. No deal had been made by the time the Soviet Union collapsed, and by 1995, Libya was left with little choice but to try to develop the bomb indigenously. In 1998, he said, it turned to the Khan network to help "speed things up. We wanted to make the supplier a one-stop shop. We used no other suppliers." The Khan Network Relying on the Khan network meant he no longer had to worry about the origin of the equipment and material, or haggle with individual suppliers over the price and (often shoddy) quality of goods on the nuclear black market. He said he never knew (nor wanted to know) where Khan was getting most of what he bought for Libya, though international inspectors say it came mainly from Pakistan, Germany and Malaysia. He claimed that he never knew whether the casks filled with uranium hexafluoride for Libya's gas-enrichment program had originated in North Korea, as U.S. intelligence analysts now believe (based on isotope fingerprints of traces found on the containers). During its second trip in December, the team was taken to sites that U.S. intelligence had not previously spotted and was permitted to photograph and take notes on the astonishing blueprints that few weapons designers had ever seen outside declared nuclear states. The drawings were of a relatively old, crude, but workable design that Pakistan got from China in the early 1960s. The blueprint copies that Khan had provided, as a "sweetener," no less, with their Chinese scribbling still in the margins, had been kept in their original wrappings--a plastic bag from a Pakistani tailor's shop--another bonanza for Western intelligence. |
| Posted by:Nimble Spemble |
| #2 WSJ EFL The author is Judith Miller. Why would she want to give Kappes kudos? Judith Miller covert CIA? It is scary how easily one rogue scientist could potentially single-handedly destroy the world, even operating under the radar of our own government, let alone their's. Other articles about Khan suggested he may also have shared technology with or obtained some from Syria, South Africa, Brazil, and Saudi Arabia. It has been only recently that Chavez caught everyone's attention, and he has been previously rumored to have bought radioactive materials from Spain. I think CIA seriously underestimates what some of these Pakistani tribesmen can replicate, even making exact gun copies the old fashioned way. And the Asians....they can copy anything. I hope container and port security gets as much attention as the Mexican border, but if terrorists could place a missile delivery system south of the border, adding 6,000 Guard to the Mexican border may be too little, too late. |
| Posted by: Danielle 2006-05-16 12:20 |
| #1 The "G-man" had a groove? Who knew? (had to say it;) Seriously, while not a surprise to RBers, it's stunning what was going on (and likely still is). How can the EUroweenies not take Iran and it's loony-toon leadership seriously? I don't believe they are naive, I think they have so deluded themselves that they actually believe the rest of the world operates with their principles. |
| Posted by: Spot 2006-05-16 10:19 |